What beginning to exist implies in terms of “cause”

If it was proposed that a particle came into existence, then the claims that may be made about this event are that it was:

1. Necessary

1. Possible

1. Impossible

There is no 4th alternative. Moreover, the 3rd can obviously be dismissed. Thus two cases remain to be considered as follows:

If it was supposedly necessary, then this necessity could either be claimed to be:

1. Intrinsic to the particle or

1. Extrinsic to the particle

There is no 3rd alternative. The first is clearly self-contradictory, because the event did not exist, and what does not exist cannot be intrinsically necessary in existence. It follows that the supposed particles’ supposed necessity of existence must be from other than it.

If it was supposedly possible, then it follows that the possibility of its existence must have outweighed its prior non-existence. Otherwise it would have remained non existent. This outweighing could either be claimed to be:

1. Intrinsic to the particle or
2. Extrinsic to the particle

There is no 3rd alternative. The first is clearly self-contradictory, because the event/particle did not exist, and what does not exist cannot have any influence on anything. It follows again that the supposed particles’ existence would have to be from other than it.

With this understanding of “cause”, it is clear that to propose that something can begin to exist without a “cause” is absurd.

Hence, the atheist contention that we do not know if something can begin to exist without a cause is absurd.

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The Wahabi Box Theory of Emergence (WBTE)

The below article is written to clarify what the wahabis are aiming at in some of their writings. This is needed, since they almost never really define their terms, or clarify what exactly the different viewpoints are in meaning (as opposed to wording). What I have written below aims to clarify what they are aiming at in one particular word game: their concept of “bringing into existence” vs. “creating”.

Before delving into this discussion two fundamental points should be clear regarding the belief of Muslims:

1. Muslims believe that everything that has a beginning must have been created by Aļļaah, i.e. brought into existence by His Will and Power. This includes every and any beginning of any kind, such as a movement or thought, or a change in shape or color. To claim that any beginning of any kind was not created by Aļļaah is to commit shirk, and makes one a non-Muslim.
2. Muslims believe that Aļļaah is not in a location, because He is not a body, not something that fills space. He exists without being in space, or in a location in any sense. He is neither in a specific location, nor everywhere. This belief is clarified here in terms of the reasons why this belief is of great importance. However, the following point should be extra clear:

The wahabis falsely believe that Aļļaah has a location. Sometimes they say they do not believe that Allah is a body, but this is just a play with words. Being in a location means being limited to that location, and that necessitates having borders and therefore either being a small dot, or something larger. This is issue is important, because every Muslim must believe that Aļļaah does not resemble His creation. Moreover, believing Aļļaah to be limited in any sense is an invitation to atheism, because the proof of Aļļaah’s existence is based on the existence of bodies. This is why wahabis are often against learning the detailed proofs of Aļļaah’s existence, as has been discussed here.

Having made the above points clear, let us get back to the main topic: the wahabi understanding of the concept of bringing into existence and the word creating.

In short, the wahabi theory is that there are two types of things that have a beginning, i.e. events:

1. Whatever Aļļaah brings into existence in the world. These are called “created” or “brought into existence”.
2. Whatever Aļļaah brings into existence, as they falsely believe, in Himself. I.e. in the entity that they worship that is limited to a specific location “up there” and claim is “Aļļaah”. This is the type of event they are referring to when they say that “not everything that has a beginning is created.”

To sum up the wahabi position:

1. If something is brought into existence in the world, then this can be called both “brought into existence” and “created”.
2. If something is brought into existence in the thing they falsely believe to be Aļļaah, then this is called “brought into existence”, but it is not “created”.

In other words, according to the wahabis, whether something brought into existence is called “created”, or not, is only a matter of the location of this new existence. I.e. it is a matter of which box it emerges in. This is what I have called, “The Wahabi Box Theory of Emergence”.

There is a very serious problem with this pathetic play with words. It means they believe that Aļļaah is a location for created events. Yes, I said “created” events. After all, the essential meaning of creating is that Aļļaah brings into existence by His Power and according to His Will. Where the thing or event comes into existence makes no difference to the essence of this meaning. I.e. bringing something into existence is to create, no matter where it comes into existence, and believing that Aļļaah is partially created is another blasphemous belief.

The Arabic language does not allow for the wahabi understanding of the word “create”, where it is restricted to only specific locations. Besides being quite obvious, this has been discussed more fully in this article.

The correct Islamic understanding is that:

1. When one says that Aļļaah brings something into existence, it means that He brings it into existence by His Will and Power.
2. When one says that Aļļaah creates something it also means that He brings it into existence by His Will and Power.
3. Where the event brought into existence emerges makes no difference whatsoever to the use of the two phrases “Aļļaah creates” or “Aļļaah brings into existence”.

Why do the wahabis play these word games? It is because they know they cannot say that anything is created in Aļļaah. It will be too obvious to lay people that they are wrong. They thrive on being vague and imprecise.

The difference between wahabi creed and Islaam III: what the scholars said about their belief

An important reply has been posted at this link regarding takfiir of anthropomorphists.

(Updated) Takwiin, effective pertainment and AI-‘Iijiyy on Allaah not being in time

By actions the Asħˆariyys mean the created things themselves that exist by the influence of Aļļaah’s attribute of power, or what they call effective pertainment. Effective pertainment is the pertaining of Aļļaah’s power to what exists of created things, as opposed to valid pertainment, which is the pertaining Aļļaah’s power to everything possible. The Maaturiidiyys say that the attribute of power is Aļļaah’s power to bring into existence, while the bringing into existence is another attribute called takwiin. So what Asħˆariyys explain as (1) "effective pertainment" and (2) "valid pertainment" is explained as two attributes, respectively: (1) "takwiin" or "creating" and (2) "power to create" according to Maaturiidiyys.

Aļļaah’s providing, giving, bringing into existence, etc. is called effective pertainment in the Asħˆariyy school, while in the Maaturiidiyy school these are different names for takwiin according to what the attribute of takwiin pertains to.

When we remember that Aļļaah is not in time according to all, then it becomes easy to understand that this is mainly a semantical difference; using different words to explain the same thing. Although the Asħˆariyys say that the effective pertainment has a beginning, this is with respect to us, because we are in time. So we say that Jill was created yesterday, but the time element of yesterday is a created attribute of Jill, where as the attribute of Aļļaah is creating Jill with the "yesterday" as one of her attributes, the meanings associated with her being, sort of like color. In other words, Aļļaah does not pass through a state of time called before creating Jill and after creating Jill, because He is not in time.

This means that Aļļaah Himself did not change during those six days in which He created the Heavens and the Earth. What changed is creation; those six days are for creation. Accordingly, the Imam of Guidance, Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy says: “A fundamental belief principle is that whenever Aļļaah is ascribed an attribute, then this attribute is eternal (i.e. without a beginning or end). One says that He is attributed with knowledge, power and providing eternally without a beginning and without an end. If He is mentioned with regard to His management of creation and orders to it, then time is stated, but this time is for creation, not for Him. For example, it is said, "Aļļaah knows eternally that you are sitting here," or "(sitting here) at this time." I.e. Aļļaah knows eternally without a beginning or an end that the person is sitting now…. This is all to prevent people from thinking "How were the created things in eternity?”[1]

An-Nasafiyy, the second most important scholar in the Maaturiidiyy school after Al-Maaturiidiyy himself, said: "His eternal attribute of creating does not lead to saying that the world is eternal, because the possible in existence cannot be eternal, and because creating is not for the immediate existence of the created, but for the time of its existence."[2] He also said: "The Karraamiyyah all claimed that Aļļaah’s creating (takwiin) is an event in Aļļaah with a beginning, and that events occur in Aļļaah. Aļļaah is greatly above what the unjust ascribe to Him."[3]

It must be understood that Aļļaah’s creating is not a sequential action, it is an action without a how. It has no beginning or end. If it was sequential, one previously non-existent action coming into existence after another, then each action would itself need to be brought into existence. This is because it did not exist previously. Then if that action of bringing the action into existence also had a beginning, we would need a bringing into existence of that one also, etc. to infinity, which would mean that one single act of creating would need an infinite amount of bringings into existence prior to it. This means that the act of creating can’t ever exist, because the prerequisite infinite amount of bringings into existence cannot ever be concluded. The solution to this is to say that Aļļaah’s act of bringing into existence does not have a beginning, and therefore does not need to be brought into existence.

In other words, Aļļaah created the world in six days, without His act of creating it having a beginning or an end, because Aļļaah is not in time; His attributes do not change and do not renew.

Further to this concept, here is what the two famous asħˆariyys, ˆAđududDiin Al-‘Iijiyy, and Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy have to say about Aļļaah not being in time. Al-‘Iijiyy’s words are bolded in brackets, while the rest is Al-Jurjaaniyy’s explanation[4]:

الشرح (المقصد الرابع إنه تعالى ليس في زمان) أي ليس وجوده وجودا زمانيا ومعنى كون الوجود زمانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في زمان كما أن معنى كونه مكانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في مكان	(The fourth topic: on Aļļaah not being in time.) That is, His existence is not in time. The meaning of existence in time is that it cannot be except in time, just as the meaning of existence in a location is that it cannot be except in a location.
(هذا مما اتفق عليه أرباب الملل ولا نعرف فيه للعقلاء خلافا) وإن كان مذهب المجسمة يجر إليه كما يجر إلى الجهة والمكان	(This is one of the things that the people of all sects and religions agreed upon, and we do not know of any disagreement upon this between rational beings.) This is so, even if the anthropomorphists imply that, just as they imply direction and location.
(أما عند الحكماء فلأن الزمان) عندهم (مقدار حركة المحدد) للجهات (فلا يتصور فيما لا تعلق له بالحركة والجهة)	(As for according to the philosophers, this is because time) according to them (is the amount of limited movement) in any direction (so being in time cannot be true of what does not have to do with movement or direction.)
وتوضيحه أن التغير التدريجي زماني بمعنى أنه يتقدر بالزمان وينطبق عليه ولا يتصور وجوده إلا فيه والتغير الدفعي متعلق بالآن الذي هو طرف الزمان فما لا تغير فيه أصلا لا تعلق له بالزمان قطعا نعم وجوده تعالى مقارن للزمان وحاصل مع حصوله وأما أنه زماني أو آني أي واقع في أحدهما فكلا	That is, gradual change is in time, in the sense that it is measured in time, and coincides with time, and its existence cannot be other than in time, and a momentary change defines the “now” which is a the last point in time [i.e. so far]. Accordingly, what does not change at all, is not related to time at all. Yes, Aļļaah’s existence is affirmed as true and real no matter what time one is in, but it is not in time, or momentary. That is, it is not occurring in a time or a moment.
(وأما عندنا فلأنه) أي الزمان (متجدد يقدر به متجدد فلا يتصور في القديم فأي تفسير فسر) الزمان (به امتنع ثبوته لله تعالى)	(As for according to us, this is because it) i.e. time (is something renewing by which something else renewing is measured, so it cannot be true of the beginninglessly eternal. Accordingly, no matter how we define it,) i.e. time (it cannot be affirmed as being true of Aļļaah.)
(تنبيه) على ما يتضمنه هذا الأصل الذي مهدناه آنفا (يعلم مما ذكرنا أنا سواء قلنا العالم حادث بالحدوث الزماني) كما هو رأينا (أو الذاتي) كما هو رأي الحكيم (فتقدم الباري سبحانه عليه) لكونه موجدا إياه (ليس تقدما زمانيا) وإلا لزم كونه تعالى واقعا في الزمان بل هو تقدم ذاتي عندهم وقسم سادس عندنا كتقدم بعض أجزاء الزمان على بعضها	(Important note) regarding this principle that we have just explained: (It is known from what we mentioned previously that regardless of whether we say that the world has a beginning that is in time) as is our view, (or that it is in being) as is the view of the philosopher (it is still true that the precedence of Aļļaah over creation) by His being its Creator (is not a precedence of time.) Otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is a precedence of being, according to the philosophers, and a sixth meaning [of precedence] in our view [that is not in time], like the precedence of moments of time over other moments of time [The sixth meaning of precedence is that of Creator over created, not in time, and this is beyond what our minds can grasp, because the reality of Aļļaah’s existence cannot be grasped. The precedence of moments of time over other moments is mentioned to show that precedence in existence is not necessarily in time].
(و) يعلم أيضا (أن بقاءه ليس عبارة عن وجوده في زمانين) وإلا كان تعالى زمانيا بل هو عبارة امتناع عدمه ومقارنته مع الأزمنة (ولا القدم عبارة عن أن يكون قبل كل زمان زمان) وإلا لم يتصف به الباري تعالى	(Moreover,) it is also known (that His everlastingness is not an expression meant to indicate His existence in two consecutive times,) otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is an expression meaning that it is impossible for His to cease to exist, or accompany time [i.e. to be thought of as passing through time]. (Furthermore, His beginningless existence is not meant to express that there is a time before all times,) otherwise it would not be ascribed to Him.
(وأنه) أي ما ذكرناه من أنه تعالى ليس زمانيا (يبسط العذر في ورود ما ورد من الكلام الأزلي بصيغة الماضي ولو في الأمور المستقبلة) الواقعة فيما لا يزال كقوله تعالى إنا أرسلنا نوحا وذلك لأنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لا بحسب ذاته ولا بحسب صفاته كان نسبة كلامه الأزلي إلى جميع الأزمنة على السوية إلا أن حكمته تعالى اقتضت التعبير عن بعض الأمور بصيغة الماضي وعن بعضها بصيغة المستقبل فسقط ما تمسك به المعتزلة في حدوث القرآن من أنه لو كان قديما لزم الكذب في أمثال ما ذكر فإن الإرسال لم يكن واقعا قبل الأزل	(In addition it) [i.e. the fact we have mentioned regarding Him (تعالى) not being in time] (justifies what has been revealed of Aļļaah’s speech expressed in the past tense, even for what pertains to the future) and happens with a beginning, such as His saying (تعالى): إنا أرسلنا نوحا Meaning: Verily we have sent Nuuĥ. This is because if He is not in time, neither in His Self, nor His attributes, then His beginningless and endless Speech has the same relation to all times. It is just that His wisdom dictates revealing expressions regarding some issues in past tense, and some in future tense. Accordingly, the claim of the Muˆtazilites regarding the Qur’aan [i.e. the attribute of speech that the expressions in the revealed book refer to] having a beginning is invalid. [They claimed invalidly that it must have a beginning, and cannot be an eternal attribute, saying:] because otherwise the expressions like the one mentioned would be untrue, since the sending [of Nuuĥ in this case] did not happen before beginningless eternity.
(وههنا أسرار أخر لا أبوح بها ثقة بفطنتك) منها إذا قلنا كان الله موجودا في الأزل وسيكون موجودا في الأبد وهو موجود الآن لم نرد به أن وجوده واقع في تلك الأزمنة بل أردنا أنه مقارن معها من غير أن يتعلق بها كتعلق الزمانيات	(There are other hidden realities known through this that I will not mention explicitly, based on trust in your intelligence.) Among these is the fact that if we say “Aļļaah existed before creation, and shall exist forever, and He exists now,” then we do not mean by this that His existence falls in these times. Rather, we mean that His existence is true at all times, without Him being in them the way things in time are.
ومنها أنه لو ثبت وجود مجردات عقلية لم تكن أيضا زمانية	Another [fact known from this] is that if it was established that there are beings with a beginning that are not in place, then they would not be in time. [This is true according to the philosophers’ definition of time, because it is dependent on space. In Sunni terminology, however, it is not acceptable to say that such beings would not be in time. This is because such beings would pass through renewed existence, as they are not necessary in existence, and can change in knowledge or will, or other attributes.]
ومنها أنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لم يكن بالقياس إليه ماض وحال ومستقبل فلا يلزم من علمه بالتغيرات تغير في علمه إنما يلزم ذلك إذا دخل فيه الزمان	[Yet] another [fact known from this] is that if He is not in time, then the measures of time in terms of past, present and future would not hold true of Him. Accordingly, it is not necessitated from His knowledge of changing things that His knowledge should change. It would only be necessary if He was in time [and He is not.]

