The difference between wahabi creed and Islaam III: what the scholars said about their belief

An important reply has been posted at this link regarding takfiir of anthropomorphists.

Ibn Taymiyyah approves of the claim that Aļļaah sits

Ibn Taymiyyah condones of the claim that Aļļaah sits saying:

It has been narrated through the acceptable scholars and Muslim saints (‘awliyaa’) that Muĥammad, the Messenger of Aļļaah (صلى الله عليه وسلم) will be seated by His Lord on His throne with Him. ¹

قال ابن تيمية في مجموع الفتاوى – (4 / 374) فَقَدْ حَدَثَ الْعُلَمَاءُ الْمَرْضِيُّونَ وَأَوْلِيَاؤُهُ الْمَقْبُولُونَ : أَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يُجْلِسُهُ رَبُّهُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ مَعَهُ .

This is further to the quotes we have shown earlier regarding Ibn Taymiyyah’s extremely blasphemous anthropomorphism, which includes affirming 6 physical boundaries, divisibility in the mind’s eye due to size, ability to shrink, possibility of being hit by a bucket, having the world physically inside of Him, and more. See the table of contents for details.

All of this, of course, he claims is affirmed by the Qur’aan and the Sunnah and the Salaf and Muslim saints! Such statements of his are buried in ridiculously long books saying very much about very little, and that is why some scholars did not discover him, and praised him based on other things. Those who did discover him, however, such as Taqiyyu-d-Diin Al-Ĥuşniyy, the famous Shaafiˆiyy jurist and author of the widely studied fiqh manual “Kifaayatu-l-‘Akħyaar” called him “an absolute kaafir (zindiiq – which originally means fire worshiper, but later used to mean a particularly mean kaafir),” and alluded to how he considered having his remains extracted from his grave and burned in public as an admonition to the public.

1Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy, Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 4 / 374.

Wahabi contention: Al-Baaqillaaniyy believed Aļļaah’s aboveness to be in the sense of location

The wahabis are claiming that Al-Baaqillaaniyy is an “early ‘Ashˆariyy” and quote him to show, as they claim, that the so called “early ‘Ashˆariyys” believed Aļļaah to be in a location above the Arsh. They quote him, saying:

And if someone says: Where is He? It is said to him: Asking where (al-ayn) is asking about place (al-makaan) and He is not one that a place (makaan) is permitted to enclose (yahwee), and nor [one that] places can encompass. Except that we say: Indeed He is Above His Throne, [but] not with the meaning of a body [being as such] through contact and adjacency, Exalted is He above that with a Lofty Exaltation.

As you can see, Al-Baaqillaaniyy explicitly denies place, and even the validity of asking “where?” Yet the wahabis claim that this is somehow different from saying Aļļaah’s aboveness is not in the sense of direction or location. In other words, they claim that he means that Aļļaah is located above the throne, in a direction to be pointed at, yet not a body. We have shown previously that this is a nonsensical idea.

This is not what Al-Baaqillaaniyy means, and I suspect they know that, but they will go very far in defending their ideas, even forgery and lies. An example being when they claim that there is a difference between “bringing into existence in Himself” and “creating in Himself” to defend their idea that Aļļaah brings about changes in Himself, a plain kufr belief. The father of their kufr and verbose word games, Ibn Taymiyyah, was much more explicit than they are, openly stating that Aļļaah has a size and six limits, i.e. a body, even if he does not usually call it that.

Here is an explicit statement showing that Al-Baaqillaaniyy did not mean that Aļļaah is in a direction:

And Aļļaah, (تعالى) is neither ascribed with directions, nor that He is in a direction. ¹

قال الباقلاني في كتابه الإنصاف : والله تعالى لا يوصف بالجهات، ولا أنه في جهة. ²

He also said:

If someone said, “How is He?” then it is said to him, “If you mean by howness composition, form or kind, then (the answer is that) He has no form or kind to tell you about. If you meant by “how is He?” to ask, ”What is His attribute?” then the answer is that He is attributed with Life, Knowledge, Power, Hearing and Seeing. If you meant by “How is He?” to say, “How does He deal with His creation?” then the answer is: “By justice and grace.” ³

قال الباقلاني (ت 403 هـ) في [التمهيد : "فإن قال قائل وكيف هو قيل له إن أردت بالكيفية التركيب والصورة والجنسية فلا صورة له ولا جنس فنخبرك عنه. وإن أردت بقولك كيف هو أي على أي صفة هو فهو حي عالم قادر سميع بصير. وإن أردت بقولك كيف هو أي كيف صنعه إلى خلقه فصنعه إليهم العدل والإحسان" اهـ

So for those who need to be spoon-fed, I hope that would be enough. All Al-Baaqillaaniyy is doing is saying that Aļļaah is ascribed with aboveness, but not in the sense of direction, just as many of the Salaf did, like Aţ-Ţabariyy. They did not explain it further, and simply left it at that. This is what we call tafwiiđ. Then there are those that explain it further, such as Al-Qurţubiyy in this quote.

Note that the wahabis have also claimed explicitly or implied that Abuu Ĥaniifah, Al-Qurţubiyy, An-Nawawiyy and Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy believed Aļļaah to be in a direction. We have shown previously shown this to be false. If you are interested, click on their names to see.

1Abuu Bakr Al-Baaqillaaniyy (338 h. – 403 h.), Al-Inşaaf, 177.

2الباقلاني, الإنصاف, 177.

3Abuu Bakr Al-Baaqillaaniyy (338 h. – 403 h.), Tamiid, 300.

It is impossible for anthropomorphists to prove the existence of a Creator that is not brought into existence.

When we look around us, we see two things: borders (physical limit/ spacial limit/ shape) and color. There is nothing else that is seen by our eyes. We do not need to consider color, because color is secondary to borders in that they fall within borders.

What we are left with then, for proving the need of creation for a Creator, is borders. We must prove that all borders, not matter the shape, must have a Creator, in order to show that the Creator exists[1]. Why all? Because border only differ in their size and shape; there is no difference between them based on which one could claim that one of them needs a creator, while another does not. There is no such difference between them.

Accordingly, if someone says that Aļļaah has a border, then he is forced to either say that Aļļaah, like everything else with a border, needs a creator, or that He cannot prove that borders needs a creator. If he can’t prove that borders need a creator, then he can’t prove that what we see with our eyes around us needs a creator.

All anthropomorphists believe that Aļļaah is something that can be pointed at in a direction. This means they believe that He has a border in that direction. They also believe that Aļļaah is not created. Accordingly, they are forced to say that borders do not need a creator. This again means that they cannot prove the createdness of anything that is seen.

They want us to believe that this is the path of truth and reason, and the way of the Qur’aan, the Prophets and the pious Salaf. This is nothing less than an insult to the religion and the Creator, and a denial of Islam being in agreement with sound reason. It reduces it to the guesswork that all other religions are. It is an endorsement of the idea that science and reason cannot agree with religion. What an enormous price to pay just to hold onto the idea that Aļļaah’s aboveness is one of relative spacial positioning, instead of just saying that His aboveness is in power and status, not in location.

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[1] All borders need a creator, because their shape is intrinsically possible. After all, a physical limit is conceptually just a connection of dots forming a line or surface. Each dot is connected to the next at one of its sides. The choice of placement of a connected dot to another is for any available space at any angle and from any angle. That’s it. The placement of connected dots form limits, and since the way the dots are placed next to each other needs specification in terms of ‘where’, it must be true that all limits need to be specified.

More simply put: anything that has a physical limit (or size), has a shape, because the limit has to have some shape. Anything that has a certain shape could have had any other shape, because any shape isn’t intrinsically of higher priority than any other shape, so having a certain shape means that there must be someone who specified it and chose it among all other possibilities.

This means that any physical limit needs a creator and cannot be eternal, because its existence depends on prior specification, and all such limits are equal in this dependence. So if someone claims that one such limit does not require a creator, or to be specified, then He can no longer logically prove that another limit does need a creator. This means that he can no longer logically prove that shapes need someone to give them a form. To be able to do that, rather, he must hold on to the premise that all limits need a creator. He must hold that since Aļļaah is not specified or created, and is definitely eternal, it must be true that Aļļaah exists without physical limits.

An-Nawawiyy did not believe that Aļļaah is something that is in a location/direction

An-Nawawiyy said in his commentary on Muslim’s ĥadiitħ collection:

المنهاج شرح صحيح مسلم بن الحجاج , النووي , دار إحياء التراث العربي , 1392 – (3 / 19): اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ لِأَهْلِ الْعِلْم فِي أَحَادِيث الصِّفَات وَآيَات الصِّفَات قَوْلَيْنِ : أَحَدهمَا : وَهُوَ مَذْهَب مُعْظَم السَّلَف أَوْ كُلّهمْ أَنَّهُ لا يُتَكَلَّم فِي مَعْنَاهَا ، بَلْ يَقُولُونَ : يَجِب عَلَيْنَا أَنْ نُؤْمِن بِهَا وَنَعْتَقِد لَهَا مَعْنًى يَلِيق بِجَلَالِ اللَّه تَعَالَى وَعَظَمَته مَعَ اِعْتِقَادنَا الْجَازِم أَنَّ اللَّه تَعَالَى لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْء وَأَنَّهُ مُنَزَّه عَنْ التَّجَسُّم وَالِانْتِقَال وَالتَّحَيُّز فِي جِهَة وَعَنْ سَائِر صِفَات الْمَخْلُوق ، وَهَذَا الْقَوْل هُوَ مَذْهَب جَمَاعَة مِنْ الْمُتَكَلِّمِينَ ، وَاخْتَارَهُ جَمَاعَة مِنْ مُحَقِّقِيهِمْ وَهُوَ أَسْلَم . وَالْقَوْل الثَّانِي : وَهُوَ مَذْهَب مُعْظَم الْمُتَكَلِّمِينَ أَنَّهَا تُتَأَوَّل عَلَى مَا يَلِيق بِهَا عَلَى حَسَب مَوَاقِعهَا ، وَإِنَّمَا يَسُوغ تَأْوِيلهَا لِمَنْ كَانَ مِنْ أَهْله بِأَنْ يَكُونَ عَارِفًا بِلِسَانِ الْعَرَب وَقَوَاعِد الْأُصُول وَالْفُرُوع ، ذَا رِيَاضَة فِي الْعِلْم

Know that the scholars, with regard to the ĥadiiths and aayahs that mention attributes, have two sayings:

One of them, and it is the saying of most of the Salaf, or all of them, is that one does not speak about their meaning. Instead they say, “we must believe in them and be sure that they have a meaning that befits the greatness and glory of Aļļaah, with the firm belief that Aļļaah does not resemble anything, and that He is clear of having a size, movement, a location in a direction, and all other attributes of creation. This saying is the saying of a number of the Kalaam scholars, and it is the chosen saying of a number of scholarly authenticators and verifiers, and it is the safest path.

