The wahabi doctrine of flawed aboveness

August 28, 2009

Al-Qurţubiyy states:

I say accordingly that Aļļaah’s aboveness and His highness refers to His highness of glory and attributes and greatness. That is, nothing is above Him when it comes to the meanings of greatness that are necessarily ascribed to Him, and there is nothing that shares His aboveness with Him. Rather He is the most High in the absolute sense, subĥaanah.1 (Tafsiir Al-Qurţubiyy, 7 / 220)

Note that because aboveness in location is relative, unlike the absolute aboveneness that Al-Qurţubiyy affirms, those who believe in it are bound to attribute flaw to Aļļaah. In Al-Asnaa Al-Qurţubiyy says this explicitly:

It is said to them [the anthropomorphists who believe Aļļaah is in a place or direction, etc.]: “If Allaah was specified by a specification, formed by a form, limited by a limit and end, existing in a specific direction, [or] changing by emergent [previously non existing] attributes in Himself, then He would have been emergent and specified by whatever He was specified with in terms of quantity and form, and [thus] requiring a specifier [for the quantity and form], and if He required a specifier, then He would have been in need and emergent. And if this is invalid, then it is true that He is without a limit or an end, and that He is Self-existent in the sense that He does not need a place to confine Him or a body to be in, or something to hold Him, or another that He gets help from. His attributes of His self do not change by His actions or leaving them. (Al-Asnaa, 2/21)

In short, Al-Qurţubiyy says that believing Allaah’s aboveness is one of direction/ location necessitates believing He has a flaw. This is because it necessitates likening Him to things that need a creator to specify it.

It also necessitates another flaw. This additional flaw is that they will either have to say that Aļļaah can create a body above Himself, and thereby become below, or that He cannot, and have thereby attributed to Him lack of power to create bodies anywhere He chooses.

They have also made Him, according to their belief, dependent on creating something below Himself, in order to achieve aboveness. No wonder then, that Ibn Taymiyyah said Aļļaah must create something or another. According to him, the Creator would lose His aboveness if He did not! Such is the dilemma of the relative aboveness doctrine of wahabism.

1تفسير القرطبي – (7 / 220): قلت: فعلوا الله تعالى وارتفاعه عبارة عن علو مجده وصفاته وملكوته. أي ليس فوقه فيما يجب له من معاني الجلال أحد، ولا معه من يكون العلو مشتركا بينه وبينه، لكنه العلي بالإطلاق سبحانه.

References:

Al-Asnaa Fii Sħarĥi Asmaa’-illaahi-l-Ĥusnaa. Al-Qurţubiyy. 1995: Daar Aş-Şaĥaabah Li-t-Turaatħ.

Jaamiˆu Aĥkaami-l-Qur’aan. Al-Qurţubiyy (671 AH), Sħasuddiin. Ed. Aĥmad Al-Farduuniyy & Ibraahiim Aţfiisħ. Kairo, Egypt: Daar ˆaalam Al-Kutub Al-Mişriyyah, 1384.

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Ibn Taymiyyah says Allaah is divisible into quantities and areas

August 25, 2009

Some Wahabis are scrambling around the web like headless chicken, trying to deny that their high priest of unknown-shape figure worship, Ibn Taymiyyah, said that Aļļaah is divisible. What if people came to know? They are afraid of their real beliefs being exposed. Now, let us look at what they quote from Ibn Taymiyyah. They quote him saying (their translation):

And these two meanings (of at-tajazzee and al-inqisaam, divisibility) are from those [meanings] that the Muslims are agreed upon that Allaah should be purified and sanctified from, for indeed Allaah, the Sublime, is "Ahad" and "Samad". He does not separate into parts (yatajazzee, yataba”ad) and is not divisible (munqasim) with the meaning that part of Him separates from another (part) just like a divided, split-up body is separated – like what is divided of the connected bodies, such as bread, meat and clothing and so on. A part of Him does not separate (from Him) like what separates from the hawayaan (animate, mammals) of its superfluities. And He (Allaah) is purified of such meanings with the meaning that they are non-existent (regarding Him) and are impossible for Him. Thus, His Essence does not accept tafreeq or tab’eed (meanings of division, separation).1 (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/12)

Now this is confusing isn’t it, because we have already shown ample quotes of him saying that Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not.)

Is he just contradicting himself, as is so often the case with a deviant trying to escape FakħrudDiin Ar-Raaziyy compelling arguments? Or is there something else?