[1] Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH), Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah, 9/473.

[2] Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115 AD), Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 1:1/99.

[3] Ibid., 1:1/401.

[4] Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD) and ˆAđudu-d-Diin Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD), Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif, 3/41.

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Bilbliography

Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115 AD). Tabşiratu-l-Adillah. Edited by Dr. Huuseyin Atay. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Turkey: Ri’aasat al-Shu’uun al-Diiniiyyah lil-Jumhuuriyyah al-Turkiyyah, 1993.

Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH). Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 1426.

Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD), and ˆAđudu-d-Diin Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD). Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif. 3 vols. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Jiil – Shaamilah, 1997.

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Question: Can we say that we mainly use logic when it comes to belief (Aqeedah)?

I do not think that is precise. You need logic in all matters of belief and jurisprudence (fiqh). The question is where the most explicit and immediate premises come from; are they scriptural, or based on the nature of the world around us? In fiqh they are always scriptural, i.e. based on the judgments (orders/prohibitions, etc.) that they contain. In belief issues, however, they are sometimes based on the world around us. Why? Because the premises for relying on scriptures must be from something other than the scripture, to avoid circular reasoning[1].

This means that the proofs of Aļļaah’s existence, some of His attributes, and the miracles of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم), and thus his prophethood (صلى الله عليه وسلم), have premises based on:

a) the essential nature of the world, such as the fact that it changes, and consists of parts that are intrinsically possible in existence, and therefore need a creator (see Foundations of The Religion."

b) on what is normally correlated, such as "touch fire -> get burned". It is through the normal we can recognize the extraordinary, i.e. miracles that prove prophethood. We know the splitting of the moon as a miracle of the Prophet Muĥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم) because it never happened before or after him.

Note that the underlying premises (unlike the immediate and explicit) on any fiqh issue are not based on the scriptures, but also on these premises. This is because the establishment of the scriptures as being revealed from Aļļaah, and obligatory to follow, are based on these premises.

Logic is always needed, even if you are only dealing with proofs from the Qur’aan and the Sunnah. This is because logic is about making precise definitions and constructing proofs, whether they be constructed from premises that are taken from the revealed scriptures or not.

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[1] An example of this would be if someone said, "I pray because Aļļaah orders me to, because it says so in His book, and I know this book tells me what Aļļaah orders, because the book tells me it is." To get out of this line of reasoning, you need to prove by other means than the book’s instructions that the book is really from Aļļaah. To do this you need to prove that Aļļaah exists, and that miracles prove prophethood, and that is the role of Kalaam/Belief Science.

The Wahabi-type belief was that of a fringe group in hiding throughout most of this nation’s history

Ibn Jibriin, major wahabi, admits this in his book here stating:

When the third century of the Hijrah ended, the last of the best (three) centuries, these books (the books he likes[1]) were unfortunately left for dead, and were stored away without anyone recognizing, reading, or studying them except rarely, and only in hiding. The Asħˆariyy school and Muˆtazilite schools[2] were firmly established and people pored over their study everywhere.[3]

He admits here that his belief system was only taught in hiding! In other words, it was a baaţiniyy[4] type of sect, and not the majority Sunni sect at all. Then he says:

And by careful study of these centuries: the fourth, the fifth, the sixth, and most of the seventh, you do not find anyone that is upon the school of the Sunnah![5]

What is this “School of the Sunnah” that disappeared for 4 centuries?(!!!) We get an idea when he speaks about the books written in those centuries that are so terrible in his view. He takes the Creed of Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy as an example of the least worst of them (although Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy was actually among the Salaf, born in the 3^rd century) He says about it:

Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy mentioned in it some terrible statements that were widespread in his time through the kalaam scholars, such as his statement: “Verily Aļļaah is clear of the having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments. The six directions (up, down, front, back, left and right) do not contain Him (un)like all created things.[6]

What we can understand then, is that anthropomorphist creed of believing that Aļļaah is a bodily being, something to be pointed at in a direction, and with parts, and dimensions is what was only taught in hiding during those centuries.

So what, you may ask, happened in the 7^th century? Well, who other than Ibn Tayimiyyah? Ibn Jibriin says about him:

He did not care about the people of his time, or about who opposed him. Rather, he spoke openly about what he believed, and renewed that belief of the Salaf, and wrote books that no one can oppose, and clarified in them what is more obvious than the sun…. No doubt, he spoke openly, because Aļļaah gave him knowledge, and ability to explain, so no one in his time could resist him. So he is the one that renewed the Sunni school.[7]

In short, he is telling us above that what he calls the “Sunni belief” was almost extinct for 4 centuries, and was only taught in hiding, due to fear of persecution. So the question then becomes, how can this be sect be called Sunnis in any reasonable persons vocabulary? Moreover, how does that fit with the majority of scholars being Sunnis?

Most importantly: How could this belief of Ibn Taymiyyah possibly be collaboratively, mass-narrated from the salaf, without possibility of perversions by mistakes or otherwise, when it was hidden for four centuries???

That is, how can they claim to know for sure that a belief system that went into hiding has been absolutely reliably narrated from the Salaf? It has only been narrated by a handful of Hanbali pretenders, and in hiding, so it is like the gospel of the christians during their persecution by the jews and the Romans. We all know what happened to their books.

Of course, after Ibn Taymiyyah’s demise in jail for heresy, the school once again became a hidden sect. So much for the, “books that no one could oppose,” and “no one could resist him.” In fact, even christians, who have one of the most irrational belief system on earth, cannot be fended off based on Ibn Taymiyyah’s belief principles. Why? Because his deity is a something with size, shaped by a border that can change, so why couldn’t this deity be Jesus or anything else proposed? This is what some christians are asking. They are of course right. There is no fundamental difference between them and Ibn Taymiyyah.

Ibn Al-Qayyim realized this, and that is why he put on an Asħˆariyy coat when arguing with the christians in his book Hidaayatu-l-Ĥayaaraa Fii ‘Ajwibatu-l-Yahuudi wa-Naşaaraa, “the guidance of the confused regarding answering the christians and jews”:

Fourth, verily Aļļaah does not change[8].[9]

As well known, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim taught that Aļļaah brings things into existence in Himself, such as changing location and movement. This is one of their main contentions against the ‘Asħˆariyys, who are honest when they say they believe that Aļļaah does not change.

In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah hid his beliefs to a great extent, and that is why some scholars praise him – they did not know about his outrageous beliefs. For example, you find him in one place saying it is kufr to say Aļļaah is a body, then in another that it is not allowed to forbid saying it, and in yet another that Aļļaah has six boundaries and a shrinkable size!

The belief of Ibn Taymiyyah went into hiding again after his death. His books were burned and forbidden to teach, and anyone who spread his teaching faced punishment. Ibn Al-Qayyim, as an example, was jailed and almost executed at one point. That is why even for that period it is hard find books by scholars that support the beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah.

So we also have the 8, 9^th, 10^th, 11^th centuries free of what Ibn Jibriin calls Sunnism, until the rebellion of Muĥammad ibn ˆAbdilWahhaab in the 12^th century after the Hijrah. Since then they have only grown stronger through support from the imperialist powers. It was the British that first supplied them with weapons, and thereby helped to renew the call to the so called “Salafi” version of religion. After that the books of Ibn Taymiyyah were gradually brought out from their hiding places and published.

All Ibn Jibriin says fits perfectly with what TaajudDiin As-Subkiyy[12] said some 600 years ago:

We have already mentioned what Ibn ˆAbdisSalaam and others before and after him mentioned, which is that the Sħaafiˆiyys, Maalikiyys, Ĥanafiyys and the honorable among the Ĥanbaliyys are all ‘Asħˆariyys. This is what was stated by Ibn ˆAbdisSalaam, the leader of Sħaafiˆiyys of his time, and Ibn Al-Ĥaajib, the leader of the Maalikiyys of his time, and Al-Ĥaşiiriyy, the leader of the Ĥanafiyys at the time. Among what was stated by Ibn ˆAsaakir, the great ĥadiitħ master of this Muĥammadan nation, the solid and trustworthy man: “are there any among the jurists, among the Ĥanafiyys, Maalikiyys and Sħaafiˆiyys that do not agree with him and do not related themselves to him, and pleased with his efforts for the religion of Aļļaah, praising him for great knowledge? That is, except for a tiny group that hide anthropomorphism, and make an enemy of those who believe in tawĥiid and clear Aļļaah of likeness to creation. Another exception are those that imitate the saying of the Muˆtazilites in speaking ill of him.[10]”[11]

As-Subkiyy states regarding the anthropomorphists:

The state of the Kħaţţaabiyyah (as Shiite sect), and they are (i.e. their role is taken over by) the anthropomorphists in this time of ours, (in the sense that they) went to the extent of permitting lying against their religious opponents. Especially those that hurt them in person or property. I was told that their leader was asked about a Sħaafiˆiyy:

“Should I testify against him with a lie in court?”

Their leader said, “Do you not believe that it is allowed to spill his blood?”

The interrogator answered, “Yes I do.”

The leader said, “Then whatever is less than that is less than spilling his blood, so testify and defend the Muslims from his evil.“

So this is their belief, and they think themselves Muslims, and that they are Sunnis (i.e. the anthropomorphists, those that call themselves “salafis” today.”) Yet if their scholars were counted in number, although they are not in reality scholars (because they are deviant), they would not reach a number of any significance. They consider most of the scholars of the Muhammadan nation as non-Muslims, and then they relate themselves to the Imaam ‘Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal, may Aļļaah please him, but he has nothing to do with them. However, his situation is as some of the enlightened said, as I saw written in hand by Sħaykħ Taqiyyu-d-Diin ibn Aş-Şalaaĥ (the famous author of Muqaddimah ibn Aş-Şalaaĥ[13]: “Two imaams were afflicted in their companions that they were surrounded by, and are clear of them: ‘Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal was afflicted with anthropomorphists, and Jaˆfar Aş-Şaadiq was afflicted with shiites.[14]”[15]

Note that the wahabi’s, like their predecessors among anthropomorphists, like to twist things to fit their purpose, and even tend to blatant lies and forgery. As-Subkiyy says:

The state of some anthropomorphists have reached the stage in our time where they wrote a copy of An-Nawawiyy’s commentary on Şaĥiiĥ Muslim, and took out the parts where An-Nawawiyy spoke about ĥadiitħs mentioning attributes. For verily An-Nawawiyy is an Asħˆariyy in belief, so this writer did not find it in himself to copy the book as it was composed by its author. This is an enormous sin, for it is perverting the religion, and opening the door for the loss of confidence in what is written in what people have of books, so may Aļļaah make the one who does that ugly and humiliated[16].[17]

The anthropomorphists continue on this evil path to destroy the correct belief in the Creator. They lie when they claim to be Sunnis, as Ibn Jibriin has just unintentionally implied.