The second saying, and it is the choice of most kalaam scholars, is that they are interpreted according what befits the context. This interpretation, however, is only acceptable from someone that is qualified by being an expert in the Arabic language (i.e. as used and understood by the companions) as well as the rules and principles of the religion, both in fundamentals and details, and this (work of interpretation) is a kind of exercise of (one’s) knowledge (i.e. for those qualified). [1]

المنهاج شرح صحيح مسلم بن الحجاج , النووي , دار إحياء التراث العربي , 1392 – (6 / 36-37): قَوْله صَلَّى اللَّه عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ : ( يَنْزِل رَبّنَا كُلّ لَيْلَة إِلَى السَّمَاء الدُّنْيَا فَيَقُول : مَنْ يَدْعُونِي فَأَسْتَجِيب لَهُ ) هَذَا الْحَدِيث مِنْ أَحَادِيث الصِّفَات ، وَفِيهِ مَذْهَبَانِ مَشْهُورَانِ لِلْعُلَمَاءِ سَبَقَ إِيضَاحهمَا فِي كِتَاب الْإِيمَان وَمُخْتَصَرهمَا أَنَّ أَحَدهمَا وَهُوَ مَذْهَب جُمْهُور السَّلَف وَبَعْض الْمُتَكَلِّمِينَ : أَنَّهُ يُؤْمِن بِأَنَّهَا حَقّ عَلَى مَا يَلِيق بِاَللَّهِ تَعَالَى ، وَأَنَّ ظَاهِرهَا الْمُتَعَارَف فِي حَقّنَا غَيْر مُرَاد ، وَلَا يَتَكَلَّم فِي تَأْوِيلهَا مَعَ اِعْتِقَاد تَنْزِيه اللَّه تَعَالَى عَنْ صِفَات الْمَخْلُوق ، وَعَنْ الِانْتِقَال وَالْحَرَكَات وَسَائِر سِمَات الْخَلْق . وَالثَّانِي : مَذْهَب أَكْثَر الْمُتَكَلِّمِينَ وَجَمَاعَات مِنْ السَّلَف وَهُوَ مَحْكِيّ هُنَا عَنْ مَالِك وَالْأَوْزَاعِيِّ : أَنَّهَا تُتَأَوَّل عَلَى مَا يَلِيق بِهَا بِحَسْب مَوَاطِنهَا . فَعَلَى هَذَا تَأَوَّلُوا هَذَا الْحَدِيث تَأْوِيلَيْنِ أَحَدهمَا : تَأْوِيل مَالِك بْن أَنَس وَغَيْره مَعْنَاهُ : تَنْزِل رَحْمَته وَأَمْره وَمَلَائِكَته كَمَا يُقَال : فَعَلَ السُّلْطَان كَذَا إِذَا فَعَلَهُ أَتْبَاعه بِأَمْرِهِ . وَالثَّانِي : أَنَّهُ عَلَى الِاسْتِعَارَة ، وَمَعْنَاهُ : الْإِقْبَال عَلَى الدَّاعِينَ بِالْإِجَابَةِ وَاللُّطْف . وَاللَّهُ أَعْلَم .

The saying of the Prophet (صَلَّى اللَّه عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) (literal unmeant translation):”Our Lord descends every night to the sky of the world, then says ‘who calls me, so that I will answer him?” This ĥadiitħ are one of the ĥadiitħs mentioning attributes. There are two famous ways of the scholars regarding them, that have been explained previously in the chapter on belief. Their brief description is that one is the approach of most of the Salaf, and some Kalaam scholars, which is to believe it is true in a sense that befits Aļļaah, and that its apparent, usual meaning for us, is not meant, and one does not speak about its meaning. This is accompanied with the belief that Aļļaah is clear of having attributes of created things, and of movement, movements, and all descriptions that are for created things. The other approach is that of most Kalaam scholars, and groups among the Salaf, and they are narrated here from Maalik and Al-‘Awzaaˆiyy, is to interpret these according to what befits the context. Accordingly, they interpreted this ĥadiitħ in two ways. One of them is that of Maalik and others, which is to say that it means: Aļļaah’s mercy, orders and angels descend, just as it is said, “the king did so and so”, when it was actually his followers that did it. The other interpretation is metaphorical, and its meaning is: “accepting those who call by answering them and showing them mercy.”[2]

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[1]Al-Nawawiy, Sharĥ Saĥiiĥ Muslim Li-l-Nawawiy (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Ihyaa’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 1392), 3/19.

[2]Ibid., 6/36-37.

Ibn Taymiyyah denies Tajsiim?

Ibn Taymiyyah says:

الأحد والصمد لم يذكرهما الله إلا في هذه السورة وهما ينفيان عن الله ما هو متنزه عنه من التشبيه والتمثيل ومن التركيب والانقسام والتجسيم فإن اسمه الأحد ينفي المثل والنظير (بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – 4 / 61)

Al-Aĥad and Aş-Şamad (are two names that) Aļļaah did not mention except in this Suurah, and they negate from Aļļaah what does not befit Him in terms of likeness and resemblance and composition and separation and being a body (tajsiim), for verily His name Al-Aĥad negates a like or something similar. (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 4 / 61)

Wait a minute, did not Ibn Taymiyyah say that Aļļaah has borders in all six direction and that He has a size, and a bucket might bump into Him? So how come he is saying now that He is not a body!? Well, he is beating around the bush as usual. He says in another place:

وَالْمَقْصُودُ هُنَا : أَنَّ مَا جَاءَ بِهِ الرَّسُولُ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا يُدْفَعُ بِالْأَلْفَاظِ الْمُجْمَلَةِ كَلَفْظِ التَّجْسِيمِ وَغَيْرِهِ مِمَّا قَدْ يَتَضَمَّنُ مَعْنًى بَاطِلًا وَالنَّافِي لَهُ يَنْفِي الْحَقَّ وَالْبَاطِلَ . (مجموع الفتاوى , 5 / 433)

And the purpose is to say that whatever the Messenger (صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) brought is not denied by vague utterances such as jism (body) and others that may have meanings that are invalid, while the one how denies them, denies both what is true and what is false. (Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 5/433)

The meaning of jism that Ibn Tayimiyyah denies then, is that of actual composition and actual separation of parts. What he does not deny is size, shape and taking on different shapes. We already showed the latter in our article on his bucket theology, which also shows his belief that Aļļaah is something very, very big in size. Here is another explanation of his about this idea, in which he says:

قَالَ ابْنُ أَبِي حَاتِمٍ فِي " تَفْسِيرِهِ " : حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو زُرْعَةَ ثَنَا مِنْجَابُ بْنُ الْحَارِثِ ثَنَا بِشْرُ بْنُ عِمَارَةَ عَنْ أَبِي رَوْقٍ عَنْ عَطِيَّةَ العوفي عَنْ أَبِي سَعِيدٍ الخدري رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ { عَنْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي قَوْلِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى : { لَا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ الْأَبْصَارَ } قَالَ : لَوْ أَنَّ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنْسَ وَالشَّيَاطِينَ وَالْمَلَائِكَةَ ؛ مُنْذُ خُلِقُوا إلَى أَنْ فَنُوا صُفُّوا صَفًّا وَاحِدًا مَا أَحَاطُوا بِاَللَّهِ أَبَدًا } – فَمَنْ هَذِهِ عَظَمَتُهُ كَيْفَ يَحْصُرُهُ مَخْلُوقٌ مِنْ الْمَخْلُوقَاتِ سَمَاءٌ أَوْ غَيْرُ سَمَاءٍ ؟ حَتَّى يُقَالَ : إنَّهُ إذَا نَزَلَ إلَى السَّمَاءِ الدُّنْيَا صَارَ الْعَرْشُ فَوْقَهُ أَوْ يَصِيرُ شَيْءٌ مِنْ الْمَخْلُوقَاتِ يَحْصُرُهُ وَيُحِيطُ بِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى . فَإِذَا قَالَ الْقَائِلُ : هُوَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى مَا يَشَاءُ ؛ قِيلَ : فَقُلْ : هُوَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى أَنْ يَنْزِلَ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى وَهُوَ فَوْقَ عَرْشِهِ وَإِذَا اسْتَدْلَلْت بِمُطْلَقِ الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ مِنْ غَيْرِ تَمْيِيزٍ فَمَا كَانَ أَبْلَغُ فِي الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ ؛ فَهُوَ أَوْلَى بِأَنْ يُوصَفَ بِهِ مِمَّا لَيْسَ كَذَلِكَ ؛ فَإِنَّ مَنْ تَوَهَّمَ الْعَظِيمَ الَّذِي لَا أَعْظَمَ مِنْهُ يَقْدِرُ عَلَى أَنْ يَصْغُرَ حَتَّى يُحِيطَ بِهِ مَخْلُوقُهُ الصَّغِيرُ وَجَعَلَ هَذَا مِنْ بَابِ الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ ؛ فَقَوْلُهُ : إنَّهُ يَنْزِلُ مَعَ بَقَاءِ عَظَمَتِهِ وَعُلُوِّهِ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ ؛ أَبْلَغُ فِي الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي فِيهِ مُوَافَقَةُ الشَّرْعِ وَالْعَقْلِ . وَهَذَا كَمَا قَدْ يَقُولُهُ طَائِفَةٌ " مِنْهُمْ أَبُو طَالِبٍ الْمَكِّيُّ " قَالَ : إنْ شَاءَ وَسِعَهُ أَدْنَى شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ شَاءَ لَمْ يَسَعْهُ شَيْءٌ وَإِنْ أَرَادَ عَرَفَهُ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُرِدْ لَمْ يَعْرِفْهُ شَيْءٌ ؛ إنْ أَحَبَّ وُجِدَ عِنْدَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُحِبَّ لَمْ يُوجَدْ عِنْدَ شَيْءٍ وَقَدْ جَاوَزَ الْحَدَّ وَالْمِعْيَارَ وَسَبَقَ الْقِيلَ وَالْأَقْدَارَ ذُو صِفَاتٍ لَا تُحْصَى ؛ وَقَدْرٍ لَا يَتَنَاهَى ؛ لَيْسَ مَحْبُوسًا فِي صُورَةٍ وَلَا مَوْقُوفًا بِصِفَةِ وَلَا مَحْكُومًا عَلَيْهِ بِكَلِمِ وَلَا يَتَجَلَّى بِوَصْفِ مَرَّتَيْنِ وَلَا يَظْهَرُ فِي صُورَةٍ لِاثْنَيْنِ ؛ وَلَا يَرِدُ مِنْهُ بِمَعْنَى وَاحِدٍ كَلِمَتَانِ ؛ بَلْ لِكُلِّ تَجَلٍّ مِنْهُ صُورَةٌ وَلِكُلِّ عَبْدٍ عِنْدَ ظُهُورِهِ صِفَةٌ وَعَنْ كُلِّ نَظْرَةٍ كَلَامٌ ؛ وَبِكُلِّ كَلِمَةٍ إفْهَامٌ وَلَا نِهَايَةَ لِتَجَلِّيهِ ؛ وَلَا غَايَةَ لِأَوْصَافِهِ . قُلْت : أَبُو طَالِبٍ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ هُوَ وَأَصْحَابُهُ " السالمية " أَتْبَاعُ الشَّيْخِ أَبِي الْحَسَنِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ صَاحِبِ سَهْلِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ التستري – لَهُمْ مِنْ الْمَعْرِفَةِ وَالْعِبَادَةِ وَالزُّهْدِ وَاتِّبَاعِ السُّنَّةِ وَالْجَمَاعَةِ فِي عَامَّةِ الْمَسَائِلِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ لِأَهْلِ السُّنَّةِ مَا هُمْ مَعْرُوفُونَ بِهِ وَهُمْ مُنْتَسِبُونَ إلَى إمَامَيْنِ عَظِيمَيْنِ فِي السُّنَّةِ : الْإِمَامِ أَحْمَد بْنِ حَنْبَلٍ وَسَهْلِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ التستري وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ تَفَقَّهَ عَلَى مَذْهَبِ مَالِكِ بْنِ أَنَس كَبَيْتِ الشَّيْخِ أَبِي مُحَمَّدٍ وَغَيْرِهِمْ وَفِيهِمْ مَنْ هُوَ عَلَى مَذْهَبِ الشَّافِعِيِّ . (مجموع الفتاوى , 5 / 483-482)

Ibn Abii Ĥaatim said in his tafsiir: “….. (the Prophet) said: ‘if the Jinn-, human-, devil- and angel- kind since they were created until they ended made a single row, they would not surround Aļļaah at all.’¹”

So the one who is that great, how could He be surrounded by something created, whether the Sky or something else so that it might be said that if He descended to the Sky of the World, the ˆArsħ became above Him and some of His creation surrounded Him?