In this case it is a matter of defining divisibility. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah said above:

He does not separate into parts and is not divisible with the meaning that part of Him separates from another (part) just like a divided, split-up body is separated….He (Allaah) is purified of such meanings with the meaning that they are non-existent (regarding Him) and are impossible for Him.

Pay attention to his statement, “with the meaning that part of him separates from another part just like a divided split-up body is separated;” these are the two meanings that Ibn Taymkiyyah claims are the meanings that Muslims understand from “divisibility, namely:

  1. actual separation, which he is referring to by his statement “He does not separate into parts and is not divisible with the meaning that part of Him separates from another”

  2. the practical possibility of actual separation, which is what he means by “such meanings (of actual separation)…. are impossible for Him.”

    That is why he says first, about these two meanings:

These two meanings of divisibility are from those [meanings] that the Muslims have agreed upon that Aļļaah should be purified and sanctified from.

Note also that there are meanings of divisibility that he does not deny as being true of Aļļaah, he says:

….the imams behind this saying (he means Ar-Raaziyy and others) of negating divisibility and separation is not the [meaning] of the presence of divisibility (al-inqisaam) where part of Him separates from another part, or the possibility of that (actual separation). (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/12)

What is this divisibility that they spoke of then? He explains:

What these imams mean by this saying, among the Jahmites, philosophers, Muˆtazilites and those who follow them among those who affirm attributes to Aļļaah…. [is that] …. Aļļaah does not have a quantity or boundary, or sides, or end, and is not a thing existing in itself that can be pointed at, or that a part of can be pointed at, and it is not possible, in the final conclusion, to see some of Him, but not [at the same time] something else of Him [because He is not a body, so He has neither a whole, nor a part. Accordingly, seeing Aļļaah is not about seeing a whole or a part]. This is, in their saying [then,] denying [that Aļļaah is something with] quantity and area.

This definition of divisibility, i.e. divisibility into measurable quantities and areas, is what he affirms to Aļļaah when he said, as quoted in Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not):

…this [i.e. quantitative divisibility, as stated by Ar-Raaziyy and the others] is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry.(Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

So Ibn Taymiyyah is saying here that nothing can exist, not even Aļļaah, unless it is quantitative and has an area. This is clarified even further by his statement:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).2

Here he is affirming his opinion that the Creator must have a size.

So what he is saying is that, although Aļļaah has a size with six boundaries, He is not divisible. In other words, His body, according to him, although quantitative and divisible by measurability into half a size, a quarter size and so on, no power can actually make it split at ¼ or ½. This divisibility into quantities and areas is the definition of divisibility of which Ibn Taymiyyah he claims Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal said (wahabi translation):

They speak with the ambiguous of speech, and they deceive the ignorant people on account of the doubts they place over them.

So defining divisibility as having an area that can be divided into smaller areas by measurement is “ambiguous speech” to “deceive ignorant people”? Laugh or cry, it is up to you, I think it needs no comment.

Why all these word games you may ask? Well, he performs these verbose acrobatics a lot, and there are several plausible reasons, of which two can easily be detected.

First, by having a special and restricted definition of divisibility, he can hide his belief when he wants. So if a judge asked him if he believes Aļļaah to be divisible, he would answer, “Of course not!” meaning his special definition of divisibility, and thereby saving his neck. For this same purpose he has his own definitions of what words like “body” or “create” mean, and of what it means to be an Ashˆariyy, and so on.

The second reason is to confuse the gullible who are impressed by a lot of words and phrases they cannot make sense of, and are easily affected by cheap rhetoric making them angry, such as by calling anything other than anthropomorphism “jahmism” and calling anthropomorphism “the way of the Salaf and imam Aĥmad.” A good example is the book we have quoted from, which is “Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah.” It is his attempt to refute Ar-Raaziyy’s Asaas At-Taqdiis, a small book of around 150 pages. This attempted refutation is a multi-volume work with several hundred pages of beating around the bush in the manner you have seen above. No wonder it was said about him, as mentioned by Ibn Baţuuţah “there was something wrong with his mind.” It is more than a fair assessment.

Let us finally remind ourselves of what the Sunni creed is regarding these beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy stated {in brackets}: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and following {the Jamaaˆah}. Later he stated, as part of this remembrance,{Aļļaah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.} {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}. He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said in the same remembrance: {Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.} Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans. In other words, the Sunni belief is that attributing a limit to Aļļaah makes one a non-Muslim.