In short, if you are a follower of Ibn Jibriin, Ibn Baaz, Ibn ˆUtħaymiin, and other so-called “Salafis,” know that you are a follower of a sect that has been in hiding for most of history since the Hijrah. They claim to know and follow what the Salaf believed, although they are in opposition to 95% of all scholars of all the major Islamic sciences. Part of this belief includes:

1. Denying the use of rational proof to prove that the Creator exists,

2. Questioning the mind as a tool for knowing right from wrong,

3. Believing that despite the mind being unreliable, a belief that has been narrated in hiding over several centuries is known with absolute certainty to be correctly narrated.

If you think that is just fine, and doesn’t sound like a setup for making you accept blindly, then I can’t help you.

References:

Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah. Hidaayatu-l-Ĥayaaraa Fii ‘Ajwibatu-l-Yahuudi wa-Naşaaraa. 1 vols. Kairo, Egypt: Daar Ar-Rayyaan li-t-Tutaatħ.

Taajuddiin As-Subkiyy (771 AH). Ţabaqaat Asħ-Sħaafiˆiyyah Al-Kubraa. 10 vols. 2nd ed. Hajr li-l-tibaaˆ wa-nashr wa-t-tawziiˆ, 1413.

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[1]Some of these books are by anthropmorphists, some are forgeries attribute to Imam Aĥmad, while others are just following the Asħˆariyy methodology of tafwiiđ, which is to narrate scriptures that could be misunderstood as ascribing created and bodily attributes to Aļļaah, and keep silent about their meaning, while believing that such unfitting meanings are not meant.

[2] Actually, the Muˆtazilite school was never very big, but Ibn Jibriin likes to put them side by side in order to make the impression that they are similar.) In reality there are only a handful of Muˆtazilites that have contributed to any of the Islamic sciences. Most notably Az-Zamakħsħariyy, the famous Quran commentator and linguist. They only had significant influence during a period of the ˆAbbaasiyy dynasty; the subsequent rulers Ma’muun, Al-Muˆtaşim, Al-Waaţħiq and then ended during the rule of Al-Mutawakkil. These were the heydays of this sect, and they achieved influence mainly through getting close to certain rulers. “From the appearance of Al-‘Asħˆariyy on, it was a downhill slope for them, and they eventually became virtually extinct as a sect.

[3]لما انقضى القرن الثالث آخر القرون المفضلة أميتت هذه الكتب مع الأسف، وأصبحت مخزونة لا يعترف بها ولا تُقرأ، ولا تُدرَّس إلا نادرًا وبصفة خفية، وتمكن مذهب الأشاعرة ومذهب المعتزلة أيما تمكن، وانتشر الإكباب عليه، وكثرت الدروس والكتب التي تؤلف فيما يتعلق بهذه العقائد؛ عقيدة الأشعرية وعقيدة المعتزلة، وكادت السُّنة وكُتبها أن لا يكون لها ذكر، بل كاد مذهب الإمام أحمد أن يضمحل، ولم يبق أحد عليه إلا قلة.

[4]Baaţiniyy sects are those that keep their true beliefs hidden from public through lies, deception and hypocrisy.

[5]وبالتتبع لهذه القرون: الرابع والخامس والسادس وأغلب السابع لا تجد فيها من هو على مذهب السنة

[6]وذكر فيها بعض العبارات المنكرة التي اشتهرت في زمانه عن المتكلمين، مثل قوله: إن الله مُنَزَّه عن الحدود والغايات، والأبعاض، والأعراض، لا تحويه الجهات الست كسائر المبتدعات .

[7]لم يبال بأهل زمانه ولا بمن خالفه بل أفصح بما يعتقده، وجدد عقيدة السلف، وكتب فيها المؤلفات التي لا يستطيع أحد أن يعارضه فيها، وبين فيها ما هو أجلى من الشمس….لا شك أنه ما أفصح بذلك إلا لأن الله – تعالى – وهبه علمًا وقدرة على البيان، فلم يستطع أهل زمانه أن يقاوموه، فهو الذي جدد مذهب أهل السنة

[8]المثلثة خالفت أصول الأنبياء في تقديس الله ووصفه بصفات الكمال أحدها إن الله سبحانه وتعالى قديم واحد لا شريك له في ملكه ولا ند ولا ضد ولا وزير ولا مشير ولا ظهير ولا شافع إلا من بعد إذنه. الثالث أنه غنى بذاته فلا يأكل ولا يشرب ولا يحتاج إلى شيء مما يحتاج إليه خلقه بوجه من الوجوه. الرابع إنه لا يتغير ولا تعرض له الآفات من الهرم والمرض والسنة والنوم والنسيان والندم والخوف والهم والحزن ونحو ذلك. الخامس إنه لا يماثل شيئا من مخلوقاته بل ليس كمثله شيء لا في ذاته ولا في صفاته ولا في أفعاله. (هداية الحيارى في أجوبة اليهود والنصارى – (1 / 310)

[9]Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah, Hidaayatu-l-Ĥayaaraa Fii ‘Ajwibatu-l-Yahuudi wa-Naşaaraa, 310.

[10]وحكينا لك مقالة الشيخ ابن عبد السلام ومن سبقه إلى مثلها وتلاه على قولها حيث ذكروا أن الشافعية والمالكية والحنفية وفضلاء الحنابلة أشعريون هذه عبارة ابن عبد السلام شيخ الشافعية وابن الحاجب شيخ المالكية والحصيرى شيخ الحنفية ومن كلام ابن عساكر حافظ هذه الأمة الثقة الثبت “هل من الفقهاء الحنفية والمالكية والشافعية إلا موافق الأشعرى ومنتسب إليه وراض بحميد سعيه فى دين الله ومثن بكثرة العلم عليه غير شرذمة قليلة تضمر التشبيه وتعادى كل موحد يعتقد التنزيه أو تضاهى قول المعتزلة فى ذمه…”

[11]Taajuddiin As-Subkiyy (771 AH), Ţabaqaat Asħ-Sħaafiˆiyyah Al-Kubraa, 3/373-374.

[12]ِTaajudDiin As-Subkiyy (771 AH/ 1370 AD) the great judge, jurist and historian. Author or such famous books as Jamˆu-l-Jawaamiˆ in fiqh methodology and Ţabaqaat Asħ-Sħaafiˆiyyah on the biographies of the scholars of the Shafiˆiyy school of fiqh. He is the son of ˆAliyy ibn ˆAbdilKaafii As-Subkiyy, who was the head of the scholars of his time.

[13]Ibnu-ş-Şalaaĥ (643 AH/ 1245 AD) is one of the most important scholars of tafsiir, ĥadiitħ and fiqh. He is famous for his Muqaddimatu Ibn Aş-Şalaaĥ, which became the standard for all later books in Ĥadiitħ science.

[14]طبقات الشافعية الكبرى ـ هجر للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع – 1413هـ – (2 /16-17): وقد تزايد الحال بالخطابية وهم المجسمة فى زماننا هذا فصاروا يرون الكذب على مخالفيهم فى العقيدة لا سيما القائم عليهم بكل ما يسوءه فى نفسه وماله. وبلغنى أن كبيرهم استفتى فى شافعى أيشهد عليه بالكذب فقال ألست تعتقد أن دمه حلال قال نعم قال فما دون ذلك دون دمه فاشهد وادفع فساده عن المسلمين. فهذه عقيدتهم ويرون أنهم المسلمون وأنهم أهل السنة ولو عدوا عددا لما بلغ علماؤهم ولا عالم فيهم على الحقيقة مبلغا يعتبر ويكفرون غالب علماء الأمة ثم يعتزون إلى الإمام أحمد بن حنبل رضى الله عنه وهو منهم برئ ولكنه كما قال بعض العارفين ورأيته بخط الشيخ تقى الدين ابن الصلاح إمامان ابتلاهما الله بأصحابهما وهما بريان منهم أحمد ابن حنبل ابتلى بالمجسمة وجعفر الصادق ابتلى بالرافضة

[15]Ibid., 2/16-17.

[16]طبقات الشافعية الكبرى ـ هجر للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع – 1413هـ – (2 / 19): وقد وصل حال بعض المجسمة فى زماننا إلى أن كتب شرح صحيح مسلم للشيخ محيى الدين النووى وحذف من كلام النووى ما تكلم به على أحاديث الصفات فإن النووى أشعرى العقيدة فلم تحمل قوى هذا الكاتب أن يكتب الكتاب على الوضع الذى صنفه مصنفه. وهذا عندى من كبائر الذنوب فإنه تحريف للشريعة وفتح باب لا يؤمن معه بكتب الناس وما فى أيديهم من المصنفات فقبح الله فاعله وأخزاه

[17]Ibid., 2/19.

Ibn Taymiyyah approves of the claim that Aļļaah sits

Ibn Taymiyyah condones of the claim that Aļļaah sits saying:

It has been narrated through the acceptable scholars and Muslim saints (‘awliyaa’) that Muĥammad, the Messenger of Aļļaah (صلى الله عليه وسلم) will be seated by His Lord on His throne with Him. ¹

قال ابن تيمية في مجموع الفتاوى – (4 / 374) فَقَدْ حَدَثَ الْعُلَمَاءُ الْمَرْضِيُّونَ وَأَوْلِيَاؤُهُ الْمَقْبُولُونَ : أَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يُجْلِسُهُ رَبُّهُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ مَعَهُ .

This is further to the quotes we have shown earlier regarding Ibn Taymiyyah’s extremely blasphemous anthropomorphism, which includes affirming 6 physical boundaries, divisibility in the mind’s eye due to size, ability to shrink, possibility of being hit by a bucket, having the world physically inside of Him, and more. See the table of contents for details.

All of this, of course, he claims is affirmed by the Qur’aan and the Sunnah and the Salaf and Muslim saints! Such statements of his are buried in ridiculously long books saying very much about very little, and that is why some scholars did not discover him, and praised him based on other things. Those who did discover him, however, such as Taqiyyu-d-Diin Al-Ĥuşniyy, the famous Shaafiˆiyy jurist and author of the widely studied fiqh manual “Kifaayatu-l-‘Akħyaar” called him “an absolute kaafir (zindiiq – which originally means fire worshiper, but later used to mean a particularly mean kaafir),” and alluded to how he considered having his remains extracted from his grave and burned in public as an admonition to the public.

1Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy, Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 4 / 374.

Aļļaah is not in Time, let alone time itself.

A few weeks ago I was debating a derailed Arab who was heavily influenced by various western philosophies. It was a bit like taming a wild horse. I first wanted him to understand that the world is not eternal, using the argument in Foundations of the Religion. I remained with him, as he was a friend of a friend, and after about 2 hours of dealing with his escape artistry he finally conceded, and said, “OK, I was only pretending to disagree, now what?”

I said, “Well, we know that the world has a beginning, and that it is not preceded by changes. We also know that since it could not have created itself, as it has a beginning. Clearly then, it must have been brought into existence by other than itself, and this other cannot be something that changes. We also know that this other has unlimited power, as testified to by the existence of the world after non-existence. Moreover, this other must have a will, because the world has a specification, and came into existence with a certain specification. In addition, we know that this other must have knowledge, because will without knowledge is impossible. Finally, this other must be attributed with beginningless and changeless life, not like the life of bodies, as anything with power, will, and knowledge cannot be said to be lifeless or dead.”

He said, “OK, and what else?” I said, “we know that Aļļaah is not in time and not in place, because things in time and place change and need a Creator.” Then he said something that made me almost fall out of my chair, “but Aļļaah said He is time. It is narrated by Al-Bukħaariyy that Aļļaah said, ‘I am the Dahr,’ ‘I am time,’ This is not correct what you are saying!”

I tried to explain to him that no scholar I know in history, deviant or otherwise, has understood the ĥadiitħ in this way, but it seemed to have little effect. Even when I told him that time is change, so how can you claim that Aļļaah is change? This is the result of efforts to remove rational thought from religious beliefs…. He told me that since he was a child he was taught to just accept the religion, and never to think about proofs or deeper meanings.

Today he is an agnostic, even if he does not say it plainly, as so many, many people in Muslim countries. Even those odd few that attend prayer in the masjid. They think that there are no certain proofs for religious beliefs. And the campaign against rational thought in religion, i.e. against the science of kalaam goes with full intensity from the “correction movements.”

Wa laa quwwata illaa billaaah.