Now, if someone said, “He does whatever he wills….” then it might be said, “say: ‘He is able to descend (سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى) while He is above His ˆArsħ.’” Moreover, if you seek evidence in His Power absolutely and His Greatness without distinguishing, then what is more indicative of power is what He is more deserving of being attributed with than otherwise. For verily, the one that imagines the very Great One who nothing is greater than Him (and) is able to make make Himself so small that He is surrounded by His small creation, and said ‘this is indicative of power and greatness….,’ His (the one imaging this Great One’s) saying ‘verily he descend while his greatness and aboveness over the ˆArsħ remain,’ is more indicative of power and greatness, and this is what agrees with Islamic Law and reason. This is what a group of people might say, such as Abuu Ţaalib Al-Makkiyy, he said, “If He wills He will be contained in the smallest of things, and if He wills, nothing can contain Him….”… I say: “Abuu Ţaalib, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, he and his companions are the Saalimiyyah,… They have knowledge, worship asceticism and following of the Sunnah and the Jamaaˆah in the general matters that are famous among Sunnis…..

So all of this is not believing that Aļļaah is a body?

Ibn Taymiyyah likes to say that his opponents were influenced by Greek Philosophy. From the above, however, it is pretty clear that Ibn Taymiyyah himself was heavily influenced by Greek Mythology. Watching movies like “The Clash of the Titans” gives you a pretty good idea about what Ibn Taymiyyah believed.

1This is weak ĥadiitħ, but in any case, the fact that nothing can surround Aļļaah does not mean that He is big in size. The ĥadiitħ does not state in what sense they are not able to surround. Ibn Taymiyyah, however, quickly concluded that it is terms of size, because this is according to the principles of anthropomorphism.

As-Sanuusiyy does not agree with Ibn Taymiyyah regarding composition and need.

Introduction

The wahabis in their desperation are trying to make people think that As-Sanuusiyy agrees with Ibn Taymiyyah regarding Ar-Raaziyy’s argument of the need for composition for something with size. The need for composition Ar-Raaziyy speaks of, and denies could be true of Aļļaah, is an argument As-Sanuusiyy accepts, and validates. That is, his quoted refutation of the argument for implied composition is not absolute, but for its use in a different context than this, and without admitting that there is any implied need for composition at all.

As-Sanuusiyy denies that affirming that Aļļaah has attributes such as knowledge implies composition.

The context in which As-Sanuusiyy criticizes Ar-Raaziyy, is for the latter’s weakness in facing up to the argument of the philosophers for denying that Aļļaah has attributes. They argued that since the attributes are many, they would need to be composed. As-Sanuusiyy refutes this absolutely and says that the argument for need is false, because there is no composition implied. Why is that? Because the attributes are necessary, perfect, eternal and unchanging. This is the essence of what As-Sanuusiyy says.

As-Sanuusiyy affirms that things with size do need composition, and validates this argument.

Ar-Raaziyy is not talking about Aļļaah having attributes in the argument against anthropomorphists which Ibn Taymiyyah responds to. In essence Ar-Raaziyy says that declaring Aļļaah to be something that can be pointed at means that He would then have a border, and therefore be in need of composition, like all things with size. This is true, because all shapes are possible and in need of specification.

This is not an argument that As-Sanuusiyy is against. His books are full of this type of argument, such as in “A Commentary on the Creed of Al Sanusi“. The need for bodies to be specified in shape and composition is a theme throughout, on which he bases the proof for the createdness of all things with a size. Accordingly, As-Sanuusiyy’s refutation of the argument of the need for composition of parts does not apply for the issue of physical aboveness, and is not intended by him. This is because shapes are possible, and not intrinsically necessary in themselves, so they do indeed need to be specified and composed.

Why Ibn Taymiyyah affirms implied composition and need.

Since Aļļaah has a size in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and its shape is possible, there is an implied need for composition. He says in affirmation of size:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible.¹ (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).

In affirming composition etc., he says:

We have already clarified what possibilities (in terms of what they mean) are associated with the words composition, settling in place, being other (having different sides or parts), and need, and that the meaning meant by this is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry.². (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

The proof that Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that his deity’s shape is possible,and not necessary, is in his Bucket Theology, where He says: “and it is known that Aļļaah is able to surround³….” i.e. able to take on a shape to do so, which means that it is not a necessary shape, but a possible one, and therefore in need of specification. (Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 6/574)

1قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).

2قال ابن تيمية: قولك إن كان منقسما كان مركبا وتقدم إبطاله تقدم الجواب عن هذا الذي سميته مركبا وتبين أنه لا حجة أصلا على امتناع ذلك بل بين أن إحالة ذلك تقتضي إبطال كل موجود ولولا أنه أحال على ما تقدم لما أحلنا عليه وتقدم بيان ما في لفظ التركيب والتحيز والغير والافتقار من الاحتمال وإن المعنى الذي يقصد منه بذلك يجب أن يتصف به كل موجود سواء كان واجبا أو ممكنا وإن القول بامتناع ذلك يستلزم السفسطة المحضة (بيان تلبيس الجهمية ج 1 ص 33).

3قال ابن تيمية: وَالْإِحَاطَةُ قَدْ عُلِمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَيْهَا وَعُلِمَ أَنَّهَا تَكُونُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّة وَلَيْسَ فِي إثْبَاتِهَا فِي الْجُمْلَةِ مَا يُخَالِفُ الْعَقْلَ وَلَا الشَّرْعَ ؛ لَكِنْ لَا نَتَكَلَّمُ إلَّا بِمَا نَعْلَمُ وَمَا لَا نَعْلَمُهُ أَمْسَكْنَا عَنْهُ وَمَا كَانَ مُقَدِّمَةُ دَلِيلِهِ مَشْكُوكًا فِيهَا عِنْدَ بَعْضِ النَّاسِ كَانَ حَقُّهُ أَنْ يَشُكَّ فِيهِ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْحَقُّ وَإِلَّا فَلْيَسْكُتْ عَمَّا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ . (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 574)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Bucket theology

Background

We have shown earlier irrefutable proofs that Ibn Taymiyyah was an extreme anthropomorphist. This was done in the following articles:

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not.)

Ibn Taymiyyah says Allaah needs, is divisible, and settles in a place

Ibn Taymiyyah says Allaah is divisible into quantities and areas

In the following excerpt from one of Ibn Taymiyyah’s books, this anthropomorphistطs belief is clarified further in his understanding of a ĥadiitħ narrated by At-Tirmidħiyy. This ĥadiitħ if literally translated states: “If one of you lowered a bucket by a rope, then it would fall on Aļļaah.” Muslim scholars did not take this ĥadiitħ literally, because Aļļaah is not a body for something to bump into. They said it means that it would fall by Aļļaah’s knowledge. This is after hypothesizing its authenticity. In the below Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding, based on hypothesized authenticity, is clarified. It is a literal and anthropomorphic understanding.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding of the ĥadiith of lowering a bucket

Ibn Taymiyyah says in Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa¹:

فَإِنَّ قَوْلَهُ : { لَوْ أُدْلِيَ أَحَدُكُمْ بِحَبْلِ لَهَبَطَ عَلَى اللَّهِ } إنَّمَا هُوَ تَقْدِيرٌ مَفْرُوضٌ ؛ أَيْ لَوْ وَقَعَ الْإِدْلَاءُ لَوَقَعَ عَلَيْهِ لَكِنَّهُ لَا يُمْكِنُ أَنْ يُدْلِيَ أَحَدٌ عَلَى اللَّهِ شَيْئًا ؛ لِأَنَّهُ عَالٍ بِالذَّاتِ وَإِذَا أُهْبِطَ شَيْءٌ إلَى جِهَةِ الْأَرْضِ وَقَفَ فِي الْمَرْكَزِ وَلَمْ يَصْعَدْ إلَى الْجِهَةِ الْأُخْرَى لَكِنْ بِتَقْدِيرِ فَرْضِ الْإِدْلَاءِ يَكُونُ مَا ذَكَرَ مِنْ الْجَزَاءِ .(مجموع الفتاوى – (6 / 571)

Verily his (the Prophet’s) statement: “If one of you lowered a bucket by a rope, then it would fall on Aļļaah.” This is a hypothetical consideration, that is, if the lowering happened, then it would fall on Him. It is not possible for anyone to lower anything on Aļļaah, however, because His self is high, and if anything was lowered in the direction of the Earth, then it would stop at the center, and would not go up in the opposite direction (from there). However, if there was a hypothesized lowering, then what he said would happen. (6/571)

He explains more about his problem with the concept of “lowering”, which is that it would in reality be rising, saying:

فَكَذَلِكَ مَا يَهْبِطُ مِنْ أَعْلَى الْأَرْضِ إلَى أَسْفَلِهَا – وَهُوَ الْمَرْكَزُ – لَا يَصْعَدُ مِنْ هُنَاكَ إلَى ذَلِكَ الْوَجْهِ إلَّا بِرَافِعِ يَرْفَعُهُ يُدَافِعُ بِهِ مَا فِي قُوَّتِهِ مِنْ الْهُبُوطِ إلَى الْمَرْكَزِ فَإِنْ قُدِّرَ أَنَّ الدَّافِعَ أَقْوَى كَانَ صَاعِدًا بِهِ إلَى الْفَلَكِ مِنْ تِلْكَ النَّاحِيَةِ وَصَعِدَ بِهِ إلَى اللَّهِ وَإِنَّمَا يُسَمَّى هُبُوطًا بِاعْتِبَارِ مَا فِي أَذْهَانِ الْمُخَاطَبِينَ أَنَّ مَا يُحَاذِي أَرْجُلَهُمْ يَكُونُ هَابِطًا وَيُسَمَّى هُبُوطًا…. وَهُوَ إنَّمَا يَكُونُ إدْلَاءً حَقِيقِيًّا إلَى الْمَرْكَزِ وَمِنْ هُنَاكَ إنَّمَا يَكُونُ مَدًّا لِلْحَبْلِ وَالدَّلْوِ لَا إدْلَاءَ لَهُ…. وَلَكِنَّ فَائِدَتَهُ بَيَانُ الْإِحَاطَةِ وَالْعُلُوِّ …. وَالْمَقْصُودُ بِهِ بَيَانُ إحَاطَةِ الْخَالِقِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى كَمَا بَيَّنَ أَنَّهُ يَقْبِضُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَيَطْوِي الْأَرْضَ وَنَحْوَ ذَلِكَ مِمَّا فِيهِ بَيَانُ إحَاطَتِهِ بِالْمَخْلُوقَاتِ. (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 572-573)

Likewise, what descends from a high point on Earth to its lowest point, which is it’s center, does not rise from there in that direction, except by someone lifting it, resisting its downwards pull down towards the center (i.e. the gravity pull.) If it was hypothesized that the lifter was stronger (than the gravity pull), then it would be rising towards the celestial sphere from there, and would rise to Aļļaah. It was only called lowering from the viewpoint of what is in the minds of the listeners in that what faces their feet is called falling…. even if it was actually lowering only to the point of the (Earth’s) center, and from there one would only be giving rope to the bucket, and there would be no actual lowering….. However, the beneficial point is to clarify the surrounding and highness from all directions (of the Earth)…. The purpose (of the ĥadiith) is to clarify the meaning of the Creator’s surrounding (سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى) just as He said that He grabs the Skies and folds the Earth and the like, which all explains His surrounding of created things. (6/572-573)

In other words, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, this surrounding is the physical surrounding of something with physical boundaries, size and shape.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s view on the ĥadiith from a viewpoint of belief

In the final analysis of this ĥadiith Ibn Taymiyyah says:

وَكَذَلِكَ تَأْوِيلُهُ بِالْعِلْمِ تَأْوِيلٌ ظَاهِرُ الْفَسَادِ مَنْ جِنْسِ تَأْوِيلَاتِ الْجَهْمِيَّة ؛ بَلْ بِتَقْدِيرِ ثُبُوتِهِ يَكُونُ دَالًّا عَلَى الْإِحَاطَةِ . وَالْإِحَاطَةُ قَدْ عُلِمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَيْهَا وَعُلِمَ أَنَّهَا تَكُونُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّة وَلَيْسَ فِي إثْبَاتِهَا فِي الْجُمْلَةِ مَا يُخَالِفُ الْعَقْلَ وَلَا الشَّرْعَ .