1قال ابن تيمية في بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – (3 / 12) : وهذان المعنيان مما اتفق المسلمون فيما أعلمه على تنزه الله وتقدسه عنهما فإن الله سبحانه (أحد) (صمد) لا يتجزى ويتبعض وينقسم بمعنى أنه ينفصل بعضه عن بعض كما ينفصل الجسم المقسوم المعضى مثل ما تقسم الأجسام المتصلة كالخبز واللحم والثياب ونحو ذلك ولا ينفصل عن الحيوان ما ينفصل من عضلاته وهذه المعاني هو منزه عنها بمعنى أنها معدومة وأنها ممتنعة في حقه فلا تقبل ذاته التفريق والتبعيض

2قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).


Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not.)

August 20, 2009

Before reading the below, note that Fakħruddiin Ar-Raaziyy said :

The evidence shows that the one who says that Aļļaah is a body has denied Aļļaah’s existence. The reason is that the God of the World exists, and is not a body or positioned in a body. Therefore, if the one who says that Aļļaah is a body denies this existence (without a body) then he has denied Aļļaah’s existence. It is correct to say then, that the one who says that Aļļaah is a body does not believe in Allah1. (Mafaatiiĥ Al-Għayb, 16/24)

Similarly, Al-Qurţubiyy in his commentary in the Qur’aan narrates from his Sħaykħ Ibn Al-ˆArabiyy regarding the those who say Aļļaah has a body:

The sound verdict is that they are blasphemers, because there is no difference between them and those that worship idols and pictures2. (Tafsiir Al-Qurţubiyy, 4/14)

In light of this, to know the reality of the one the Wahabi sect calls "Sħaykħ of Islaam," read the following.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah is divisible

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s book Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah3:

[Fakħruddiin Ar-Raaziyy says,] if He (Aļļaah) was divisible, then He would be composed (i.e. and therefore attributed with multitude of parts) which contradicts oneness and we have already showed that this is an invalid claim….

[Ibn Taymiyyah responds:] Rather, it is clear that if this (i.e. that Aļļaah should be divisible) was impossible, then this would mean nothing could exist….(Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

Take note of what he is saying. He is saying that if something is not divisible in some sense, then it cannot exist, even Aļļaah. He is affirming his belief that Aļļaah is indeed divisible.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah has composition, settles in a place, has different sides/parts, and needs

[Ibn Taymiyyah continues to say:] We have already clarified what possibilities (in terms of what they mean) are associated with the words composition, settling in place, being other (having different sides or parts), and need, and that the meaning meant by this is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry. (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

He is saying here that nothing can exist, not even Aļļaah, unless it has a place, parts (such as different physical sides), and needs.

Based on this incredibly ugly statement, it is no wonder then, that a number of scholars, as mentioned by TaqiyyudDiin Al-Ĥuşniyy, said that Ibn Taymiyyah was "an absolute kaafir." It is no wonder also that ˆAlaa’udDiin Al-Bukħaariyy in fury uttered, "whomsoever calls him Sħaykħ of Islam is himself a kaafir." That is, those who know about his blasphemous beliefs, as being uttered by him, or believe that he died on such beliefs without repenting.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah has 6 limits, one of which is adjacent to the ˆArsħ

Ibn Taymiyyah said:

This moderate saying among the three sayings of Al-Qaađii Abuu Yaˆlaa is the one that agrees with what Aĥmad says and others among the imaams. He [i.e. Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal – and this is a lie, Aĥmad believed what Muslims believe, but that is another matter (Trans.)] has stated, “Aļļaah is in a particular direction, and He is not spread out in all directions. Rather, He is outside the world, distinct from His creation, separate from it, and He is not in every direction.” This is what Aĥmad, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, meant when he said, “He has a limit that only He knows.” If Aĥmad had meant the direction towards the ˆArsħ (Throne) only, then this would be known to Aļļaah’s slaves, because they know that Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ, so we know then that the limit they do not know is unqualified, and is not specified for the direction of the ˆArsħ (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/438).4

Note from this that He is saying: First he claims that “Aļļaah is in a particular direction,” and that “Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ.” This is according to him the known limit. Then by his saying, “He is not in spread in all directions,” he affirms that Aļļaah has limits in all other directions, that is up, left, right, back and front, but that these are unknown in term of where.

Ibn Taymiyyah said Aļļaah has a size

Ibn Taymiyyah said:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).5

In other words, he is of the opinion that everything that exists, including the Creator, must have a size. According to Ibn Taymiyyah then, Aļļaah has a size limited by 6 limits.