After this odd incident, I did not think much of it again, until I received the following

Question:

Could you please explain, what the holy Prophet (ˆalayhissalaam) meant by the following ĥadiitħs:

Volume 8, Book 73, Number 200: Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah’s Apostle said, "Allah said, "The offspring of Adam abuse the Dahr (Time), and I am the Dahr; in My Hands are the night and the day." ! http://www.usc.edu/d…tml#008.073.200
Book 027, Number 5585: Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: None of you should abuse Time for it is Allah Who is the Time, and none of you should call ‘Inab (grape) as al-karm, for karm is a Muslim person. http://www.usc.edu/d…t.html#027.5584
Book 56, Number 56.1.3: Maalik related to me from Abu’z-Zinad from al-Araj from Abu Hurayra that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said,"Let none of you complain about time, for Allah is time.’http://www.usc.edu/d…html#056.56.1.3[1]

Answer:

As a first note, the expression, “abuse” should be “blame,” not abuse.

The ˆArabs were in the habit of blaming the passage of night and day for the bad things that happened to them, so they would say, the disasters of time have hit me. In reality, however, everything that happens is by the will and creation of Aļļaah. Accordingly, the one who blames time for what happens to him, it is as if he blames its creator. Aļļaah said about the Arab idolaters:

“وَقَالُوا مَا هِيَ إِلَّا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا وَمَا يُهْلِكُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ وَمَا لَهُمْ بِذَلِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَظُنُّونَ [الجاثية : 24]”

Meaning: “They said: ‘This is only our worldly life, we die and we live, and nothing destroys us other than time,‘ and they have no certain knowledge of this, they are only thinking that this is so.”[2] (Al-Jaatħiyah, 24) . (Tafsiiru-n-Nasafiyy, 4/198).

The Prophet (ˆalayhissalaam) therefore forbade them from this practice, and said that what you claim is time, is not time at all. It is the Creator that has willed and created whatever happens to you.

This essence of this problem is that people do not know Aļļaah, because they have not learned. Consequently, whenever they are told something like this, they have no firm principles to understand that it is not literally meant, so they can avoid falling in kufr before asking scholar what the real meaning is. Now bring a literal translation, and you have brought it out of the context of the Arabic language as well, which leaves little or no room for a sound figurative understanding. A true recipe for disaster.

References:

Madaariku-t-Tanziil wa Ĥaqaa’iqu-t-Ta’wiil. Al-Nasafiy, Abuu Barakaat. Ed. Maĥmuud Muĥammad Asħ-Sħaˆˆaar. Beirut, Lebanon: Daar An-Nafaa’is, 2005.

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[1]صحيح البخاري – حَدَّثَنَا يَحْيَى بْنُ بُكَيْرٍ حَدَّثَنَا اللَّيْثُ عَنْ يُونُسَ عَنْ ابْنِ شِهَابٍ أَخْبَرَنِي أَبُو سَلَمَةَ قَالَ قَالَ أَبُو هُرَيْرَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ اللَّهُ يَسُبُّ بَنُو آدَمَ الدَّهْرَ وَأَنَا الدَّهْرُ بِيَدِي اللَّيْلُ وَالنَّهَارُ . صحيح مسلم – و حَدَّثَنِي زُهَيْرُ بْنُ حَرْبٍ حَدَّثَنَا جَرِيرٌ عَنْ هِشَامٍ عَنْ ابْنِ سِيرِينَ عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ عَنْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ لَا تَسُبُّوا الدَّهْرَ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الدَّهْرُ. موطأ مالك – أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ لَا يَقُلْ أَحَدُكُمْ يَا خَيْبَةَ الدَّهْرِ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الدَّهْرُ

[2]قال المؤلف في تفسير النسفى :{ وَقَالُوا مَا هِىَ } [الجاثية : 24] أي ما الحياة لأنهم وعدوا حياة ثانية { إِلا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا } [المؤمنون : 37] التي نحن فيها { نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا } [المؤمنون : 37] نموت نحن ونحيا ببقاء أولادنا ، أو يموت بعض ويحيا بعض ، أو نكون مواتاً نطفاً في الأصلاب ونحيا بعد ذلك ، أو يصيبنا الأمران الموت والحياة يريدون الحياة في الدنيا والموت بعدها وليس وراء ذلك حياة. وقيل : هذا كلام من يقول بالتناسخ أي يموت الرجل ثم تجعل روحه في موات فيحيا به { وَمَا يُهْلِكُنَآ إِلا الدَّهْرُ } [الجاثية : 24] كانوا يزعمون أن مرور الأيام والليالي هو المؤثر في هلاك الأنفس وينكرون ملك الموت وقبضه الأرواح بإذن الله ، وكانوا يضيفون كل حادثة تحدث إلى الدهر والزمان ، وترى أشعارهم ناطقة بشكوى الزمان ومنه قوله عليه السلام : " لا تسبوا الدهر فإن الله هو الدهر " أي فإن الله هو الآتي بالحوادث لا الدهر { وَمَا لَهُم بِذَالِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِنْ هُمْ إِلا يَظُنُّونَ } [الجاثية : 24] وما يقولون ذلك من علم ويقين ولكن من ظن وتخمين. (4 / 198).

Ibn Taymiyyah denies Tajsiim?

Ibn Taymiyyah says:

الأحد والصمد لم يذكرهما الله إلا في هذه السورة وهما ينفيان عن الله ما هو متنزه عنه من التشبيه والتمثيل ومن التركيب والانقسام والتجسيم فإن اسمه الأحد ينفي المثل والنظير (بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – 4 / 61)

Al-Aĥad and Aş-Şamad (are two names that) Aļļaah did not mention except in this Suurah, and they negate from Aļļaah what does not befit Him in terms of likeness and resemblance and composition and separation and being a body (tajsiim), for verily His name Al-Aĥad negates a like or something similar. (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 4 / 61)

Wait a minute, did not Ibn Taymiyyah say that Aļļaah has borders in all six direction and that He has a size, and a bucket might bump into Him? So how come he is saying now that He is not a body!? Well, he is beating around the bush as usual. He says in another place:

وَالْمَقْصُودُ هُنَا : أَنَّ مَا جَاءَ بِهِ الرَّسُولُ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا يُدْفَعُ بِالْأَلْفَاظِ الْمُجْمَلَةِ كَلَفْظِ التَّجْسِيمِ وَغَيْرِهِ مِمَّا قَدْ يَتَضَمَّنُ مَعْنًى بَاطِلًا وَالنَّافِي لَهُ يَنْفِي الْحَقَّ وَالْبَاطِلَ . (مجموع الفتاوى , 5 / 433)

And the purpose is to say that whatever the Messenger (صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) brought is not denied by vague utterances such as jism (body) and others that may have meanings that are invalid, while the one how denies them, denies both what is true and what is false. (Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 5/433)

The meaning of jism that Ibn Tayimiyyah denies then, is that of actual composition and actual separation of parts. What he does not deny is size, shape and taking on different shapes. We already showed the latter in our article on his bucket theology, which also shows his belief that Aļļaah is something very, very big in size. Here is another explanation of his about this idea, in which he says:

قَالَ ابْنُ أَبِي حَاتِمٍ فِي " تَفْسِيرِهِ " : حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو زُرْعَةَ ثَنَا مِنْجَابُ بْنُ الْحَارِثِ ثَنَا بِشْرُ بْنُ عِمَارَةَ عَنْ أَبِي رَوْقٍ عَنْ عَطِيَّةَ العوفي عَنْ أَبِي سَعِيدٍ الخدري رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ { عَنْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي قَوْلِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى : { لَا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ الْأَبْصَارَ } قَالَ : لَوْ أَنَّ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنْسَ وَالشَّيَاطِينَ وَالْمَلَائِكَةَ ؛ مُنْذُ خُلِقُوا إلَى أَنْ فَنُوا صُفُّوا صَفًّا وَاحِدًا مَا أَحَاطُوا بِاَللَّهِ أَبَدًا } – فَمَنْ هَذِهِ عَظَمَتُهُ كَيْفَ يَحْصُرُهُ مَخْلُوقٌ مِنْ الْمَخْلُوقَاتِ سَمَاءٌ أَوْ غَيْرُ سَمَاءٍ ؟ حَتَّى يُقَالَ : إنَّهُ إذَا نَزَلَ إلَى السَّمَاءِ الدُّنْيَا صَارَ الْعَرْشُ فَوْقَهُ أَوْ يَصِيرُ شَيْءٌ مِنْ الْمَخْلُوقَاتِ يَحْصُرُهُ وَيُحِيطُ بِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى . فَإِذَا قَالَ الْقَائِلُ : هُوَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى مَا يَشَاءُ ؛ قِيلَ : فَقُلْ : هُوَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى أَنْ يَنْزِلَ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى وَهُوَ فَوْقَ عَرْشِهِ وَإِذَا اسْتَدْلَلْت بِمُطْلَقِ الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ مِنْ غَيْرِ تَمْيِيزٍ فَمَا كَانَ أَبْلَغُ فِي الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ ؛ فَهُوَ أَوْلَى بِأَنْ يُوصَفَ بِهِ مِمَّا لَيْسَ كَذَلِكَ ؛ فَإِنَّ مَنْ تَوَهَّمَ الْعَظِيمَ الَّذِي لَا أَعْظَمَ مِنْهُ يَقْدِرُ عَلَى أَنْ يَصْغُرَ حَتَّى يُحِيطَ بِهِ مَخْلُوقُهُ الصَّغِيرُ وَجَعَلَ هَذَا مِنْ بَابِ الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ ؛ فَقَوْلُهُ : إنَّهُ يَنْزِلُ مَعَ بَقَاءِ عَظَمَتِهِ وَعُلُوِّهِ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ ؛ أَبْلَغُ فِي الْقُدْرَةِ وَالْعَظَمَةِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي فِيهِ مُوَافَقَةُ الشَّرْعِ وَالْعَقْلِ . وَهَذَا كَمَا قَدْ يَقُولُهُ طَائِفَةٌ " مِنْهُمْ أَبُو طَالِبٍ الْمَكِّيُّ " قَالَ : إنْ شَاءَ وَسِعَهُ أَدْنَى شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ شَاءَ لَمْ يَسَعْهُ شَيْءٌ وَإِنْ أَرَادَ عَرَفَهُ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُرِدْ لَمْ يَعْرِفْهُ شَيْءٌ ؛ إنْ أَحَبَّ وُجِدَ عِنْدَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُحِبَّ لَمْ يُوجَدْ عِنْدَ شَيْءٍ وَقَدْ جَاوَزَ الْحَدَّ وَالْمِعْيَارَ وَسَبَقَ الْقِيلَ وَالْأَقْدَارَ ذُو صِفَاتٍ لَا تُحْصَى ؛ وَقَدْرٍ لَا يَتَنَاهَى ؛ لَيْسَ مَحْبُوسًا فِي صُورَةٍ وَلَا مَوْقُوفًا بِصِفَةِ وَلَا مَحْكُومًا عَلَيْهِ بِكَلِمِ وَلَا يَتَجَلَّى بِوَصْفِ مَرَّتَيْنِ وَلَا يَظْهَرُ فِي صُورَةٍ لِاثْنَيْنِ ؛ وَلَا يَرِدُ مِنْهُ بِمَعْنَى وَاحِدٍ كَلِمَتَانِ ؛ بَلْ لِكُلِّ تَجَلٍّ مِنْهُ صُورَةٌ وَلِكُلِّ عَبْدٍ عِنْدَ ظُهُورِهِ صِفَةٌ وَعَنْ كُلِّ نَظْرَةٍ كَلَامٌ ؛ وَبِكُلِّ كَلِمَةٍ إفْهَامٌ وَلَا نِهَايَةَ لِتَجَلِّيهِ ؛ وَلَا غَايَةَ لِأَوْصَافِهِ . قُلْت : أَبُو طَالِبٍ رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ هُوَ وَأَصْحَابُهُ " السالمية " أَتْبَاعُ الشَّيْخِ أَبِي الْحَسَنِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ صَاحِبِ سَهْلِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ التستري – لَهُمْ مِنْ الْمَعْرِفَةِ وَالْعِبَادَةِ وَالزُّهْدِ وَاتِّبَاعِ السُّنَّةِ وَالْجَمَاعَةِ فِي عَامَّةِ الْمَسَائِلِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ لِأَهْلِ السُّنَّةِ مَا هُمْ مَعْرُوفُونَ بِهِ وَهُمْ مُنْتَسِبُونَ إلَى إمَامَيْنِ عَظِيمَيْنِ فِي السُّنَّةِ : الْإِمَامِ أَحْمَد بْنِ حَنْبَلٍ وَسَهْلِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ التستري وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ تَفَقَّهَ عَلَى مَذْهَبِ مَالِكِ بْنِ أَنَس كَبَيْتِ الشَّيْخِ أَبِي مُحَمَّدٍ وَغَيْرِهِمْ وَفِيهِمْ مَنْ هُوَ عَلَى مَذْهَبِ الشَّافِعِيِّ . (مجموع الفتاوى , 5 / 483-482)

Ibn Abii Ĥaatim said in his tafsiir: “….. (the Prophet) said: ‘if the Jinn-, human-, devil- and angel- kind since they were created until they ended made a single row, they would not surround Aļļaah at all.’¹”

So the one who is that great, how could He be surrounded by something created, whether the Sky or something else so that it might be said that if He descended to the Sky of the World, the ˆArsħ became above Him and some of His creation surrounded Him?