Likewise, interpreting this ĥadiitħ in term of knowledge (I.e falling by Aļļaah’s knowledge it clearly false, and of the Jahmiyy kind of interpretation. Rather, based on the assumption that the ĥadiitħ is authentic, then it explains (Aļļaah’s) surrounding, and it is known that Aļļaah is able to surround and that it is going to be on the Day of Judgment as stated in the Qur’aan and the Sunnah. There is nothing, in general, in affirming this ĥadiith, that is in conflict with reason or Islamic Law. (6/574)

Conclusion

The above, along with the other articles referred to, shows that Ibn Taymiyyah did not just have anthropomorphist tendencies. He was as extreme as they come. He believed that Aļļaah is a body with a shape that surrounds things. He saw no problem in claiming that the world could be inside the Creator and one could hypothetically bump into His claimed border.

Let us again remind ourselves of what the Sunni creed is regarding these beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy stated {in brackets}: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and following {the Jamaaˆah}. Later he stated, as part of this remembrance:{Aļļaah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.} {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}. He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said in the same remembrance: {Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.} Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans. In other words, the Sunni belief is that attributing a limit to Aļļaah makes one a non-Muslim.

1قال ابن تيمية: فَإِنَّ قَوْلَهُ : { لَوْ أُدْلِيَ أَحَدُكُمْ بِحَبْلِ لَهَبَطَ عَلَى اللَّهِ } إنَّمَا هُوَ تَقْدِيرٌ مَفْرُوضٌ ؛ أَيْ لَوْ وَقَعَ الْإِدْلَاءُ لَوَقَعَ عَلَيْهِ لَكِنَّهُ لَا يُمْكِنُ أَنْ يُدْلِيَ أَحَدٌ عَلَى اللَّهِ شَيْئًا ؛ لِأَنَّهُ عَالٍ بِالذَّاتِ وَإِذَا أُهْبِطَ شَيْءٌ إلَى جِهَةِ الْأَرْضِ وَقَفَ فِي الْمَرْكَزِ وَلَمْ يَصْعَدْ إلَى الْجِهَةِ الْأُخْرَى لَكِنْ بِتَقْدِيرِ فَرْضِ الْإِدْلَاءِ يَكُونُ مَا ذَكَرَ مِنْ الْجَزَاءِ . فَهَكَذَا مَا ذَكَرَهُ السَّائِلُ : إذَا قُدِّرَ أَنَّ الْعَبْدَ يَقْصِدُهُ مِنْ تِلْكَ الْجِهَةِ كَانَ هُوَ سُبْحَانَهُ يَسْمَعُ كَلَامَهُ وَكَانَ مُتَوَجِّهًا إلَيْهِ بِقَلْبِهِ لَكِنَّ هَذَا مِمَّا تَمْنَعُ مِنْهُ الْفِطْرَةُ ؛ لِأَنَّ قَصْدَ الشَّيْءِ الْقَصْدَ التَّامَّ يُنَافِي قَصْدَ ضِدِّهِ ؛ فَكَمَا أَنَّ الْجِهَةَ الْعُلْيَا بِالذَّاتِ تُنَافِي (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 571) الْجِهَةَ السُّفْلَى فَكَذَلِكَ قَصْدُ الْأَعْلَى بِالذَّاتِ يُنَافِي قَصْدَهُ مِنْ أَسْفَلَ وَكَمَا أَنَّ مَا يَهْبِطُ إلَى جَوْفِ الْأَرْضِ يَمْتَنِعُ صُعُودُهُ إلَى تِلْكَ النَّاحِيَةِ – لِأَنَّهَا عَالِيَةٌ – فَتَرُدُّ الْهَابِطَ بِعُلُوِّهَا كَمَا أَنَّ الْجِهَةَ الْعُلْيَا مِنْ عِنْدِنَا تَرُدُّ مَا يَصْعَدُ إلَيْهَا مِنْ الثَّقِيلِ فَلَا يَصْعَدُ الثَّقِيلُ إلَّا بِرَافِعِ يَرْفَعُهُ يُدَافِعُ بِهِ مَا فِي قُوَّتِهِ مِنْ الْهُبُوطِ فَكَذَلِكَ مَا يَهْبِطُ مِنْ أَعْلَى الْأَرْضِ إلَى أَسْفَلِهَا – وَهُوَ الْمَرْكَزُ – لَا يَصْعَدُ مِنْ هُنَاكَ إلَى ذَلِكَ الْوَجْهِ إلَّا بِرَافِعِ يَرْفَعُهُ يُدَافِعُ بِهِ مَا فِي قُوَّتِهِ مِنْ الْهُبُوطِ إلَى الْمَرْكَزِ فَإِنْ قُدِّرَ أَنَّ الدَّافِعَ أَقْوَى كَانَ صَاعِدًا بِهِ إلَى الْفَلَكِ مِنْ تِلْكَ النَّاحِيَةِ وَصَعِدَ بِهِ إلَى اللَّهِ وَإِنَّمَا يُسَمَّى هُبُوطًا بِاعْتِبَارِ مَا فِي أَذْهَانِ الْمُخَاطَبِينَ أَنَّ مَا يُحَاذِي أَرْجُلَهُمْ يَكُونُ هَابِطًا وَيُسَمَّى هُبُوطًا مَعَ تَسْمِيَةِ إهْبَاطِهِ إدْلَاءً وَهُوَ إنَّمَا يَكُونُ إدْلَاءً حَقِيقِيًّا إلَى الْمَرْكَزِ وَمِنْ هُنَاكَ إنَّمَا يَكُونُ مَدًّا لِلْحَبْلِ وَالدَّلْوِ لَا إدْلَاءَ لَهُ لَكِنَّ الْجَزَاءَ وَالشَّرْطَ مُقَدَّرَانِ لَا مُحَقَّقَانِ . فَإِنَّهُ قَالَ : لَوْ أَدْلَى لَهَبَطَ ؛ أَيْ لَوْ فُرِضَ أَنَّ هُنَاكَ إدْلَاءً لَفُرِضَ أَنَّ هُنَاكَ هُبُوطًا وَهُوَ يَكُونُ إدْلَاءً وَهُبُوطًا إذَا قُدِّرَ أَنَّ السَّمَوَاتِ تَحْتَ الْأَرْضِ وَهَذَا التَّقْدِيرُ مُنْتَفٍ ؛ وَلَكِنَّ فَائِدَتَهُ بَيَانُ الْإِحَاطَةِ وَالْعُلُوِّ مِنْ كُلِّ جَانِبٍ وَهَذَا الْمَفْرُوضُ مُمْتَنِعٌ فِي حَقِّنَا لَا نَقْدِرُ عَلَيْهِ فَلَا يُتَصَوَّرُ أَنْ يُدْلِيَ وَلَا يُتَصَوَّرُ أَنْ يَهْبِطَ عَلَى اللَّهِ شَيْءٌ لَكِنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى أَنْ يَخْرُقَ مِنْ هُنَا إلَى هُنَاكَ بِحَبْلِ وَلَكِنْ لَا يَكُونُ فِي حَقِّهِ إدْلَاءً فَلَا يَكُونُ فِي حَقِّهِ هُبُوطًا عَلَيْهِ . كَمَا لَوْ خَرَقَ بِحَبْلِ مِنْ الْقُطْبِ إلَى الْقُطْبِ أَوْ مِنْ مَشْرِقِ الشَّمْسِ إلَى مَغْرِبِهَا (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 572) وَقَدَّرْنَا أَنَّ الْحَبْلَ مَرَّ فِي وَسَطِ الْأَرْضِ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى ذَلِكَ كُلِّهِ وَلَا فَرْقَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إلَيْهِ عَلَى هَذَا التَّقْدِيرِ مِنْ أَنْ يَخْرُقَ مِنْ جَانِبِ الْيَمِينِ مِنَّا إلَى جَانِبِ الْيَسَارِ أَوْ مِنْ جِهَةِ أَمَامِنَا إلَى جِهَةِ خَلْفِنَا أَوْ مِنْ جِهَةِ رُءُوسِنَا إلَى جِهَةِ أَرْجُلِنَا إذَا مَرَّ الْحَبْلُ بِالْأَرْضِ فَعَلَى كُلِّ تَقْدِيرٍ قَدْ خَرَقَ بِالْحَبْلِ مِنْ جَانِبِ الْمُحِيطِ إلَى جَانِبِهِ الْآخَرِ مَعَ خَرْقِ الْمَرْكَزِ وَبِتَقْدِيرِ إحَاطَةِ قَبْضَتِهِ بِالسَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ فَالْحَبْلُ الَّذِي قُدِّرَ أَنَّهُ خَرَقَ بِهِ الْعَالَمَ وَصَلَ إلَيْهِ وَلَا يُسَمَّى شَيْءٌ مِنْ ذَلِكَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إلَيْهِ إدْلَاءً وَلَا هُبُوطًا . وَأَمَّا بِالنِّسْبَةِ إلَيْنَا فَإِنَّ مَا تَحْتَ أَرْجُلِنَا تَحْتٌ لَنَا وَمَا فَوْقَ رُءُوسِنَا فَوْقٌ لَنَا وَمَا نُدْلِيهِ مِنْ نَاحِيَةِ رُءُوسِنَا إلَى نَاحِيَةِ أَرْجُلِنَا نَتَخَيَّلُ أَنَّهُ هَابِطٌ فَإِذَا قُدِّرَ أَنَّ أَحَدَنَا أَدْلَى بِحَبْلِ كَانَ هَابِطًا عَلَى مَا هُنَاكَ لَكِنَّ هَذَا تَقْدِيرٌ مُمْتَنِعٌ فِي حَقِّنَا وَالْمَقْصُودُ بِهِ بَيَانُ إحَاطَةِ الْخَالِقِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى كَمَا بَيَّنَ أَنَّهُ يَقْبِضُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَيَطْوِي الْأَرْضَ وَنَحْوَ ذَلِكَ مِمَّا فِيهِ بَيَانُ إحَاطَتِهِ بِالْمَخْلُوقَاتِ . وَلِهَذَا قَرَأَ فِي تَمَامِ هَذَا الْحَدِيثِ { هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ } . وَهَذَا كُلُّهُ عَلَى تَقْدِيرِ صِحَّتِهِ فَإِنَّ التِّرْمِذِيَّ لَمَّا رَوَاهُ قَالَ : وَفَسَّرَهُ بَعْضُ أَهْلِ الْحَدِيثِ بِأَنَّهُ هَبَطَ عَلَى عِلْمِ اللَّهِ وَبَعْضُ الْحُلُولِيَّةِ والاتحادية يَظُنُّ أَنَّ فِي هَذَا الْحَدِيثِ مَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى قَوْلِهِمْ الْبَاطِلِ ؛ وَهُوَ أَنَّهُ حَالٌّ بِذَاتِهِ فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ وَأَنَّ وُجُودَهُ وُجُودُ الْأَمْكِنَةِ وَنَحْوُ ذَلِكَ . وَالتَّحْقِيقُ : أَنَّ الْحَدِيثَ لَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى شَيْءٍ مِنْ ذَلِكَ إنْ كَانَ ثَابِتًا فَإِنَّ قَوْلَهُ : (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 573) { لَوْ أَدْلَى بِحَبْلِ لَهَبَطَ } يَدُلُّ عَلَى أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ فِي الْمُدْلِي وَلَا فِي الْحَبْلِ وَلَا فِي الدَّلْوِ وَلَا فِي غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ وَأَنَّهَا تَقْتَضِي أَنَّهُ مِنْ تِلْكَ النَّاحِيَةِ ؛ وَكَذَلِكَ تَأْوِيلُهُ بِالْعِلْمِ تَأْوِيلٌ ظَاهِرُ الْفَسَادِ مَنْ جِنْسِ تَأْوِيلَاتِ الْجَهْمِيَّة ؛ بَلْ بِتَقْدِيرِ ثُبُوتِهِ يَكُونُ دَالًّا عَلَى الْإِحَاطَةِ . وَالْإِحَاطَةُ قَدْ عُلِمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَيْهَا وَعُلِمَ أَنَّهَا تَكُونُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّة وَلَيْسَ فِي إثْبَاتِهَا فِي الْجُمْلَةِ مَا يُخَالِفُ الْعَقْلَ وَلَا الشَّرْعَ ؛ لَكِنْ لَا نَتَكَلَّمُ إلَّا بِمَا نَعْلَمُ وَمَا لَا نَعْلَمُهُ أَمْسَكْنَا عَنْهُ وَمَا كَانَ مُقَدِّمَةُ دَلِيلِهِ مَشْكُوكًا فِيهَا عِنْدَ بَعْضِ النَّاسِ كَانَ حَقُّهُ أَنْ يَشُكَّ فِيهِ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْحَقُّ وَإِلَّا فَلْيَسْكُتْ عَمَّا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ . (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 574)