Ibn Taymiyyah said that Aļļaah’s acts of creating come into existence in Him

Sunnis believe that Aļļaah creates by His Power without changing or going through time. This is because anything that has a beginning must be created. Accordingly, claiming that Aļļaah’s actions have a beginning implies that His actions need to be created by another act, and that act by another act, and so on. This means that an infinite loop of acts need to be completed before anything can be created, and this is impossible, because an infinite loop cannot be completed.

An-Nasafiyy said:

"The Karraamiyyah (pre-Ibn Taymiyyah anthropomorphists) all claimed that Aļļaah’s creating is an event in Aļļaah with a beginning, and that events occur in Aļļaah. Aļļaah is greatly above what the unjust ascribe to Him (Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 141)."

He also said about them:

I really do not know how these unbelievers in God talk the talk of atheists and Greek philosophers and affirm the beginning of the world, and then accept to believe that the beginninglessly eternal (i.e. Aļļaah) is something in which events (anything with a beginning) take place. How can they, when this necessitates either believing that the Creator has a beginning, or that the world (anything other than Aļļaah) has no beginning….(Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 501-502)

Ibn Taymiyyah, in contrast to this, said:

It has become clear that nothing can come into existence except from an actor (he means the Creator) that does something one after another.” He also said:“An act is impossible except bit by bit. (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141)6

In other words, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, acts of creating come into existence in Aļļaah Himself, after non-existence. This is a blasphemous belief, as mentioned above.

Ibn Taymiyyah said that creation is eternal, and that Aļļaah has no choice, but to create something

Based on his idea that Aļļaah’s actions have a beginning, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that Aļļaah has always been doing one act after another (i.e. creating) without a beginning. He says:

It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and not having something done in particular, so there is no eternal object in the world, and He is not eternally a complete influencer for anything (to exist) in the world, but He has in beginningless eternity always been a complete influencer for something (to exist), one after another… (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97)7

Note that his statement “It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular,” means that Aļļaah has no choice but to create something. This is a plain ascription of flaw to the Creator, and the one that has such a belief is light years away from being anything that can be called a Muslim. All Muslims must believe that Aļļaah does not need, and is not compelled to, or obligated to create at all.

Note also that the influence for something (to exist) that he speaks of, will be for a body to exist, or something to exist in a body, because he believes nothing can exist except bodies. According to him then, Aļļaah is the only eternal body among an eternal series of other bodies that He was compelled to create, although the type of bodies and events in them was His choice. In other words, he says that the world (which is anything other than Aļļaah) is eternal, because Aļļaah is eternally compelled to create something or another.

What Muslims believe, on the other hand, is that Aļļaah is the Creator of all things, and that He did not have to create anything, because He does not need anything, and is not obligated to do anything. In other words, it is not a necessity for Aļļaah to act, i.e create, anything at all. This is because Aļļaah is perfect, and therefore does not need to do anything. Ibn Taymiyyah, however, does not accept this, and comments on a statement of Ibn Ĥazm:

And even stranger than that is his (Ibn Ĥazm’s) claim that the scholars are in consensus about declaring a kaafir the one that does not believe that “He was eternally the only one in existence, and there was nothing existing with Him, then He created everything as He willed. (Naqd Maraatibi-l-‘Ijmaaˆ, 303)8

This is an attempt to hide his ugly kufr from his followers, for look at what Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy said:

Our shaykħ in his explanation of At-Tirmidħiyy said, “….. and it has been related by Al-Qaađii ˆIiaađ and others that the one who says that the world (anything other than Aļļaah) is eternal is a kaafir (non-Muslim) by scholarly consensus.” And Ibn Daqiiq Al-ˆIiid said: “It happened from some of those who claim to master intellectual matters, and inclines towards Philosophy, to think that the one that disagrees with the world having a beginning is not declared a kaafir…. and this is from blindness, or pretended blindness, because the world having a beginning is one of those things that are established by scholarly consensus and unequivocal (mutawaatir) narrational evidences.(Fatĥu-l-Baarii, 12/202)9

References:

Aş-Şafadiyyah. Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy. Egypt: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, 1406.

Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah. —. Makkah: Maţbaˆah Al-Ĥukuumah, 1392.

Fatĥu-l-Baarii Sħarĥu Şaĥiiĥi-l-Bukħaariyy. Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Marefah, 1379.