Now, if someone said, “He does whatever he wills….” then it might be said, “say: ‘He is able to descend (سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى) while He is above His ˆArsħ.’” Moreover, if you seek evidence in His Power absolutely and His Greatness without distinguishing, then what is more indicative of power is what He is more deserving of being attributed with than otherwise. For verily, the one that imagines the very Great One who nothing is greater than Him (and) is able to make make Himself so small that He is surrounded by His small creation, and said ‘this is indicative of power and greatness….,’ His (the one imaging this Great One’s) saying ‘verily he descend while his greatness and aboveness over the ˆArsħ remain,’ is more indicative of power and greatness, and this is what agrees with Islamic Law and reason. This is what a group of people might say, such as Abuu Ţaalib Al-Makkiyy, he said, “If He wills He will be contained in the smallest of things, and if He wills, nothing can contain Him….”… I say: “Abuu Ţaalib, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, he and his companions are the Saalimiyyah,… They have knowledge, worship asceticism and following of the Sunnah and the Jamaaˆah in the general matters that are famous among Sunnis…..

So all of this is not believing that Aļļaah is a body?

Ibn Taymiyyah likes to say that his opponents were influenced by Greek Philosophy. From the above, however, it is pretty clear that Ibn Taymiyyah himself was heavily influenced by Greek Mythology. Watching movies like “The Clash of the Titans” gives you a pretty good idea about what Ibn Taymiyyah believed.

1This is weak ĥadiitħ, but in any case, the fact that nothing can surround Aļļaah does not mean that He is big in size. The ĥadiitħ does not state in what sense they are not able to surround. Ibn Taymiyyah, however, quickly concluded that it is terms of size, because this is according to the principles of anthropomorphism.

As-Sanuusiyy does not agree with Ibn Taymiyyah regarding composition and need.

Introduction

The wahabis in their desperation are trying to make people think that As-Sanuusiyy agrees with Ibn Taymiyyah regarding Ar-Raaziyy’s argument of the need for composition for something with size. The need for composition Ar-Raaziyy speaks of, and denies could be true of Aļļaah, is an argument As-Sanuusiyy accepts, and validates. That is, his quoted refutation of the argument for implied composition is not absolute, but for its use in a different context than this, and without admitting that there is any implied need for composition at all.

As-Sanuusiyy denies that affirming that Aļļaah has attributes such as knowledge implies composition.

The context in which As-Sanuusiyy criticizes Ar-Raaziyy, is for the latter’s weakness in facing up to the argument of the philosophers for denying that Aļļaah has attributes. They argued that since the attributes are many, they would need to be composed. As-Sanuusiyy refutes this absolutely and says that the argument for need is false, because there is no composition implied. Why is that? Because the attributes are necessary, perfect, eternal and unchanging. This is the essence of what As-Sanuusiyy says.

As-Sanuusiyy affirms that things with size do need composition, and validates this argument.

Ar-Raaziyy is not talking about Aļļaah having attributes in the argument against anthropomorphists which Ibn Taymiyyah responds to. In essence Ar-Raaziyy says that declaring Aļļaah to be something that can be pointed at means that He would then have a border, and therefore be in need of composition, like all things with size. This is true, because all shapes are possible and in need of specification.

This is not an argument that As-Sanuusiyy is against. His books are full of this type of argument, such as in “A Commentary on the Creed of Al Sanusi“. The need for bodies to be specified in shape and composition is a theme throughout, on which he bases the proof for the createdness of all things with a size. Accordingly, As-Sanuusiyy’s refutation of the argument of the need for composition of parts does not apply for the issue of physical aboveness, and is not intended by him. This is because shapes are possible, and not intrinsically necessary in themselves, so they do indeed need to be specified and composed.

Why Ibn Taymiyyah affirms implied composition and need.

Since Aļļaah has a size in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and its shape is possible, there is an implied need for composition. He says in affirmation of size:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible.¹ (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).

In affirming composition etc., he says:

We have already clarified what possibilities (in terms of what they mean) are associated with the words composition, settling in place, being other (having different sides or parts), and need, and that the meaning meant by this is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry.². (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

The proof that Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that his deity’s shape is possible,and not necessary, is in his Bucket Theology, where He says: “and it is known that Aļļaah is able to surround³….” i.e. able to take on a shape to do so, which means that it is not a necessary shape, but a possible one, and therefore in need of specification. (Majmuuˆu-l-Fataawaa, 6/574)

1قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).

2قال ابن تيمية: قولك إن كان منقسما كان مركبا وتقدم إبطاله تقدم الجواب عن هذا الذي سميته مركبا وتبين أنه لا حجة أصلا على امتناع ذلك بل بين أن إحالة ذلك تقتضي إبطال كل موجود ولولا أنه أحال على ما تقدم لما أحلنا عليه وتقدم بيان ما في لفظ التركيب والتحيز والغير والافتقار من الاحتمال وإن المعنى الذي يقصد منه بذلك يجب أن يتصف به كل موجود سواء كان واجبا أو ممكنا وإن القول بامتناع ذلك يستلزم السفسطة المحضة (بيان تلبيس الجهمية ج 1 ص 33).

3قال ابن تيمية: وَالْإِحَاطَةُ قَدْ عُلِمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ قَادِرٌ عَلَيْهَا وَعُلِمَ أَنَّهَا تَكُونُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّة وَلَيْسَ فِي إثْبَاتِهَا فِي الْجُمْلَةِ مَا يُخَالِفُ الْعَقْلَ وَلَا الشَّرْعَ ؛ لَكِنْ لَا نَتَكَلَّمُ إلَّا بِمَا نَعْلَمُ وَمَا لَا نَعْلَمُهُ أَمْسَكْنَا عَنْهُ وَمَا كَانَ مُقَدِّمَةُ دَلِيلِهِ مَشْكُوكًا فِيهَا عِنْدَ بَعْضِ النَّاسِ كَانَ حَقُّهُ أَنْ يَشُكَّ فِيهِ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْحَقُّ وَإِلَّا فَلْيَسْكُتْ عَمَّا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ . (مجموع الفتاوى – 6 / 574)

Refuting Yaser Qadi’s opposition to proving Allaah’s existence

Islam is a great religion, it does not need to attack reason or logic to hold. It has nothing to hide. It is not based on blind imitation, or blind acceptance. The argument for its correctness agrees with reason from beginning to end, as has been shown in the article “Foundations of the Religion“. There is no argument based on valid premises and sound structure that can put a dent in it. This is what we Sunnis believe, and any religion that does not meet this criteria is not the religion of Aļļaah.

Yaser Qadi is out to show otherwise in his The Theological Implications of the Story of Ibrahim & the Stars (Ibn Taymiyyah vs. the Mutakallimun). He now opposes the proof of the Creator’s existence, not by showing that the premises do not hold or that the argument is false, but by saying in essence: “it is not mentioned in the Qur’aan, is complicated, was not used by the companions and there is no need, because everybody knows by the fiţrah.” Thus he implies that it is prohibited. Of course, it is all based on the talk of arch-anthropomorphist, Ibn Taymiyyah.

To continue reading you may download the article Rational Quranic Islam vs Wahabism in PDF formats. The table of contents is:

Introduction…. p. 3
Circular reasoning is Quranic?!…. p. 3
Different times and different people need different types of proofs…. p. 4
The Imam ˆAbdulQaahir on the Sunni scholars of the science of belief…. p. 5
Kalam scholars used terminology like those of the Aristotelians to show them wrong…. p. 10
The principles of the proofs for the creators existence…. p. 10
About the so called proof of the existence of God through the proof of the createdness of “accidents”…. p. 11
The proof of the creators existence is in compliance with the Qur’aan…. p. 12
Implications of the proof of Allaah’s existence for denying Allaah’s resemblance to creation…. p. 12
A more detailed way of showing that bodies must be created for one to prove that the world is created…. p. 14
Ibn Taymiyyah’ arguments against the proof stating that bodies must have a creator…. p. 15
The anthropomorphist dilemma; the motivation of Ibn Taymiyyah for attacking the proof of Allaah’s existence based on the fact that the world consists of bodies and attributes…. p. 19
Conclusion….   p. 19

Deviant contention: Are you saying that Allah has an infinite number of attributes now?

This is a rhetorical question, implying that “how can you say that events in the past, before now, cannot be infinite, yet claim that Aļļaah’s attributes are infinite now?”

The answer is that infinity is not impossible in absolute terms. Actually, quite the contrary. What is impossible is to have an infinite amount of beginnings passing/ending/completing/finishing, because it is self contradictory.

Aļļaah’s existence is infinite, because it does not have a beginning or end, so there is no contradiction here. All that is being said is that His existence is infinite and that His attributes are also infinite. This is not contradictory, unlike in the case of what has a beginning, because what has beginning cannot be beginningless, and it cannot ever finish endlessness. This means that it must always be limited and cannot ever realize infinity in its existence.

One word about “now.” This word refers to a particular moment in time. It reflects the relative situation of all things in time to one another at a particular instant. Passing through time, from one “now” to another, is something that is caused by its intrinsically possible existence.

To understand this, one must realize that something existing is either intrinsically (i.e. with respect to itself alone) possible in its existence, or intrinsically necessary. There is no third judgment for what exists. The possible in existence accepts non-existence, while the necessary does not, because otherwise it would not be intrinsically necessary. Aļļaah is necessarily existent, but everything else is possible, because what is possible in existence needs something other than itself to exist. If it did not, then it would be intrinsically necessary.

Time exists because when something is only possible in existence, it is possibly non-existent after existence. This means that once it exist, it is possibly non-existent in the next instant, with or without change. If it still exists in the next instant, then it has lasted 2 moments of time and so on.

Aļļaah’s existence is not in time, however, because Aļļaah’s existence is not a possibility, but an existence that is intrinsically necessary (Waajibu-l-Wujuud). In light of this, if Aļļaah’s existence was divisible into time periods, then His necessary existence would be in a state of renewal, moment by moment, and what is renewed is not necessary in existence. Rather it is only possible in the next moment, i.e. possible after having existed. In other words, renewal of existence does not apply to what is necessary in existence, because it does not need renewal. After all, if it needed renewal, it would not be necessary in existence. Consequently, it does not have moments of existence.

Moreover, time is possible in existence, as it is parts (moments) following each other in sequence, and these parts are definitely not eternal. The whole of time then, is dependent on possible parts, which is the moments of renewal, and what depends on the possible is surely only possible in existence. This also makes it clear that Allaah cannot be something passing through moments of time.

Furthermore, if Aļļaah’s existence had been divisible into moments of time, then this would either be with Him having a beginning, which is refuted by His necessary existence, or with Him having no beginning. If his existence was divisible into moments of time, without a beginning, then this would mean that an infinite number of moments passed before the world came into existence. An infinite number of moments cannot pass, however, because infinity cannot be completed. Therefore, since an infinite amount of moments cannot pass, it must be true that Aļļaah’s existence is not divisible into moments of time, and that He does not pass through it.

In addition, we can say that Aļļaah’s existence is not something that ends up at points in time, because it is both beginningless and endless. After all, beginninglessness cannot end, and this means that Aļļaah’s endlessness cannot ever begin in any sense. This means again that it is impossible that His existence should realize an “after”, and therefore a “before” as well. Needless to say, what does not realize a before or an after, cannot be said to pass through time.

Since Aļļaah’s existence is necessary, not renewing, and without a before or after, it is not in time. It is, therefore, not problematic to say that He “exists now” without having to “reach now,” by passing though time.

Based, on this, it should be understood that even though we affirm Aļļaah’s existence now, this is a reference to His existence that is necessary and thus not in time. When someone said Aļļaah exists now e.g. 1000 years ago, he was referring to the very same existence, without change or renewal, without a before or after, and thus without having passed through time. This means that the relation of all different times, past, future or present, is one relation to Aļļaah. In other words, one time is not further from Him than another, just as one place is not further from Him than another, as He is not in place.

Furthermore, Aļļaah’s infinite attributes are not Him. They are, however, also not other than Him, as they must be necessarily true of Him, since they cannot have a beginning. Since this is true of His attributes of beginninglessness and endlessness, we know that He is already attributed with infinity. It is not problematic to say then, that His attributes are infinite. Not the least when it does not even really imply the realization of a multitude of different things to infinity, as His attributes are not other than Him, not separate realities. Rather, they are infinite meanings that are true of Aļļaah, who’s existence is infinite. This is unlike what has a beginning, because otherness is established by its prior non-existence. All events are therefore other than each other and distinct, and therefore have a real countable/numerical existence.

Allaah is not in time

Wahabi argues: If tensed facts exist, then it necessarily follows that truth or falsehood is changing over time. For example, the tensed statement “It is now 1:27 pm” is only true at 1:27 pm and false at all other times. So if Allah knows this tensed fact, His knowledge must be changing constantly as He knows when certain statements become true and false. However, if Allah is absolutely changeless, that would mean that Allah cannot know tensed facts, hence compromising His attribute of omniscience.