The wahabi doctrine of flawed aboveness

Al-Qurţubiyy states:

I say accordingly that Aļļaah’s aboveness and His highness refers to His highness of glory and attributes and greatness. That is, nothing is above Him when it comes to the meanings of greatness that are necessarily ascribed to Him, and there is nothing that shares His aboveness with Him. Rather He is the most High in the absolute sense, subĥaanah.¹ (Tafsiir Al-Qurţubiyy, 7 / 220)

Note that because aboveness in location is relative, unlike the absolute aboveneness that Al-Qurţubiyy affirms, those who believe in it are bound to attribute flaw to Aļļaah. In Al-Asnaa Al-Qurţubiyy says this explicitly:

It is said to them [the anthropomorphists who believe Aļļaah is in a place or direction, etc.]: “If Allaah was specified by a specification, formed by a form, limited by a limit and end, existing in a specific direction, [or] changing by emergent [previously non existing] attributes in Himself, then He would have been emergent and specified by whatever He was specified with in terms of quantity and form, and [thus] requiring a specifier [for the quantity and form], and if He required a specifier, then He would have been in need and emergent. And if this is invalid, then it is true that He is without a limit or an end, and that He is Self-existent in the sense that He does not need a place to confine Him or a body to be in, or something to hold Him, or another that He gets help from. His attributes of His self do not change by His actions or leaving them. (Al-Asnaa, 2/21)

In short, Al-Qurţubiyy says that believing Allaah’s aboveness is one of direction/ location necessitates believing He has a flaw. This is because it necessitates likening Him to things that need a creator to specify it.

It also necessitates another flaw. This additional flaw is that they will either have to say that Aļļaah can create a body above Himself, and thereby become below, or that He cannot, and have thereby attributed to Him lack of power to create bodies anywhere He chooses.

They have also made Him, according to their belief, dependent on creating something below Himself, in order to achieve aboveness. No wonder then, that Ibn Taymiyyah said Aļļaah must create something or another. According to him, the Creator would lose His aboveness if He did not! Such is the dilemma of the relative aboveness doctrine of wahabism.

1تفسير القرطبي – (7 / 220): قلت: فعلوا الله تعالى وارتفاعه عبارة عن علو مجده وصفاته وملكوته. أي ليس فوقه فيما يجب له من معاني الجلال أحد، ولا معه من يكون العلو مشتركا بينه وبينه، لكنه العلي بالإطلاق سبحانه.

References:

Al-Asnaa Fii Sħarĥi Asmaa’-illaahi-l-Ĥusnaa. Al-Qurţubiyy. 1995: Daar Aş-Şaĥaabah Li-t-Turaatħ.

Jaamiˆu Aĥkaami-l-Qur’aan. Al-Qurţubiyy (671 AH), Sħasuddiin. Ed. Aĥmad Al-Farduuniyy & Ibraahiim Aţfiisħ. Kairo, Egypt: Daar ˆaalam Al-Kutub Al-Mişriyyah, 1384.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Allaah is divisible into quantities and areas

Some Wahabis are scrambling around the web like headless chicken, trying to deny that their high priest of unknown-shape figure worship, Ibn Taymiyyah, said that Aļļaah is divisible. What if people came to know? They are afraid of their real beliefs being exposed. Now, let us look at what they quote from Ibn Taymiyyah. They quote him saying (their translation):

And these two meanings (of at-tajazzee and al-inqisaam, divisibility) are from those [meanings] that the Muslims are agreed upon that Allaah should be purified and sanctified from, for indeed Allaah, the Sublime, is "Ahad" and "Samad". He does not separate into parts (yatajazzee, yataba”ad) and is not divisible (munqasim) with the meaning that part of Him separates from another (part) just like a divided, split-up body is separated – like what is divided of the connected bodies, such as bread, meat and clothing and so on. A part of Him does not separate (from Him) like what separates from the hawayaan (animate, mammals) of its superfluities. And He (Allaah) is purified of such meanings with the meaning that they are non-existent (regarding Him) and are impossible for Him. Thus, His Essence does not accept tafreeq or tab’eed (meanings of division, separation).¹ (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/12)

Now this is confusing isn’t it, because we have already shown ample quotes of him saying that Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not.)

Is he just contradicting himself, as is so often the case with a deviant trying to escape FakħrudDiin Ar-Raaziyy compelling arguments? Or is there something else?

In this case it is a matter of defining divisibility. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah said above:

He does not separate into parts and is not divisible with the meaning that part of Him separates from another (part) just like a divided, split-up body is separated….He (Allaah) is purified of such meanings with the meaning that they are non-existent (regarding Him) and are impossible for Him.

Pay attention to his statement, “with the meaning that part of him separates from another part just like a divided split-up body is separated;” these are the two meanings that Ibn Taymkiyyah claims are the meanings that Muslims understand from “divisibility, namely:

1. actual separation, which he is referring to by his statement “He does not separate into parts and is not divisible with the meaning that part of Him separates from another”

2. the practical possibility of actual separation, which is what he means by “such meanings (of actual separation)…. are impossible for Him.”

   That is why he says first, about these two meanings:

These two meanings of divisibility are from those [meanings] that the Muslims have agreed upon that Aļļaah should be purified and sanctified from.

Note also that there are meanings of divisibility that he does not deny as being true of Aļļaah, he says:

….the imams behind this saying (he means Ar-Raaziyy and others) of negating divisibility and separation is not the [meaning] of the presence of divisibility (al-inqisaam) where part of Him separates from another part, or the possibility of that (actual separation). (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/12)

What is this divisibility that they spoke of then? He explains:

What these imams mean by this saying, among the Jahmites, philosophers, Muˆtazilites and those who follow them among those who affirm attributes to Aļļaah…. [is that] …. Aļļaah does not have a quantity or boundary, or sides, or end, and is not a thing existing in itself that can be pointed at, or that a part of can be pointed at, and it is not possible, in the final conclusion, to see some of Him, but not [at the same time] something else of Him [because He is not a body, so He has neither a whole, nor a part. Accordingly, seeing Aļļaah is not about seeing a whole or a part]. This is, in their saying [then,] denying [that Aļļaah is something with] quantity and area.

This definition of divisibility, i.e. divisibility into measurable quantities and areas, is what he affirms to Aļļaah when he said, as quoted in Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not):

…this [i.e. quantitative divisibility, as stated by Ar-Raaziyy and the others] is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry.(Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

So Ibn Taymiyyah is saying here that nothing can exist, not even Aļļaah, unless it is quantitative and has an area. This is clarified even further by his statement:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).²

Here he is affirming his opinion that the Creator must have a size.

So what he is saying is that, although Aļļaah has a size with six boundaries, He is not divisible. In other words, His body, according to him, although quantitative and divisible by measurability into half a size, a quarter size and so on, no power can actually make it split at ¼ or ½. This divisibility into quantities and areas is the definition of divisibility of which Ibn Taymiyyah he claims Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal said (wahabi translation):

They speak with the ambiguous of speech, and they deceive the ignorant people on account of the doubts they place over them.

So defining divisibility as having an area that can be divided into smaller areas by measurement is “ambiguous speech” to “deceive ignorant people”? Laugh or cry, it is up to you, I think it needs no comment.

Why all these word games you may ask? Well, he performs these verbose acrobatics a lot, and there are several plausible reasons, of which two can easily be detected.

First, by having a special and restricted definition of divisibility, he can hide his belief when he wants. So if a judge asked him if he believes Aļļaah to be divisible, he would answer, “Of course not!” meaning his special definition of divisibility, and thereby saving his neck. For this same purpose he has his own definitions of what words like “body” or “create” mean, and of what it means to be an Ashˆariyy, and so on.

The second reason is to confuse the gullible who are impressed by a lot of words and phrases they cannot make sense of, and are easily affected by cheap rhetoric making them angry, such as by calling anything other than anthropomorphism “jahmism” and calling anthropomorphism “the way of the Salaf and imam Aĥmad.” A good example is the book we have quoted from, which is “Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah.” It is his attempt to refute Ar-Raaziyy’s Asaas At-Taqdiis, a small book of around 150 pages. This attempted refutation is a multi-volume work with several hundred pages of beating around the bush in the manner you have seen above. No wonder it was said about him, as mentioned by Ibn Baţuuţah “there was something wrong with his mind.” It is more than a fair assessment.

Let us finally remind ourselves of what the Sunni creed is regarding these beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy stated {in brackets}: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and following {the Jamaaˆah}. Later he stated, as part of this remembrance,{Aļļaah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.} {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}. He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said in the same remembrance: {Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.} Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans. In other words, the Sunni belief is that attributing a limit to Aļļaah makes one a non-Muslim.