Jaamiˆu Aĥkaami-l-Qur’aan. Al-Qurţubiyy (671 AH), Sħasuddiin. Ed. Hisħaam Samiir Al-Bukħaariyy. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Daar ˆaalam Al-Kutub, 1423.

Mafaatiiĥ Al-Għayb. FakħrudDiin Al-Raaziy. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 1421.

Naqd Maraatibi-l-‘Ijmaaˆ. Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy. Beirut, Lebanon: Daar Ibn Ĥazm, 1419.

Tabşiratu-l-Adillah. Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy. Ed. Dr. Hüseyin Atay. Turkey: Riʼāsat al-Shuʻūn al-Dīnīyah lil-Jumhūrīyah al-Turkīyah, 1993.

الصفدية. أحمد عبد الحليم بن تيمية الحراني (728). مصر: مكتية ابن تيمية, 1406.

بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية. —. Ed. محمد بن عبد الرحمن بن قاسم. مكة المكرمة: مطبعة الحكومة, 1392.

فتح الباري شرح صحيح البخاري. أحمد بن علي بن حجر أبو الفضل العسقلاني الشافعي 852 هـ. بيروت, لبنان: دار المعرفة, 1379.

نقد مراتب الإجماع. أحمد عبد الحليم بن تيمية الحراني (728). بيروت, لبنان: دار ابن حزم, 1998.

1 يقول الرازي: الدليل دل على أن من قال إن الإله جسم فهو منكر للإله تعالى وذلك لأن إله العالم موجود ليس بجسم ولا حال في الجسم فإذا أنكر المجسم هذا الموجود فقد أنكر ذات الإله تعالى فالخلاف بين المجسم والموحد ليس في الصفة بل في الذات فصح في المجسم أنه لا يؤمن بالله (مفاتيح الغيب ـ ترقيم الشاملة موافق للمطبوع – 16 / 24)

2يقول القرطبي: الصحيح القول بتكفيرهم ، إذ لا فرق بينهم وبين عباد الأصنام والصور (تفسير القرطبي – 4 / 14)

3قال ابن تيمية: قولك إن كان منقسما كان مركبا وتقدم إبطاله تقدم الجواب عن هذا الذي سميته مركبا وتبين أنه لا حجة أصلا على امتناع ذلك بل بين أن إحالة ذلك تقتضي إبطال كل موجود ولولا أنه أحال على ما تقدم لما أحلنا عليه وتقدم بيان ما في لفظ التركيب والتحيز والغير والافتقار من الاحتمال وإن المعنى الذي يقصد منه بذلك يجب أن يتصف به كل موجود سواء كان واجبا أو ممكنا وإن القول بامتناع ذلك يستلزم السفسطة المحضة (بيان تلبيس الجهمية ج 1 ص 33).

4قال ابن تيمية: فهذا القول الوسط من أقوال القاضي الثلاثة هو المطابق لكلام أحمد وغيره من الأئمة وقد قال إنه تعالى في جهة مخصوصة وليس هو ذاهبا في الجهات بل هو خارج العالم متميز عن خلقه منفصل عنهم غير داخل في كل الجهات وهذا معنى قول أحمد “حد لا يعلمه إلا هو” ولو كان مراد أحمد رحمه الله الحد من جهة العرش فقط لكان ذلك معلوما لعباده فانهم قد عرفوا أن حده من هذه الجهة هو العرش فعلم أن الحد الذي لا يعلمونه مطلق لا يختص بجهة العرش (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج1/ص438).

5قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).

6قال ابن تيمية في الصفدية : وتبين أنه لا يمكن حدوث شيء من الحوادث إلا عن فاعل يفعل شيئا بعد شيء….” وقال: “الفعل لا يعقل ولا يمكن إلا شيئا فشيئاً….(الصفدية, 2/141)”

7قال ابن تيمية في الصفدية (2 / 97): وحينئذ فالذي هو من لوازم ذاته نوع الفعل لا فعل معين ولا مفعول معين فلا يكون في العالم شيء قديم وحينئذ لا يكون في الأزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء من العالم ولكن لم يزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء بعد شيء وكل أثر يوجد عند حصول كمال التأثير فيه.