Comment: This pseudo-argument that this wahabi enemy of himself, and of Aļļaah, feels so happy about, originates from likening the Creator to the created. Again and again they come back to their basic belief in the Creator, which is that He is something limited to a place (i.e. a body) with changes in it over time. They thought they could know the reality of Aļļaah’s knowledge by imagination and drawing inferences from their own existence. That is why, for example, they believe that His Will is a series of different wills over time, just like ours. Now even the belief in His perfect Knowledge is subject to their blasphemous attacks. They argue as above, because they cannot imagine perfect knowledge not in time, and think that reality is limited to what they can imagine. It is because they base their arguments upon imagination that they make so many mistakes.

Not being able to imagine something does not mean it cannot be true

It is not enough to say, “I can’t imagine it, so it cannot be true,” or even “I can’t understand it, so it can’t be true.” Even in sciences studying creation, especially physics, the facts and concepts they speak of are so counter intuitive and unfamiliar to our minds and knowledge that they cannot be imagined. That is why they rely on complex mathematics to express their theories instead. So if concepts in physics cannot be conceptualized in the mind, what would be the case for the Creator and His attributes?

For example, they say that if lightning hit the back of a moving train and at the same time its front, then to an outsider they happen simultaneously, but to someone inside the front is hit before the back, because he is moving towards the event. Accordingly, there could be points in time that are separate according to one frame of reference and simultaneous to another. None of these frames are special, and it is as equally true to say that it occurred simultaneously as it is to say that one occurred first.

The belief that Aļļaah does not resemble His creation and how it is applied here for average Muslims

Every aspect of a created thing or being has a beginning, since no aspect of it is eternal. Likewise, everything that has a beginning must be a creation, as it must have been brought into existence. This means that Aļļaah is not something you can imagine, not Him and not His attributes, because your imagination is based on what you are familiar with, namely things that have a beginning, things that last moments of time despite their possible non-existence.

Based on this, the scholars taught people the rule that “whatever you can imagine in your mind, Aļļaah does not resemble it.” Similarly, the cousin of the Prophet Muĥammad, and famous companion, Ibn ˆAbbaas said, “Ponder about everything, but do not ponder about the Self of Aļļaah.” (Fatĥu-l-Baariy 13/383 ) He said this because such dwelling leads one to draw analogies between the Creator and the created, which is blasphemy. It contradicts the belief in Aļļaah’s Oneness, as it involves the heretical belief that Aļļaah has an equal in some aspect. It also contradicts the Quranic “Absolutely nothing resembles Him.”

Accordingly, Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy stated in his creed: “Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.” Note the categorical sense of “a meaning,” which tells us that this is true for any meaning that applies to humans, not just some. For example, having a direction, a body, changing or the like. Note also that he states “meaning”, and not “word,” because the important thing is the meaning of the word, not the word itself. Consequently, if someone said “Aļļaah is not a body,” yet believed that Aļļaah is something in a place, then he is not a Muslim. This is because he believes Aļļaah to be attributed with the bodily meaning of occupying place.

Had the Wahhabis held onto this advice from the scholars, they would have rejected the argument they presented above at face value, and remained firmly within the fold of Islam. This is what average Muslims have done, because they know that they cannot imagine Aļļaah or His attributes. There would be no need for complex answers. Instead, the Wahhabis, out of their inclination towards deviance and hatred for the People of the Truth, the Sunnis, they decided to present an argument based on the idea that “what is true of creation must be true of the Creator.”

As for us, the People of the Truth, the Sunnis, we do not liken Aļļaah to His creation, and we do not draw analogies between the Creator and His creation. We firmly believe that Aļļaah is not in the frameworks of time and place, unlike Wahhabis. Consequently, Aļļaah’s Knowledge is not our kind of knowledge, created knowledge, so it is not restricted by time. No creation can fully know the reality of Aļļaah, or His attributes. It is One Knowledge by which He knows everything, unlike our knowledge. As for time, it is something we are stuck passing through, a function of our reality of being under constant change and renewal relative to all other things in space. Aļļaah is neither in a state of change nor renewal, nor is He in a place, so it is nonsensical to draw analogies between ourselves or our knowledge and Aļļaah and His Knowledge.

A look at “Tensed Facts”

What confused the wahabi is that at 1:27 pm he is in one situation of time and place, and at 1:28 pm at another, as estimated by the position of the Sun with respect to the Earth, as is the custom of humans (see footnote[1].) He thought that since he is changing situations with respect to the rest of creation, that Aļļaah also was in a situation at 1:27 pm and then another at 1:28 pm. This is not the case, because Aļļaah is not in a “situation,” as He is not in a place, and is not in time, so the question, “when was He?” does not apply to Him. Missing this point, he thought that knowledge of “tensed facts” has to be in time. This cannot be true, because it is impossible that Aļļaah should be in time, as we shall prove below under the next heading.

The past tense, for example, is an expression referring to the relative situation of created things to each other. So when someone says “12:00 noon already passed,” he means that he already passed through that state relative to space and the change and renewal of other creations. Aļļaah, on the other hand, does not pass through relative situations, since He is not in a place and does not change and does not renew.

As for the present tense, it is true for me, at 1:27, that it is 1:27, but this is only a name for my relative position to other things that change with me at different places. Aļļaah is not in a place and does not change, or renew, so His knowledge is not relative to time. Aļļaah knows everything about all times, without Himself being in time. His knowledge of time is without a beginning, end, change or renewal.

Aļļaah knows all these relations, because He created them. He knows them with one indivisible knowledge, that is neither a whole nor a part, because it is not composed lest it need a composer, and that is beginningless and without end, because it is not brought into existence, lest it need a creator.

In fact, Aļļaah created our knowledge and perception of “tensed facts,” so He knows the “now is 1:27”, for a created being which is a matter of time, space and relative change or renewal for that being. He knows it without His knowledge having a future, past or present, because He created it. He knows it perfectly, because He created every aspect of it, unlike the creations that exist in the uncountable when situations/times that each and every creation pass through during the time they last. In fact, created beings only have the knowledge of the “now” they are in according to the limited perceptions He created in them.

We believe then, that Aļļaah knows “tensed facts” without needing to be in the creation of time. We believe His knowledge is eternal and some information created, just as we believe that Aļļaah’s action of creating is eternal while the created has a beginning.

It is impossible that Aļļaah should be in time

The arguer thinks Aļļaah’s knowledge is something that can be divided over moments of time, so that the concepts of past, present and future applies to it. That cannot be true, however, because Aļļaah’s existence is not a possibility, but an existence that is intrinsically necessary (Waajibu-l-Wujuud). To clarify: something that exists is either intrinsically (i.e. with respect to itself alone) possible in its existence, or intrinsically necessary. There is no third judgment for what exists. The possible in existence accepts non-existence, while the necessary does not. Aļļaah is necessarily existent, but everything else is possible, because what is possible in existence needs something other than itself to exist. If it did not, then it would be intrinsically necessary.

If Aļļaah’s existence was divisible into time periods, then His necessary existence would be in a state of renewal, moment by moment, and what is renewed is not necessary in existence, rather it is only possible in the next moment, i.e. possible after having existed. In other words, renewal of existence does not apply to what is necessary in existence, because it does not need renewal. After all, if it needed renewal, it would not be necessary in existence. Consequently, it does not have moments of existence.

Another way to say this is that if Aļļaah’s existence had been divisible into moments of time, then this would either be with Him having a beginning, which none of us believe, or with Him having no beginning. However, if his existence was divisible into moments of time, without a beginning, then this would mean that an infinite number of moments passed before the world came into existence. An infinite number of moments cannot pass, however, because infinity cannot be completed. Therefore, since an infinite amount of moments cannot pass, it must be true that Aļļaah’s existence is not divisible into moments of time. Accordingly, His knowledge is not either, because it is an eternal, necessary, and thus non-renewing, attribute of Aļļaah. We know He has this attribute, because He specified and brought everything into existence, and since He specified it, He must definitely know it also.

Our knowledge, on the other hand, is a knowledge that is renewed over time, so our knowledge existing at 1:27 differs from our knowledge at 1:28. This is because it is changing, and because it is not necessary in existence, and is therefore divisible into moments of existence.

Beginningless Eternity is not a time

One important point needs to be stressed: Beginningless Eternity is not a past time. Rather, it is an expression by which we mean the existence of Aļļaah with the non-existence of time, place and all creation. The mind wants to know what this precedence of the Creator with respect to His creation is. It is not in time, however, because time is possible in existence, as it is parts (moments) following each other in sequence, and these parts are definitely not eternal. The whole of time then, is dependent on possible parts, and what depends on the possible is surely only possible in existence. Accordingly, the precedence of its Creator cannot be in time, not the least because that would make Him both in time and not in time, which is self-contradictory.

The reality of this, however, is not something the mind can grasp, because anything that enters the mind is in a situation of time. That is why Aļļaah being precedent is known by us in general, but not in detail or comprehensively.

For example, Aļļaah’s precedence of beginninglessness indicates a distinction between His beginninglessness and His endlessness. Beginningless eternity, however, is not something other than Aļļaah (but not Him Himself either.) Moreover, distinction between the two meanings would require a beginning for endlessness, but this is impossible, because any hypothesized beginning would have endlessness before it, as there is no beginning before that. That is, distinction between beginninglessness and endlessness would require the completion of beginninglessness, and that is impossible, because what does not begin cannot finish. This means that our minds are incapable of distinguishing between the concepts of beginninglessness, endlessness and eternity. The reason is that the mind only knows what the mind encompasses. So what is apparent is that Aļļaah is first in that everything that has a beginning depends on Him for their existence. If one tries to understand the reality of that firstness, however, one is completely unable, because the mind cannot encompass what has no limit.

Now we are back to the point that the reality of Aļļaah’s existence is not comprehensible to humans, but at an even deeper level than previously. A further indication of this fact, is that a human being does not conceptualize something except if he perceives in his mind inner feelings, such as pain and pleasure, or input from his senses, such as light, color, shape, sound, voice, taste, smell, temperature and softness. Anything beyond that is difficult for a human to conceptualize. Since Aļļaah’s reality is not like what we perceive through our senses, we are not able to conceptualize Him.

Yet another indication of this incomprehensibility, is that what we know about Him, is either in the sense of negation, like in the sense that He is neither a body, nor a particle, or in terms of meanings that pertain to Him, such as, “He is the one that has all rights to judge.” In fact the most apparent fact we know about Him is: “He is the Creator of the world,” and that therefore He precedes it. Yet we cannot know the reality of this precedence, because it is not one of time.

We are compelled, nevertheless, to speak about this meaning in a figurative way, because language has been established to speak about things that are in time and place, and we do not have special vocabulary to express exactly what we want to say. For this reason, the feeble minded will think that we are saying something other than what we intend, such as when we say “before Aļļaah created the worlds.” We not mean by this to say that Aļļaah was in time.

In this regard, the Imam of Guidance, Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy says: “A fundamental belief principle is that whenever Aļļaah is ascribed an attribute, then this attribute is eternal. One says that He is attributed with knowledge, power and providing eternally without a beginning and without an end. If He is mentioned with regard to His management of creation and orders to it, then time is stated, but this time is for creation, not for Him. For example, it is said, “Aļļaah knows eternally that you are sitting here,” or “(sitting here) at this time.” I.e. Aļļaah knows eternally without a beginning or an end that the person is sitting now…. This is all to prevent people from thinking “How were the created things in eternity? (Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah 9/473)”

Having said that, what the arguer is describing, is a change of information over time for something in time. Time is something relative to one’s frame of reference, as one relates to all other things in space. Even in modern, generally accepted physics, they teach that the order of things is a matter of one’s reference point in space, and now the trend is that the phenomena of time is related to mass. Strange, but since Aļļaah is not in a place, unlike what Wahhabis believe, this helps us to accept also that time is not something He passes through as He does not have a reference point in space nor does He have mass, because He is not a body. Rather, all places at all times pertain to Him with no difference between them, because He is not in a place and does not change. It is what His Power to create pertains to that is in time and place with respect to each other, not that He Himself is in time.

Accordingly, Aļļaah knows eternally without a beginning or end, or change or renewal, the fact that “the time is 1:28 when the time is 1:28” and He knows the relation of that particular time to all other times. For example, He knows the time at which this time is present in itself, and when it is passed, and when it is future, just as He knows that time’s relation to the beginning of time, and so on. In other words, He knows everything that has to do with that time, both what we know, and what we do not know. So if that time comes, in relation to us, as we pass through time, and He is not, then Aļļaah did not increase His knowledge, because He knows eternally everything that has to do with it.

Further explanation

The ambiguity of what the wahabi said is made clearer if we hypothesized that a prophet asked his Lord, “what time is it now?” and Aļļaah revealed to him that the time is so and so. Is this revelation that was revealed to Him something that happened to Aļļaah’s knowledge, or something that He knows without beginning or end? The answer is without doubt that it is something that Aļļaah knows eternally, because the word “now” is a word of relativity (relative to what passes through time) that Aļļaah (who is not in time) knows by His beginningless and endless knowledge. In other words, it is true that the time, at that particular point in time, is called “now” relative to things that are renewed or that change (i.e. things that could intrinsically, with respect to themselves, in the mind’s eye, be non-existent after existence.) So it is true that it is “now” with respect to that prophet when he asks. Based on this we can rephrase the hypothesized request as follows: “What is the time now, relative to myself?” or, “What is the time now, relative to what passes through time?”