1قال ابن تيمية في بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – (3 / 12) : وهذان المعنيان مما اتفق المسلمون فيما أعلمه على تنزه الله وتقدسه عنهما فإن الله سبحانه (أحد) (صمد) لا يتجزى ويتبعض وينقسم بمعنى أنه ينفصل بعضه عن بعض كما ينفصل الجسم المقسوم المعضى مثل ما تقسم الأجسام المتصلة كالخبز واللحم والثياب ونحو ذلك ولا ينفصل عن الحيوان ما ينفصل من عضلاته وهذه المعاني هو منزه عنها بمعنى أنها معدومة وأنها ممتنعة في حقه فلا تقبل ذاته التفريق والتبعيض

2قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).

Refuting Yaser Qadi’s opposition to proving Allaah’s existence

Islam is a great religion, it does not need to attack reason or logic to hold. It has nothing to hide. It is not based on blind imitation, or blind acceptance. The argument for its correctness agrees with reason from beginning to end, as has been shown in the article “Foundations of the Religion“. There is no argument based on valid premises and sound structure that can put a dent in it. This is what we Sunnis believe, and any religion that does not meet this criteria is not the religion of Aļļaah.

Yaser Qadi is out to show otherwise in his The Theological Implications of the Story of Ibrahim & the Stars (Ibn Taymiyyah vs. the Mutakallimun). He now opposes the proof of the Creator’s existence, not by showing that the premises do not hold or that the argument is false, but by saying in essence: “it is not mentioned in the Qur’aan, is complicated, was not used by the companions and there is no need, because everybody knows by the fiţrah.” Thus he implies that it is prohibited. Of course, it is all based on the talk of arch-anthropomorphist, Ibn Taymiyyah.

To continue reading you may download the article Rational Quranic Islam vs Wahabism in PDF formats. The table of contents is:

Introduction…. p. 3
Circular reasoning is Quranic?!…. p. 3
Different times and different people need different types of proofs…. p. 4
The Imam ˆAbdulQaahir on the Sunni scholars of the science of belief…. p. 5
Kalam scholars used terminology like those of the Aristotelians to show them wrong…. p. 10
The principles of the proofs for the creators existence…. p. 10
About the so called proof of the existence of God through the proof of the createdness of “accidents”…. p. 11
The proof of the creators existence is in compliance with the Qur’aan…. p. 12
Implications of the proof of Allaah’s existence for denying Allaah’s resemblance to creation…. p. 12
A more detailed way of showing that bodies must be created for one to prove that the world is created…. p. 14
Ibn Taymiyyah’ arguments against the proof stating that bodies must have a creator…. p. 15
The anthropomorphist dilemma; the motivation of Ibn Taymiyyah for attacking the proof of Allaah’s existence based on the fact that the world consists of bodies and attributes…. p. 19
Conclusion….   p. 19

Wahabi claims Pharaoh’s saying: “O Haman! Build me a tall building so I that I might reach the paths of the skies, and look upon Moses’ God,” (Ghaaafir, 36-37) proves that Moses believed Allah is placed in the Sky.

They also supply some hand picked quotes from scholarly works in support of this idea.  The answer is as follows:

First, it is just not possible to establish an irrefutable Islamic belief based on what the kaafir Pharao says. The fact the Pharao believed that the god Moses spoke of is placed in the Sky does not necessitate that Moses has said this to him, because whatever Pharao says about the “God of Moses” could be something Pharao falsely assumed or misinterpreted.

Second, quotes from books about what other than a Prophet said also does not prove a belief to be true. You need a highly authentic ĥadiith or a Quranic statement (other than quotes of what a kaafir says,) and you need to establish their meaning in a way that does not contradict other narrated texts, or any irrefutably established fact. See this article.

Third, the Sky is below the ˆArsħ and inside the collection of creation. To believe that Allaah is in the Sky is contrary to the “placed above the throne” belief, and pure ĥuluul (believing that Allaah is inside creation.) If they say “in the Sky” means “above the Sky,” then they have interpreted it with other than the linguistically apparent meaning, and chosen an interpretation that contradicts with “He does not resemble anything,” and the Prophet’s saying: “O Aļļaah, You are the First, so there is nothing before You, and You are the Last so there is nothing after You. You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below you. (Muslim)” See this aricle.

Finally, and most importantly, place is an aspect of particles, or bodies of them. If Allaah was in a place He would be something with size, a particle or a body, and all particles and bodies need a creator, as they need specification. Denying this contradicts the main premise for the proof of the Creator’s existence. See this article with links.

Wahabi contention: Aļļaah is above the Arsh, but we do not say He is a body.

Wahabi wrote:

Allah is indeed above his Arsh and separate from His creation- all the evidence points to this.  We don’t say Allah is a body or anything- we just affirm what He and His Messenger (sallallahu aleyhi wasallam) affirmed. This is in opposition to Abu Aristotle

If you mean by "above the ˆArsh" in the sense of greatness of status or the like, then this is true, and all Muslims must believe that. This is the most beautiful meaning one can understand from this statement, and is therefore how it should be understood, because Aļļaah has the most beautiful namings.

However, it is not true that evidence shows that Aļļaah is above the Arsh in the sense of location and direction, because Aļļaah told us that He does not resemble anything, and because it is not the most beautiful meaning of the statement.

If He was in a place, then He would have a limit adjacent to the ˆArsh, and this limit would be of some shape. Such a shape would need to be specified and brought into existence, i.e. created by a creator, just like all other shapes, which means that Aļļaah would be in need of a creator, and that would mean that He is like creation. That is why the Salaf said that Aļļaah is without a how, that is, without a shape. This is actually very obvious. See also what Al-Qurţubiyy said in this regard at this link, and see Wahabi contention: Maalik says Aļļaah has a how.

As for your, "We don’t say Allah is a body or anything…." this misses the point. It is not about the words you use. If you say that Aļļaah is in a place/location over the Arsh, then you are saying that He is a body, because being in a location necessitates borders for the thing in that place. This is because something in a location is either in all locations, or in some location(s). If it is in some location, but not others, it must be confined by a border and have a size and shape limiting it to that location i.e. it must be a body. That is why it makes no sense to say that Aļļaah is in a place, but is not a body. We do not care about the word body, as much as we care about its meaning. Or put in another way, we care about the word body, because of its meaning. For more detail see this article: Bodies have limits, but not Aļļaah .

More wahabi arguments for Allaah having a direction

Wahabi said: Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari himself not only made ithbaat of ALlah having uloow, but made takfir of the who denied it.

Comment: All Muslims would, but this is based on the belief that ˆuluww, or aboveness, does not mean highness in place, but absolute aboveness in status and power. No Muslim denies that Aļļaah is attributed with absolute aboveness in this sense. This is an absolute meaning, unlike highness in place, because all status and power belong to Aļļaah in reality:

إِنَّ الْعِزَّةَ لِلَّهِ جَمِيعًا

Meaning: “Verily all power and subjugation belongs to Aļļaah.” Accordingly, the Prophet’s greatness, for example, is a gift from Aļļaah only. (Yunus, 65)

This is unlike saying that Aļļaah’s aboveness is in location, which is a relative meaning pertaining to relative placement of things, and not an absolute. It also does not necessitate a greatness, because Tibet is at a higher location than Makkah, yet Makkah is better.

Wahabi said: We do not call the literal reality of Allah being above us to be in a “location” as defined by the heretics of ahlul-kalaam. Location to them is confinement, within space, and in a direction. These are some of the general aspects of what “locality” is with the ahlul-kalaam.

Answer: Sunnis deny that Aļļaah is in a location because it means being confined in space. This is something no one can deny, because if something is a location, then it is not in other locations, which means it is confined to the location it is in. Moreover, being in a location implies being a body, because a body is something with size, as has been stated by the guru of anthropomorphism Ibn Taymiyyah:

فقد ثبت بموجب هاتين المقدمتين صحة قول القائلين بالجهة وقول القائلين بأنه جسم وكونه جسما يستلزم القول بالجهة

“…. It is established from what necessarily follows from these two premises, the correctness of the saying of those who say that Aļļaah is in a direction, and the saying of those who say that He is a body, and that Him being a body necessarily implies Him being in a direction (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 2 / 125)⁠.” This is what their imaam adheres to, so who are they following when they deny this obvious necessity of direction and location? Who are these “salaf” they claim to follow?

Being in a direction, necessitates being confined in a location, and being a limited substance or body. Therefore Aļļaah’s aboveness, the one mentioned in the scriptures, is not an aboveness in the sense of direction, because in another aayah Aļļaah said:

وَلِلَّهِ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى فَادْعُوهُ بِهَا وَذَرُوا الَّذِينَ يُلْحِدُونَ فِي أَسْمَائِهِ سَيُجْزَوْنَ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ

Meaning: “Aļļaah is the one that has the most beautiful namings, so call Him by them, and leave those who deviate with respect to His namings. They will be pay for what they have done.” (Al-‘Aˆraaf, 180)

We know from this aayah that whenever the scriptures contain a word ascribing something to Aļļaah, it should be understood as having the most beautiful meaning of these words, and as we all know, “aboveness” can mean aboveness in status. This is a beautiful meaning, unlike “aboveness in direction.” Therefore, we understand from Aļļaah’s aboveness that it is an aboveness of status, not of direction or location.

See also this article, and especially this article.

Wahabi contention: The [Philosophers/Muˆtazilites/Jahmiyys] are deviant. The [Philosophers/Muˆtazilites/Jahmiyys] said that Allah is not in a direction. The Asħˆariyys also said that Aļļaah is not in a direction. Therefore the Asħˆariyys are also deviant.

Comment: This is a typical wahabi strategy of trying to scandalize their opponents. It is fallacious, because the philosophers’ agreement with the Asħˆariyys on some issues does not mean that the Asħˆariyys are like the philosophers in everything, least of all deviant beliefs. The main deviant belief of the philosophers that the Muslims said they were blasphemers for, was their claim that creation is eternal. This belief of theirs was shared by Ibn Taymiyyah.

Bodies have limits but not Allaah

Wahabi contention: “But whatever has no limit is not separate and distinct from the creation and cannot be above the world because all of this is necessitated by the meaning of al-hadd [i.e. limit]”

Comment: Note that they mean by this “whatever has no [physical] limit is not [physically] separate and distinct from the creation and cannot be [physically] above the world.” This statement is based on drawing analogy between creation and the Creator. It assumes that Aļļaah is a body (something with a size), and must therefore, as they say, have a physical boundary. This assumption is made, because they think of Aļļaah in terms of what is true for creation.

The Sunni belief on the one who says Allaah has a limit is that He is a kaafir

Just to remind ourselves of the Sunni belief in this matter, Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy stated {in brackets}: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and following {the Jamaaˆah}. Later he stated, as part of this remembrance,{Aļļaah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.} {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}. He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said in the same remembrance: {Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.} Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans. In other words, the Sunni belief is that attributing a limit to Aļļaah makes one a non-Muslim.

A brief synopsis of the fallacy contained in the argument for a limit

The concepts of physical separation and connection relate to bodies, not to Aļļaah. If they said a body cannot be separate and extinct from another body unless it has a limit, then this is true. It is not true, however, that Aļļaah is a body, so it is not true that He must have a limit. Therefore, it is also not true that Aļļaah is either physically outside or inside the world. This is a fallacy called “false dichotomy,” which is when someone argues and gives you a choice between two things, none of which are true, like if someone said, “the stone is either blind or seeing, which is it?” The problem with this is that a stone is neither said to be blind nor seeing. That is, you neither say, “the stone is blind” nor “the stone is seeing.” So when they say, “Aļļaah is either inside or outside, which is it?” they are using a false dichotomy to trick you into thinking that there is no other alternative. This is not correct, because the two choices a person has about something existent is first, “Is it in a place or not?” If the answer to that choice is “in a place,” then one may ask, “it is inside or outside area so and so?” If the answer is, “not in a place,” however, then the question, “is it inside or outside area so and so?” is pure nonsense. To illustrate in terms of the example of the stone, there was another question before “is the stone seeing or blind?” which was, “does the stone have sight?” Since the answer is “no,” it makes not sense to ask, “is it seeing or blind?”