8قال ابن تيمية في: وأعجب من ذلك حكايته الإجماع على كفر من نازع أنه سبحانه "لم يزل وحده، ولا شيء غيره معه، ثم خلق الأشياء كما شاء.(نقد مراتب الإجماع, 303)”

9قَالَ شَيْخنَا فِي شَرْح التِّرْمِذِيّ : الصَّحِيح فِي تَكْفِير مُنْكِر الْإِجْمَاع تَقْيِيدُهُ بِإِنْكَارِ مَا يُعْلَم وُجُوبُهُ مِنْ الدِّين بِالضَّرُورَةِ كَالصَّلَوَاتِ الْخَمْس ، وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ عَبَّرَ بِإِنْكَارِ مَا عُلِمَ وُجُوبه بِالتَّوَاتُرِ وَمِنْهُ الْقَوْل بِحُدُوثِ الْعَالَمِ ، وَقَدْ حَكَى عِيَاض وَغَيْره الْإِجْمَاع عَلَى تَكْفِير مَنْ يَقُول بِقِدَمِ الْعَالَم ، وَقَالَ اِبْن دَقِيق الْعِيد : وَقَعَ هُنَا مَنْ يَدَّعِي الْحِذْق فِي الْمَعْقُولَات وَيَمِيل إِلَى الْفَلْسَفَة فَظَنَّ أَنَّ الْمُخَالِف فِي حُدُوث الْعَالَم لَا يُكَفَّر لِأَنَّهُ مِنْ قَبِيل مُخَالَفَة الْإِجْمَاع ، وَتَمَسَّكَ بِقَوْلِنَا إِنَّ مُنْكِر الْإِجْمَاع لَا يُكَفَّر عَلَى الْإِطْلَاق حَتَّى يَثْبُتَ النَّقْلُ بِذَلِكَ مُتَوَاتِرًا عَنْ صَاحِب الشَّرْع ، قَالَ وَهُوَ تَمَسُّكٌ سَاقِط إِمَّا عَنْ عَمًى فِي الْبَصِيرَة أَوْ تَعَامٍ لِأَنَّ حُدُوث الْعَالَم مِنْ قَبِيل مَا اِجْتَمَعَ فِيهِ الْإِجْمَاع وَالتَّوَاتُر بِالنَّقْلِ (فتح الباري العسقلاني, 12/202).


Refuting Yaser Qadi’s opposition to proving Allaah’s existence

August 2, 2009

Islam is a great religion, it does not need to attack reason or logic to hold. It has nothing to hide. It is not based on blind imitation, or blind acceptance. The argument for its correctness agrees with reason from beginning to end, as has been shown in the article “Foundations of the Religion“. There is no argument based on valid premises and sound structure that can put a dent in it. This is what we Sunnis believe, and any religion that does not meet this criteria is not the religion of Aļļaah.

Yaser Qadi is out to show otherwise in his The Theological Implications of the Story of Ibrahim & the Stars (Ibn Taymiyyah vs. the Mutakallimun). He now opposes the proof of the Creator’s existence, not by showing that the premises do not hold or that the argument is false, but by saying in essence: “it is not mentioned in the Qur’aan, is complicated, was not used by the companions and there is no need, because everybody knows by the fiţrah.” Thus he implies that it is prohibited. Of course, it is all based on the talk of arch-anthropomorphist, Ibn Taymiyyah.

To continue reading you may download the article Rational Quranic Islam vs Wahabism in PDF formats. The table of contents is:

Introduction…. p. 3
Circular reasoning is Quranic?!…. p. 3
Different times and different people need different types of proofs…. p. 4
The Imam ˆAbdulQaahir on the Sunni scholars of the science of belief…. p. 5
Kalam scholars used terminology like those of the Aristotelians to show them wrong…. p. 10
The principles of the proofs for the creators existence…. p. 10
About the so called proof of the existence of God through the proof of the createdness of “accidents”…. p. 11
The proof of the creators existence is in compliance with the Qur’aan…. p. 12
Implications of the proof of Allaah’s existence for denying Allaah’s resemblance to creation…. p. 12
A more detailed way of showing that bodies must be created for one to prove that the world is created…. p. 14
Ibn Taymiyyah’ arguments against the proof stating that bodies must have a creator…. p. 15
The anthropomorphist dilemma; the motivation of Ibn Taymiyyah for attacking the proof of Allaah’s existence based on the fact that the world consists of bodies and attributes…. p. 19
Conclusion….   p. 19


Foundations of the religion in PDF

August 2, 2009

One of the most important readings on this website is the introductory article on how the religion of Islam agrees with sound reason.

Here is the article as a PDF download: The Foundations of the Religion