As for the Eternal, the relation of all different places is one to Him, in the sense that no place is closer or further from Him than another, because He is not in place, neither in one place, nor in all places. Likewise, all different times have one relation to Him, in the sense that one time is not nearer to Him than another. This is indicated in the aayah:

هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ [الحديد : 3]

Literally translated: “He is the First and the Last.” Since Aļļaah does not have a beginning, it is true, based on the aayah, that He is First and Last without a beginning, i.e. without a past time, i.e. without being last after having been first. So the meaning of being last is not after being first and being first is not before being last. We consequently know that He is not bound by time, and that all different times have one relation to Him, because created things (i.e. what passes through time) cannot be last unless they have a past time. There is no question, however, that comprehending this is utterly beyond the capability of our minds.

The origin of this doubt-spreading point brought forward by the wahabi is his thinking that Aļļaah passes through time, just as creation does. So he thought that the relation of “now” to Aļļaah is the same as the relation of “now” to us, His creation. This thinking stems from his failure to define time properly, and failure to differentiate between the Creator and the created. If he was really trying to get to the truth, he would have solved this problem by defining time properly. Alternatively, he could have believed Aļļaah’s saying about Himself:

وَخَلَقَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ [الأنعام : 101]

Meaning: “He created everything, and He knows everything.” After all, time is definitely other than Aļļaah, so He is its Creator, and He is not passing through it.

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[1]This is because measuring time is estimating renewal or change by renewal or change in something else. For example, days are measured in terms of changes in the sun or moon’s positions. If a sunrise is followed by a sunset, we say that a day has passed, and if this happens seven times, then we say that a week has passed and so on. Elements and bodies are in a constant state of renewal, because their existence in every new moment is only a possibility; you do not know with absolute certainty whether they will exist in the next moment or not. They are therefore in a continuous state of renewal of existence. That is why the concept of time always applies to them; they cannot break free of it. They are in a state of continuous state of existence after existence instead of non-existence, as long as they exist. This is what it means to pass through time. This is not so with Aļļaah, because Aļļaah’s existence is a must, and it is therefore impossible that He should cease to exist. In other words, His existence is not in time, because His existence is not in a state of renewal. It is also clear then that He is not measurable in terms of time, because time is a measure of relative change or renewal between two things, and Aļļaah is not attributed with change or renewal. He is, after all, the Creator of time, because time is other than Aļļaah, and He said in His Book that He created everything.

Wahabi says: it is absurd to say that you can’t prove there is a beginning to the world if one says Allah can perform new acts.

Comment: "New acts" are in your view events that happen in Aļļaah Himself, and since they have a beginning they need to be brought into existence according to a specification, which means they need another act to exist, and if that act has a beginning, then that one also needs another act and so on, in an infinite past loop, which cannot be completed, so the "new act" can never exist. Since you have implied that there can be an infinite number of events in the past, and thereby rejected its obvious impossibility, you have no way to prove logically that the world has a beginning. This is because you have stubbornly or ignorantly rejected the impossibility of the completion of infinite past events, so there is no logical way to prove why the world cannot have infinite past evens, i.e. no beginning. The reason for this is that you rejected the impossibility of infinite past events, which is the main premise for the proof for why the world (defined as everything other than Aļļaah) must have a beginning.

Wahabi says: This statement is out of date because today we can prove the beginning of the universe by appealing to the best scientific evidence (e.g. big bang cosmology and the second law of thermodynamics?)

Comment: These are scientific theories only, and theories can be proven wrong. Moreover, they do not prove, as scientists see it, that this world is brought into existence by other than it, nor do they by themselves prove unequivocally that there were no events prior to the proposed Big Bang. To prove that, you must accept that completing an infinity of past events is impossible, as it clearly is. This again means that you must reject the idea that Aļļaah’s Will or Creating happens with a beginning.

Wahabi wrote: If you are saying the Qur’aan is internal speech….

Wahabi wrote: Hmmm…it’s interesting that Imam Ahmad didn’t say what you’re saying. If you’re saying the Qur’an is Allah’s internal speech, then let’s see the evidence for that- unless you make things up…

I never said ” Aļļaah has “internal speech,” and I fear that anyone who says that has committed kufr, as it suggests that He has an inside and an outside, which means He would be a body. Believing that Aļļaah has a body is blasphemy, as stated by Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy {in brackets}: {This is a detailed remembrance of the belief of the People of the Sunnah and following {the Jamaaˆah}. Later he stated, as part of this remembrance,{Aļļaah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.} {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}. He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said in the same remembrance: {Whoever attributed to Aļļaah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.} Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans. In other words, the Sunni belief is that attributing a limit to Aļļaah makes one a non-Muslim.

What we do say is that Aļļaah’s attribute of Speech is not emergent, because anything emergent (having a beginning) must be specified and brought into existence, i.e. created, and we cannot say that an attribute of His is created. This means that Aļļaah’s attribute of Speech is not letters or sounds, because letters and sounds begin to exist, i.e. they are emergent. The word “Qur’aan” refers to Aļļaah’s attribute of Speech, but it also refers to the revealed book with Arabic letters and words, which tells us what Aļļaah said eternally without a beginning or end, i.e. not in time. This is the source of the confusion in this issue. If you really care and want to understand why Sunnis say what they say, read this article carefully along with all of its linked articles: Wahabi contention: Ashˆaris say “This Quran is not Allaah’s Speech”.

Wahabi contention: Asharis are forced to believe that Allah’s Will for the creation of time occured before time

A wahabi said: Asharis believe that Allah has willed all events that have ever and will ever occur from pre-eternity. They don’t believe that He wills whenever He pleases. Rather they believe that He willed everything from pre-eternity and then the events will occur delayed at some time later. However, us Salafis believe that once Allah wills something to occur it occurs immediately/simultaneously. The Salafi view unlike the Ashari view is in full conformity with sound logic.

My (the wahabi anthropomorphist) argument is as follows:

• Point 1: Asharis believe that time is created.
• Point 2: Asharis believe that Allah does not operate in time.
• Point 3: Asharis believe that time is the created effect out of Allah’s pre-eternal will being implemented. Hence, Allah’s pre-eternal will is the cause of time’s existence.
• Point 4: According to sound logic the cause of an effect either precedes its effect or occurs simultaneously along with it in a temporal sense.
• Point 5: Asharis do not believe that Allah’s will is simultaneous with the creation of time, since they believe that Allah’s will is pre-eternal, while time is a creation that only occurred around 15 billion years ago (according to the best of science, we are not sure. The point is that physical time is not eternal.)
• Point 6: Hence, Asharis are forced to believe that Allah’s will of the creation of time occurred before time.
• Point 7: Point 6 is a logical contradiction. How can there be something before the creation of time? The word before is a temporal word and it makes no sense to make such a statement.
• Conclusion: Allah’s willing everything to occur from pre-eternity is a logical contradiction and logical impossibility. The Salafi belief that the effect occurs immediately/simultaneously with Allah’s will, which is the cause of that effect is in full conformity and harmony with sound logic.The only way for the Asharis to maintain that God willed everything from pre-eternity and creation began to exist later is to deny that time is a creation, but the two cannot both be true at the same time. So they must compromise on one of these beliefs.

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Comment: First of all, if you had some understanding, you would have noticed that you started by boasting of your mean anthropomorphist creed. This is a creed that no one accepts, unless his mind is malfunctioning. Are you proud to say that Aļļaah wills whenever He wishes?” This is ascribing to Aļļaah, who is eternally without a beginning, attributes that did not exist and then became existing. It has been established with unequivocal proofs that something eternal without a beginning cannot have attributes that have a beginning. This is because this will that you describe as emerging from non-existence, and ascribe to Aļļaah, would be an attribute of perfection, which means that Aļļaah would be lacking this perfection before it occurred. No one believes this except a kaafir that does not realize the greatness of Aļļaah. Nothing is left after that, except you saying that this will you claim emerged in the Creator Almighty is an attribute of imperfection, and this is madness and stupidity that does not need an answer.

Second, do you think that a rational being is duped by your term, “delayed” to pave the way for your figure-worship agenda? You said, “the Ashˆariyys believe that He willed everything from pre-eternity and then the events will occur delayed at some time later,” and then immediately you followed this with: “Salafis believe that once Aļļaah wills something to occur it occurs immediately/simultaneously.” Here you tried to give the reader the impression that you glorify Aļļaah and attribute to Him having a will that is executed, while the Ashˆariyys ascribe to Him flaws and attribute to Him willing what is not executed except after a delay.

The reality of the matter, however, is that the People of the Truth, the People of the Sunnah, Ashˆariyys and Maaturiidiyys, believe that what Aļļaah has willed to happen by His beginninglessly eternal Will, happens at its specified time, and without any delay.

As for you, the anthropomorphists, you believe that what Aļļaah has willed does not happen unless a will emerges in Aļļaah that He was not attributed with before. In other words, you believe that everything that happens in creation from the smallest matters to the largest is simultaneous with the emergence of a will in Aļļaah that did not previously exist. So you made, according to your claim, Aļļaah ever- and continuously changing. This is in disagreement with all sound minded people in history, who all said, “Aļļaah is the one that is clear of imperfection – He changes things, and does not change.”

Third, you tried to imitate the People of the Truth in using rational proofs, and all you came up with was a quack. How did you expect to succeed anyway, when rational thought is something you have not tasted and Aļļaah has deprived you of? Anyway, take this as a slap to your clueless venture and crooked thoughts:

As for your first point, which is that time is a creation. This is exactly the truth. We do not say, however, that it exists outside the mind. This is because it is not something that exists in itself, nor something that exists in something that exists in itself. Rather, it is a consideration in our minds, or a mental estimation of an aspect of creation, which is that it intrinsically accepts non-existence and change.

As for your second point, which is your statement, “Asharis believe that Allah does not operate in time,” this one needs to be rephrased. What we believe is that Aļļaah is not bound by time in the sense that He, all glory belongs to Him, is not tied to time, unlike everything else. In other words, He is clear of being restricted to, or unreleasable from, the frame of time. This is because it is impossible that He should become non-existent or change.

In your third point, you said, “Asharis believe that time is the created effect out of Allah’s pre-eternal will being implemented,” and then you claimed this means that Allah’s pre-eternal will is the cause of time’s existence. This is not the case. Rather, we believe that time is a matter of consideration, tied to our minds, for all created things, as any creation may become nonexistent after its existence. We also believe that the existence of time, like other created things, is according to the beginningless Will, Power and Knowledge of Aļļaah.

We do not say that Aļļaah’s Will is the cause of time’s existence, as you claim, because we do not call Aļļaah a cause. Rather He is the creator of causes and effects. A cause, literally speaking, is something that begins and then ends when its effect takes place, and Aļļaah’s Will is eternal and therefore unchanging. Strictly speaking then, Aļļaah’s Will is not a cause, and the world is not its effect, because Allaah’s Will does not begin or end.

To clarify, we know that Aļļaah has a will, because He specified how creation is to be. Someone who believes this might claim that this will’s existence is intrinsically necessary in itself, or intrinsically possible in itself, there is no third alternative. What we believe is that its existence is necessary, and not merely possible, which means that Aļļaah’s Will is eternal and does not change. Here is why:

1. We know that the world is not eternal, because it is intrinsically, that is, with regards to itself, only possible in existence. This is, again, because the existence of something can only be either intrinsically necessary or intrinsically possible. If it is necessary, then it must be eternal, because if it was not, then it would be possible, since its non-existence would be possible. That is why by establishing that something can cease to exist, or has a beginning, we can establish that it is possible in existence. Moreover, since something’s existence is either possible or necessary, we can know something to be necessary by showing it is not merely possible.
2. If something is intrinsically possible in existence it needs to be brought into existence by something other than itself. This is because it needs to be specified in terms of time, place and other characteristics[1].
3. The sound mind tells us that the world is not intrinsically necessary in existence, but needs to be brought into existence. The reason for this is that it changes all the time by moving, being still, changing in shape and color, changing in composition, and so on. To clarify, these changes entail the cessation of one characteristic and the emergence of another, which tells us that the attribute was only possible in existence, and not necessary.
4. This means again that the world needs specification for how it is at any point in time. This specification either comes from something else that is possible in existence, namely a cause that occurs, or from something necessary in existence, which is what we believe. Remember that what is necessary in existence cannot have a beginning or end, because its non-existence is impossible.
5. We cannot say that Aļļaah’s willing an event to occur is something that occurs, because that would mean it too was non-existent and in need of being brought into existence, which would mean that it too would need to be brought into existence by something existing. This leads to an infinite loop in the past that would have to complete, and an infinite loop cannot be completed, so an emergent will cannot therefore be the explanation of creation’s existence. This is unless we affirm that there is a will that is necessary, i.e. neither begins nor ends.
6. Not only that, if one does not believe that Aļļaah’s attribute of Will is necessary, it would mean that Aļļaah’s Will is created, because to create is to bring into existence according to a specification. This would mean, in reality, that creation was created by creation, and that is atheism. There is no escape from this, and calling it “emergent, but not created” does not solve the problem, because we are concerned about meanings of words, not words and letters in themselves, and the essential meaning of creating is as we have stated: to bring into existence according to a specification. The world exists because Aļļaah brought it into existence as specified by His Will, i.e. created it. An emergent will has to be brought into existence according to specification, so it must be created.
7. To avoid saying that Aļļaah’s Will needs a creator, and believing in infinite loops that complete, we have to say that His Will is not the cause of creation, but a necessary attribute of Aļļaah, without a modality, by which creation is specified in terms of time, place, shape, color, and other characteristics. Aļļaah’s Will is one will, not a collection of wills, unlike ours, otherwise it would be composed and arranged, like you people believe, and therefore in need of being composed and arranged by specification. What this means is that His Will is not a collection of existing wills for all the different things He has willed, as you people believe. Rather, it is without a modality and cannot be imagined, because it is not created, and therefore does not have a structure or specification in terms of time or space. The reality of our will, on the other hand, is that it is a possibility, because it is a collection of different wills at different points in time, ever changing and developing during our lives. This is why our will needs a creator, and why Aļļaah’s Will cannot be like that. We say that Aļļaah’s Will is one eternal and unchanging Will that pertains to all that is possible in existence, i.e. specifiable. Then instead of employing our imagination, we say that sound reason tells us that it does not change or cease in any sense, because that would make it need a creator, like anything else that is only possible in existence.