The stated wahabi contention that “what is not limited cannot be above,” assumes that Aļļaah’s aboveness is physical, but no Muslim says that He is. Muslims believe that Aļļaah is above us in status and power, not in physical location. Being physically above something else can only be for something physical, and there is no greatness in being physically above something anyway. If there was, then Tibet would be better than Makkah. By saying that Aļļaah’s aboveness is one of status and power, we have chosen the most beautiful meaning of “aboveness” and we have avoided attributing a limit to the Creator.

A detailed explanation of why the wahabi argument is invalid

To recap, the wahabi argument in formal terms is that they say:

1) Everything that exists is in a place.

2) Everything that occupies space has a limit.

3) Allaah exists.

4) Therefore (they say) Allaah has a limit, and claiming otherwise is sophistry

While we accept premises 2) and 3), we do not accept premise 1). The reason why we do not accept premise 1), namely that everything that exists is in a place, is:

First, there is no evidence that could be claimed for premise 1) except observation of what we have perceived with our senses in our daily lives. Essentially what they are saying is that “everything I have perceived in my life is physical, therefore everything that exists is physical.” This is clearly not a logical argument, but it is the core of their argument. The underlying trick in this claim is that our imagination is limited to what our five senses have experienced in this life. Our minds record these experiences, and in our minds we are able to manipulate these recordings in different ways as concepts. Our ability to conceptualize is limited to these recordings, and any fact that does not agree with these recordings is difficult to deal with in our minds, and will even often be rejected based on it. It is this limit of our minds that the devil uses to trick people into anthropomorphist belief. He makes them think that what one cannot imagine cannot exist, and makes them ignore the fact that our imagination is based on a limited set of sensory experiences, and it does not cover all that exists in creation, let alone what could have existed, and what must exist.

Second, since there is no actual proof of premise 1) being valid by logic alone, we take guidance from the Quranic fact that Aļļaah does not resemble His creation,

لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ وَهُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ

Meaning: “Absolutely nothing resembles Him, and He is All-Hearing, All-Seeing.” (Al-Sħuuraa, 11) Accordingly, what is necessarily true regarding creation’s existence is not true of His. (For a more complete discussion of the meaning of this aayah, you should read this very important article: Wahhabi Contention: How are “Ar Rahmanu `alal `arsh istawa” and “Laysaka mithlihi shay`” different?)

In light of this we observe that all creation around us are things that occupy space (dead matter and live beings) and attributes of those things that occupy space (like color or love). This is the kind of existence that all creation as we know it has. Based on this, we conclude that Aļļaah is not in a place nor is He an attribute of something in a place, otherwise His existence would be of created kind, and that is contrary to the aayah.

We also take guidance from the Quranic fact that Aļļaah is attributed with absolute pre-existence to everything else:

هُوَ الأَوَّلُ

Meaning: “He is the one that is attributed with absolute precedence.” (Al-Ĥadiid, 03).” We understand from this that He existed before everything else, and that He was not preceded by non-existence or the existence of something else. He existed, and there was nothing with Him and nothing prior to Him. Al-Bukħaariy narrated that the Prophet Muĥammad said:

كان الله ولم يَكُنْ شَيْءٌ غَيْرُهُ

“Aļļaah existed and there was nothing else” (Bukħaariy No. 3019) Aļļaah’s existence then, does not resemble the existence of created things. It is a beginning-less and necessary existence, and is not affected by anything.

This aayah and hadiith are another base then, and we say that while it is true that physical things are either inside or outside something, it is not true of Aļļaah, because He is the creator of all places, all insides and all outsides, as He existed before them.

Consequently, the correct belief is that Aļļaah created all places, and He existed before everything else, including place and time. Since He existed before them, it must be true that He existed without them. In other words, as the scholars say, “Aļļaah existed, and there was no place, and He is now as He was eternally – without a place.”

We also take guidance from other aayahs in the Quran to show that the anthropomorphist’s premise, “everything that exists is in a place,” is false, and that sound reason does not dictate what they claim. One way we can do this is by showing that not everything that exists must be limited, as follows:

First, note that whatever has a physical limit is a creation, because a limit must be specified in terms of size and shape etc. That is, it requires a Creator to exist. If one denies this, then one is no longer able to prove that physical limits require a Creator, such as the human body, or the celestial bodies. That is, the shape of the camel, or the skies would no longer be proofs for Aļļaah’s existence and Power, and this is in contradiction with the Quranic statements, such as:

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآَيَاتٍ لِأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ

Meaning: “Verily in the creation of the Skies and the Earth, and the differences of night and day there are signs for those who have perceptive minds.” (Aal ˆImraan, 190)

أَفَلاَ يَنظُرُونَ إِلَى الإِبْلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْ

Meaning: “What, do they not consider how the camel was created?” (Al-Għasħiyah, 17)

Can anyone ponder these aayahs without pondering the physical boundaries of the skies, earth and camel? Of course not, without boundaries, there is no camel and there is no sky and no earth, because this is the reality of their existence. It is the limits of bodies that make us sure that they are created and enable us to ponder upon them as signs of Aļļaah. In fact, the aayahs are requesting us to ponder the boundaries of the skies, the earth and the camel. If someone claims that Aļļaah has a physical limit, then they are saying that physical limits do not necessarily need a creator, and have thereby invalidated these Quranic proofs.

This is true because a physical limit is a physical limit, and once you claim that one limit does not need a creator, then you cannot prove that another limit necessarily needs a creator. Why? Because a physical limit is conceptually just a connection of dots forming a line or surface. Each dot is connected to the next at one of its sides. The choice of placement of a connected dot to another is for any available space at any angle and from any angle. That’s it. The placement of connected dots form limits, and since the way the dots are placed next to each other needs specification in terms of ‘where,’ all limits need to be specified. This means they need a creator and cannot be eternal, because their existence depends on prior specification. So if someone claims that one such limit does not require a creator, then He can no longer logically prove that another limit does need a creator. This means that he can no longer logically prove that shapes need someone to give them a form. To be able to do that, rather, he must hold on to the premise that all limits need a creator. Since Aļļaah is neither specified, nor created, and is definitely eternal, it must be true that Aļļaah exists without limits and therefore without being in a place.

More simply put: anything that has a limit i.e. boundary has a shape because the limit has to have some shape. Anything that has a certain shape could have had any other shape, because any shape isn’t of higher priority than any other shape, so having a certain shape means that there must be someone who specified it and chose it among all other possibilities.

Similarly, the very state of being in a place needs a specifier. The proof that the state of being in a place needs to be specified, is that once something is in a place, it is conceivable that it could have been in another place, just like what was shown true above regarding connecting dots in a limit. Consequently, once we see something is in a place, we ask how it got there. We ask this, because we know that once something is in a place, then something prior to it has put it there. That is, something prior to it specified its place. So the concepts of being physically inside or outside cannot apply to Aļļaah, because if they did, it would necessitate Him being specified, or influenced or changed. Rather, we must believe that Aļļaah is only attributed with attributes that are eternal, and therefore do not necessitate specification. See also what Al-Qurţubiyy said in this regard at this link.

In conclusion, the first premise of the wahabis is not only unverifiable, but definitely wrong.

The “simple” Wahabi belief

According to the Wahabies Allah is literally above the throne without ever leaving it, AND literally in the sky of the world in the last third of the night (i.e. always, because the Earth is round, so it is always the last third of the night somewhere.) Anyone see a problem here? Then they say it is blasphemy to

Ibn Taymiyyah says Allaah needs, is divisible, and settles in a place

To know the pitiful state of the one the Wahabi sect calls “Sħaykħ of Islaam,” read the following from his book Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah¹., in which he criticizes Fakħruddiin Ar-Raaziyy’s arguments against anthropomorphism:

ˆAliyy Al-Qaariy on anthropomorphism

For those that might think that ˆAliyy Al-Qaariy was soft on believers in Aļļaah having a direction, or bodily attributes, because he did not hate Ibn Taymiyyah should think again. The only reason for this was that he did not think that Ibn Taymiyyah had such beliefs. There are many scholars that were in this boat in the past, because Ibn Taymiyyah’s works had not been gathered and consolidated. Anyway, here is ˆAliyy Al-Qaariy’s view on anthropomorphic beliefs, he states in Sħarĥ Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar:

“فمن أظلم ممن كذب على الله أو ادعى ادعاء معينا مشتملا على اثبات المكان والهيئة والجهة من مقابلة وثبوت مسافة وأمثال تلك الحالة، فيصير كافرا لا محالة) اهـ.

“Who is more unjust than the one that lied about Aļļaah, or claimed something that included affirming (to Him) a place, shape or direction such as facing, distance and the like… Such a person becomes a kaafir (non-Muslim) without doubt (P. 355).”

–Sharh Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar, Ali Al-Qari, Dar Al-Basħa’ir Al-Islamiyah, Beirut, 1998.

Q & A: If Allah is not above then why did Prophet go up to meet his Lord?

Question: We Ahlus-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah negate (like the Salaf) negate direction for Allah (SWT) but what is the answer to the following question put forth by the Salafis that, “If Allah is not above then why did Prophet go up to meet his Lord?”

Answer: This is a nonsensical question. It is like asking, “why did Aļļaah will for the Prophet to have his first revelation by Makkah, and not in China?” You might ask them “why not?”

Aļļaah had willed for the Prophet to see Aļļaah when the Prophet was in the skies. That does not mean that it was a physical meeting. No, Aļļaah is not in a place or direction, and the seeing of Him is without Him being in a place or direction. This seeing could occur anywhere, as Aļļaah is not in a place, but Aļļaah willed for the Prophet to receive the ability to see Aļļaah while in the Sky.

Question: Please also provide an explaination to the negation of direction for Allah from Quraan, Sunnah & Aqeedah Tahawiyyah. In the past you have answered questions about alleged physical ascension and descent of Allah if you can shed some light on the above question, I would be grateful.

Answer: You should read “How are “Ar Rahmanu `alal `arsh istawa” and “Laysaka mithlihi shay`” different?”

Author: Shaykh Abu Adam al Naruiji

Wahhabi Contention: Wahhabis claim that Abu Hanifa said, “Allah is in the sky.”

Wahhabi Contention: The wahabis claim that the Imam met a follower of Jahm ibn Sawfaan, the famous heretic and founder of the Jahmiyyah sect, who claimed that Allah is literally everywhere. According to the story, Abu Hanifah told him “Allah is in the Sky.” (Al-Asmaa’ wa Sifaat 2/441).

Sunni Answer: The response to this is threefold. First regarding the meaning. This narration is mentioned by Al-Bayhaqi in Al-Asmaa’ wa Sifaat. Al-Bayhaqi himself states about it: “If this is true, then the meaning is as we have mentioned earlier.” Al-Bayhaqi mentioned earlier that the word “في” translated here as “in,” means “above,” and not “in.” He also said that this aboveness is in the sense of status and power, not direction or place. Explaining the meaning of a scholar’s saying “Allah is above the throne, not sitting, not standing, not in contact with the throne, and not separate from it,” Al-Bayhaqi said, “He means separation of self in the sense of being isolated or at a distance, because contact and separation, of which the latter is the opposite of the former, and standing and sitting, are attributes of bodies, and Allah is One, did not beget and was not begotten, and there is nothing that resembles Him. So it is impossible that what is possibly true of bodies should be possibly true of Him.” (Al-Asmaa’ wa Sifaat 2/412).