This is the difference between belief by imagination and belief by sound reason. This is why the Salaf said, “whatever you imagine, Aļļaah is different from it, Aļļaah’s attributes are without a how,” which succinctly and simply summarizes the above argument.

Your fourth point was: “According to sound logic the cause of an effect either precedes its effect or occurs simultaneously along with it in a temporal sense.” If you mean by this that the tie between causes and effects is a must, then this is not correct. Rather, there is no mentally necessary relation between causes and effects. This is because Aļļaah could create a cause, without the existence of the effect, or an effect, without the existence of its cause. An example of the first is a fire that does not burn, like in the case of Prophet Ibraahiim, and of the second, ashes created by Aļļaah without a prior fire. All this, however, has nothing to do with the point at hand, because Aļļaah’s Will is not a cause of creation.

Your fifth point was your claim that we do not believe that Aļļaah’s Will is simultaneous with the creation of time, as time is created in our view, and Aļļaah’s Will is beginninglessly eternal, and not created. This misleadingly suggests that we believe that Aļļaah’s Will is something that occurred eternally and then became non-existent. This is not the case, because eternity does not cease. In other words, we believe that Aļļaah’s Will is eternally without a beginning, and it is now as it was eternally, before the existence of any creation, and does not change.

Your sixth point was, “Asharis are forced to believe that Allah’s will of the creation of time occurred before time.” This is not correct, because Aļļaah’s Will is not something that has a beginning, so we do not say that it “occurs.” Rather, His Will is an eternal, unchanging, unceasing, perfect and necessary attribute of Aļļaah that He absolutely must be attributed with.

The reason for your mistake is that you have not understood the concept of eternity, and believe there are an infinite amount of occurrences and events in the past, without a beginning. This is shirk, if you could only understand, but who am I talking to? So you considered that we believed Aļļaah’s Will to be like that, namely occurring without a beginning, which is perfectly self-contradictory, for how does the beginningless occur???

The seventh point was that Point 6 is a logical contradiction. You said, “How can there be something before the creation of time? The word before is a temporal word and it makes no sense to make such a statement.” This is true, but this contradiction is not what we believe. This is only what you imagined to be, and ascribed it to us, as mentioned in my comment on your sixth point.

As for the conclusion that you imagined, stating that we have self-contradictory beliefs, this is incorrect, because you based it on the false premises exposed above. Our belief that Aļļaah willed everything that was and everything that will be is not contradictory, but in agreement with sound reason. What actually contradicts sound reason is your belief that occurrences happen in Aļļaah Himself. He is clear of and above what you claim (and by “above” I do not mean direction, you twit).

It remains to be said that our belief that Aļļaah eternally willed all created things is not in contradiction with sound reason, even though we say that time is created. It is your hateful, kaafir heart and flawed reasoning that mislead you to a conclusion contrary to this fact.

As for terms we use, the likes of “before,” and other words that have meanings originally meant for time, in expressions like, “Aļļaah existed before time and place” – these are figurative uses aiming beyond the meanings that these words are originally for. This is needed, because a language, no matter how rich, will be narrower in its original vocabulary of literal meanings than all of the different meanings a person might want to express. For this reason, figurative and more liberal use of vocabulary is needed. This is how it is, if you could only understand, but again, who am I addressing to understand?

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[1] If someone suggested that it was eternal, then he is saying that its beginningless existence is possible, and not necessary. If it was possible, however, then that means that the possibility of non-existence succumbed to the dominance of the possibility of existence without a reason or explanation. After all, we have already said that its existence is intrinsically possible, which means that neither the option of existence, nor the one of non-existence is dominant over the other. This would again mean that its existence was not intrinsically merely possible in the first place, and this is self-contradictory.

Wahabi contention: Ashˆaris say “This Quran is not Allaah’s Speech”

Wahabi says:
<<The Ash’aris to this day remain too coward to express their beliefs, lest they are frowned upon by the audience. How many times I asked you to answer a simple question: Who said Alif-Laam-Meem? Why is it so difficult for you to utter in public – your belief – that Alif-Laam-Meem is in fact created and that Allah never said these letters? Because you do not – yet – want to shock the Muslim Ummah, who unanimously believe that Allah spoke those letters. This is why you explicitly state in works that this discussion should be confined within a classroom setting, lest you are exposed. Try to gain some courage and be like your Ash’arite predecessor, Abu al-Futuh. You know who Abul-Futuh is? He is the Ash’arite who would leave his mosque, wearing thick armoury, mounting his horse, and then proclaiming in public: “This Quran is not Allah’s Speech! This is just paper and ink!” while the Muslim population of Baghdad would stone him and throw filth at him. This was your past, and this still remains your present. But you simply do not have the courage of Abul-Futuh.>>

Comment:
Let us say that Obama made a speech today at a White House press conference. Then the reporters wrote down what was said and published it in the Washington Post under the title “Obama’s Speech.” Now, if someone came and said, “This is not Obama’s Speech! This is just paper and ink!” Would you consider this person sensible? Of course you would not. Why? Let us first look at the concept of speech and the meanings of the word “speech” in this example.

If we were to imagine the events surrounding the press conference, we can imagine that before even saying anything, Obama had something on his heart that he wanted to say. These unexpressed meanings that he wanted to say is the speech that he wants to make. This is called a speech, as we just did when we said “the speech that he wants to make,” but it is not letters or sounds. Rather it is a collection of meanings that words can be used to express. Words, after all, are just collections of sounds that refer to meanings that we want to express. Yet, we refer to collections of words put together in sentences by someone as “his speech,” even if it translated to another language that this someone does not even know. So if Obama’s speech was translate to Arabic we would still call it “Obama’s Speech.” This is because they refer to the meanings he originally expressed based on the meanings he wanted to convey, which is his inner speech.

The word “speech” then, has at least two meanings. The first is the speech inside of us, which is the meanings inside of us that we want to express. The second is the expression of this inner speech in words and letters, or even body language. The reason why the expression is simply called “his speech” or “her speech” is because the expressed form of it is an expression of what the person wanted to say, which is his inner speech.

I do not know who this Abu-l-Futuh is, but he is not Ashˆariyy. The Ashˆariyys do not say that the Qur’aan is not Allaah’s Speech. They say it is Allaah’s Speech, meaning that the word Qur’aan refers to the eternal speech of Allaah, which is not letters and not sounds. The word “Qur’aan” then, has two meanings. The first is the eternal speech of Allaah which is an eternal attribute of His that is not letters, sounds or language, and is not sequential. The second is the book in the mushaf, which is the expression in Arabic of what Allaah said eternally. This book is called Allaah’s Speech, because it refers to what Allaah said eternally, and one cannot say that it is not Allaah’s speech, because that entails denying Allaah’s eternal speech.

Not to draw a resemblance, but for the purpose of explanation: Consider a case where you said “it is not Obama’s speech,” about the Obama speech published in the Washington Post in the example mentioned above. What you are understood as saying is that Obama did not express the meanings published, and that they are falsely attribute to him. Moreover, if you added, “This is just paper and ink!” you will be labeled as a complete ass, because no one means the paper or ink if they refered to the published speech as “Obama’s speech.” Rather, they are referring to the meanings expressed in the words and letters.

Likewise, when Muslims hold the mushaf up and say, “this is Allaah’s Speech,” they mean the meanings that Allaah said eternally, not the paper or ink. That is why if someone translated an aayah of the Qur’aan to English and stated before it “Allaah said….” people will not object and say, “Allaah did not say that,” unless he disagreed with the translation. Alternatively, they mean the Arabic expression of Allaah’s eternal speech in particular, which can be considered the second meaning of the word “Qur’aan,” which the scholars refer to as an-naţħm, or “the structure.”

As for when some of the later asħˆariyys spoke of the permissibility of saying “the Qur’aan is created,” they were referring to the Arabic expression, not Aļļaah’s Speech. They said that this statement may be used in a classroom setting. The reason is because over time the word Qur’aan is mainly understood as referring to the expression of Aļļaah’s eternal Speech in Arabic words and letters. They were afraid that some people would understand from the expression, “the Qur’aan is not created,” that the Arabic expression is not created, which is far more dangerous than saying “the Qur’aan is created,” if one means the Arabic expression (not Aļļaah’s eternal attribute of Speech). After all, the latter meaning is sound, because Arabic expressions have a beginning and cannot be eternal, and if they are not eternal, then they must have been specified and brought into existence by Aļļaah. In other words, they must have been created. The only bad side of this would be that this expression is a bidˆah in religion, so they restricted it to a classroom purposes, because this is where the setting of religious necessity applies. That is, the necessity of preventing the kufr belief that Aļļaah speaks in letters and sounds, which is far more important than avoiding a dubious innovation.

It is obvious that the letter Alif is created. The reason is that this letter is an alphabetic symbol referring to the sound “LLL…” All alphabetic letters are written symbols that refer to sounds that we make with our voices. It is impossible that the eternal speech of Allaah should be letters, because His speech is not sound. His speech is not sound because it is eternal, and therefore does not have a beginning. Wakiiˆ said : “The one that says the Qur’aan is created has said it is emergent, and the one that says it is emergent has blasphemed (Al-Bayhaqiyy, Al-Asmaa’ Wa-ş-Şifaat, 1/608-609).”

Clearly then, since the Qur’aan is not emergent, unlike what the wahabi’s claim, it must be eternal. This necessarily implies that it is not sounds or letters. The reason is that sounds of letters that form words must begin and end. So if we said with our voices, “bismillaah”, then we start by uttering b, then end b, then begin i, then end i, etc., which means that speech consisting of letters and sound has a beginning, i.e. is emergent. This again means that it must be created, because anything with a beginning must be specified in terms of what it is and when it is to be, and brought into existence, which is the Arabic meaning of “create.” That is why the wahabis in their ignorance, by saying that Allaah’s speech is letters and sounds, have also said that it is created, even if they do not know it. Moreover, by claiming that Allaah’s Speech is words and letters, they have likened His speech to creation’s speech, and the Qur’aan states that Aļļaah does not resemble anything. Furthermore, speech in words and letters, i.e. by voice and sound, are actually vibrations of the vocal cords, and the body of air around us. This wahabi belief then, is just a branch of their belief that Aļļaah is a body. Finally, by claiming that Aļļaah’s speech is letters and words, they have said that Allaah’s Speech has delays. The reason is that information in words and letters come from sequences of meanings, which means that one piece of information will have been delayed by those preceding it, and will be delaying those that follow. This is an imperfection, and Aļļaah’s attributes are attributes of perfection.

Accordingly, we say that Allaah said Alif laam miim eternally, without His Speech being letters or sounds.

For a more complete coverage of this topic, see also (in chronological order):

Q & A: What about Alif Laam Meem?

Fakhruddin Al Raazi makes takfir for the Mujassimah, the Hululiyyah and the Hurufiyyah

Wahabi’s say that Aļļaah’s speech is created, but do not know it.

Wahabi’s still say that Aļļaah’s speech is created, but still do not know it.

Wakiiˆ on those who say “the Qur’aan is created.”

Wahabi asks: ‘who said alif laam meem?’

More Wahabi nonsense about Aļļaah’s attributes being emergent

The “simple” Wahabi belief

According to the Wahabies Allah is literally above the throne without ever leaving it, AND literally in the sky of the world in the last third of the night (i.e. always, because the Earth is round, so it is always the last third of the night somewhere.) Anyone see a problem here? Then they say it is blasphemy to

Al-Qurţubiyy explains why Aļļaah is not in a place or direction, and does not change.

Al-Qurţubiyy (the famous mufassir) said: “It is said to them [the anthopomorphists who believe Aļļaah is in a place or direction, etc.]: “If Allaah was specified by a specification, formed by a form, limited by a limit and end, existing in a specific direction, [or] changing by emergent [previously non existing] attributes in Himself, then

More Wahabi nonsense about Aļļaah’s attributes being emergent

Wahabi said: “If one were to call the arabic language created as it is the action and implementation of the ilm of Allah,