Al-Bayhaqi also said, commenting on a haditħ: “What is at the end of this hadith is a hint to the fact that Allah exists without a place…. Some of our companions used as a proof for Allah not being in a place the saying of the Prophet (about Aļļaah): 

َأَنْتَ الظَّاهِرُ فَلَيْسَ فَوْقَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الْبَاطِنُ فَلَيْسَ دُونَكَ شَيْءٌ

“You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below You.” If there is nothing above Him and nothing below Him, then He is not a body or in a direction, and He does not have physical specification.” (Al-Asmaa’ wa Sifaat 2/391).

In short, if it is correct to say in Arabic (not in English) a phrase that if literally translated would say, “Allah is in the Sky” then this is simply a figure of speech to ascribe aboveness of status to Allah, or something like that, and is not meant to ascribe to Him aboveness in the sense of direction, location or place. This is because anything that is in a direction has limits, no matter how big, and ascribing a limit to Allah is blasphemy. An example of using the phrase “above the sky” to mean high status is the poem of the companion An-Naabighah: 

علونا السماء عفة وتكرما …. وإنا لنرجو فوق ذلك مظهرا

“We have risen above the sky in abstinence and honor… and verily we hope for a higher ascent” (Gharib al Hadith 1/190). 

Accordingly, Ibn Al-Jawzi, the famous Hanbaliyy jurist and hadith scholar said in “Daf’ Shubah al-Tashbhi”,

وجعلوا ذلك فوقية حسية، ونسوا أن الفوقية الحسية إنما تكون لجسم أو جوهر وأن الفوقية قد تطلق لعلو المرتبة فيقال: فلان فوق فلان

“And they (the corrupt Hanbaliyys) made Allah’s aboveness physical, and forgot that physical aboveness can only be for a body, or an indivisible element, and that aboveness can be used for the meaning of high status, for one may say for example, ‘so and so is above so and so’.” (Daf`u Shubhat al Tashbih 23)

Note that this sense of aboveness is common in English as well. For example, if someone worked for Microsoft, he might say, “Bill Gates is above me,” even if his office was at a higher floor than that of Bill. You can also note here that the most noble of the two meanings of aboveness is that of status, so this is the only meaning that is appropriate when speaking of Allah. 

Second, regarding the authenticity of the narration; this story is narrated from Abu Yanifah by Nuh ibn Abi Maryam, and then the next narrator is Nu`aym ibn Hammaad. About this Nuh, Ibn Hajar Al `Asqalaani said in “Taqrib Al Tahdhib”: “they (the imams of hadiith) said he is a liar.” (Taqrib al Tahdhib 567)  About Hammaad he said: “He makes a lot of mistakes.” (Taqrib al Tahdhib 564) 

In other words, the narration claiming that Abu Haniifah said that Allah is in the sky is not authentic. 

Third, the belief of Abu Hanifah was narrated by Al-Tahaawi in his Aqidah, who stated at the beginning of it: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and the Jamaa`ah according to the method of the jurists of this religion, Abu Hanifah Al Nu`maan ibn Thaabit Al-Kufi, Abu Yusuf Ya`qub ibn Ibrahiim Al Ansari, and Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Al Hasan Al Shaybaani…} Then he said later {in brackets}: {Allah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments. The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}.

In other words, if (and there is no proof of that) Abu Hanifah said what this unauthentic narration claims, then the meaning is that Allah is above the sky in status and power, not in direction or place.

In his “Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar” Abu Hanifah said,

ومعنى الشىءِ إثباتُهُ بلا جسمٍ ولا جوهرٍ ولا عَرَضٍ، ولا حدَّ لهُ، ولا ضدَّ لهُ، ولا ندَّ له، ولا مِثلَ لهُ.

“When we say that Allah is shay’ we mean that He exists without a body, essence, or temporary attributes. He does not have a limit, an opposite, a substitute, or a like in any sense of likeness at all.” (Al Fiqh Al Akbar 63)

Abu Hanifah said in Al Fiqh Al Absat:

كان الله ولا مكان ، كان قبل أن يخلق الخلق ، كان ولم يكن أين ولا خلق ولا شىء وهو خالق كل شىء فمن قال لا أعرف ربي أفي السماء أم في الأرض فهو كافر . كذلك من قال إنه على العرش ولا أدري العرش أفي السماء أم في الأرض

Allah existed and there was no place. He existed before he created creation. He existed and there was no “where,” no creation or anything else. He is the Creator of everything.  So the one that says, “I do not know about by Lord, is He in the Sky or on Earth,” is a blasphemer. Likewise, the one who says “Verily He is over the throne, but I do not know whether the throne is in the sky or on Earth.”

Abu Hanifah said this because in both expressions it is clear that the speaker ascribes a place to Allah, and is not intending to say aboveness without direction or place. This is obviously what Abu Hanifah means, as he stated right before it, “Allah existed and there was no place.”

Note again that the Prophet made it clear that Allah’s abovenes is not in place or direction, but in status, when He said: “You are Al-Thahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al Batin, so there is nothing below you.” This hadith makes it explicit that Allah’s aboveness is not one of place and direction. 

أخبرنا أبو بكر بن الحارث الفقيه ، أنا أبو محمد بن حيان ، أنا أحمد بن جعفر بن نصر ، ثنا يحيى بن يعلى ، قال : سمعت نعيم بن حماد ، يقول : سمعت نوح بن أبي مريم أبا عصمة ، يقول : كنا عند أبي حنيفة أول ما ظهر إذ جاءته امرأة من ترمذ كانت تجالس جهما ، فدخلت الكوفة ، فأظنني أقل ما رأيت عليها عشرة آلاف من الناس تدعو إلى رأيها ، فقيل لها : إن ههنا رجلا قد نظر في المعقول يقال له : أبو حنيفة . فأتته ، فقالت : أنت الذي تعلم الناس المسائل وقد تركت دينك ؟ أين إلهك الذي تعبده ؟ فسكت عنها ، ثم مكث سبعة أيام لا يجيبها ، ثم خرج إليها وقد وضع كتابين : الله تبارك وتعالى في السماء دون الأرض . فقال له رجل : أرأيت قول الله عز وجل : ( وهو معكم (1) ) قال : هو كما تكتب إلى الرجل : إني معك وأنت غائب عنه . قلت : لقد أصاب أبو حنيفة رضي الله عنه فيما نفى عن الله عز وجل من الكون في الأرض . وفيما ذكر من تأويل الآية وتبع مطلق السمع في قوله : إن الله تعالى في السماء ومراده من تلك والله أعلم ، إن صحت الحكاية عنه ، ما ذكرنا في معنى قوله : ( أأمنتم من في السماء ) الأسماء والصفات  ج 2   ص 441

الأسماء والصفات  ج 2   ص 412: وذهب أبو الحسن علي بن محمد بن مهدي الطبري في آخرين من أهل النظر إلى أن الله تعالى في السماء فوق كل شيء مستو على عرشه بمعنى أنه عال عليه ، ومعنى الاستواء : الاعتلاء ، كما يقول : استويت على ظهر الدابة ، واستويت على السطح . بمعنى علوته ، واستوت الشمس على رأسي ، واستوى الطير على قمة رأسي ، بمعنى علا في الجو ، فوجد فوق رأسي . والقديم سبحانه عال على عرشه لا قاعد ولا قائم ولا مماس ولا مباين عن العرش ، يريد به : مباينة الذات التي هي بمعنى الاعتزال أو التباعد ، لأن المماسة والمباينة التي هي ضدها ، والقيام والقعود من أوصاف الأجسام ، والله عز وجل أحد صمد لم يلد ولم يولد ولم يكن له كفوا أحد ، فلا يجوز عليه ما يجوز على الأجسام تبارك وتعالى . وحكى الأستاذ أبو بكر بن فورك هذه الطريقة عن بعض أصحابنا أنه قال : استوى بمعنى : علا ، ثم قال : ولا يريد بذلك علوا بالمسافة والتحيز والكون في مكان متمكنا فيه ، ولكن يريد معنى قول الله عز وجل : ( أأمنتم من في السماء (2) ) أي : من فوقها على معنى نفي الحد عنه ، وأنه ليس مما يحويه طبق أو يحيط به قطر ، ووصف الله سبحانه وتعالى بذلك بطريقة الخبر ، فلا نتعدى ما ورد به الخبر .

الأسماء والصفات  ج 2   ص 391 والذي روي في آخر هذا الحديث إشارة إلى نفي المكان عن الله تعالى ، وأن العبد أينما كان فهو في القرب والبعد من الله تعالى سواء ، وأنه الظاهر ، فيصح إدراكه بالأدلة ؛ الباطن ، فلا يصح إدراكه بالكون في مكان . واستدل بعض أصحابنا في نفي المكان عنه بقول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : « أنت الظاهر فليس فوقك شيء » . وأنت الباطن فليس دونك شيء « . وإذا لم يكن فوقه شيء ولا دونه شيء لم يكن في مكان .

7210 نوح بن أبي مريم أبو عصمة المروزي القرشي مولاهم مشهور بكنيته ويعرف بالجامع لجمعه العلوم لكن كذبوه في الحديث وقال بن المبارك كان يضع من السابعة مات سنة ثلاث وسبعين ت فق تقريب التهذيب  ج 1   ص 567

7166 نُعَيْمُ بنُ حَمّاد بن معاوية بن الحارث الخزاعي أبو عبد الله المروزي نزيل مصر صدوق يخطىء كثيرا فقيه عارف بالفرائض من العاشرة مات سنة ثمان وعشرين على الصحيح وقد تتبع بن عدي ما أخطأ فيه وقال باقي حديثه مستقيم خ مق د ت ق تقريب التهذيب  ج 1   ص 564

3543 الضعفاء والمتروكين لابن الجوزي  ج 3   ص 164: نعيم بن حماد يروي عن ابن المبارك وثقه أحمد ووثقه يحيى في رواية وقال مرة يشبه له فيروي ما ليس له أصل وقال النسائي ليس بثقة وقال الدراقطني كثير الوهم وقال أبو الفتح الأزدي قالوا كان يضع الحديث في تقوية السنة وحكايات مزورة في ثلب أبي حنيفة كلها كذب وكذلك ذكر ابن عدي الضعفاء والمتروكين ، اسم المؤلف:  عبد الرحمن بن علي بن محمد بن الجوزي أبو الفرج الوفاة: 579 ، دار النشر : دار الكتب العلمية – بيروت – 1406 ، الطبعة : الأولى ، تحقيق : عبد الله القاضي

References:

-Al-Bayhaqi (458 AH). Al-Asmaa’ wa Sifaat. 2 vols. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Maktabah Al-Sawaadiy.

-Abu Hanifah, An Nu`maan ibn Thaabit (80-150 AH/ 699-767. Al Fiqh Al Akbar. Kairo, Egypt: Maktabah Al-Azhariyah Li Al-Turaath, 1421/2001.

-Al-Khattaabi (319-388 AH/ 931-998 AD). Gharib al Hadith. 3 vols. Makkah: Jaami`ah Umm Al-Quraa, 1402.

-Ibn Hajar Al `Asqalaaniyy. Taqrib al Tahdhib. Syria: Daar Al-Rasheed, 1406/1986.

-Abu alFaraj Ibn Al-Jawzi (508-597 AH/ 1114-1201 AD). Daf`u Shubhat al Tashbih. Cairo, Egypt: Maktabah Al Azhariyah Li Al-Turaath, 1418/1998.

Author: Shaykh Abu Adam Al Naruiji