A SUMMARY OF FACTS COMPARING THE BELIEFS OF MUSLIMS VS. THOSE OF IBN TAYMIYYAH AND THE PHILOSOPHERS’

A QUICK LOOK AT THE RESULTS OBTAINED

	MUSLIM sayings versus those of the philosophers	Ibn Taymiyyah’s sayings versus those of the  philosophers
Number of disagreements	13	6
Number of agreements	1	5
Number of similarities	0	3
Total number of beliefs compared	14	14
% of agreements	7%	36%
% of similar sayings	0%	21%
% of similar sayings or agreements	7%	57%

FALSE PROPAGANDA & ACCUSATIONS

A common accusation of the wahabis and other anthropomorphists throughout history, is that the mainstream scholars of Islam, the Sunnis, the Asħˆariyys and Maaturiidiyys, took their beliefs from the Aristotelian philosophers. For someone with insight into the science of belief, this is obviously ridiculous, as they are bitter enemies, but those who do not have this insight might be affected by such fear mongering.

FACT 1

In reality, however, the reason why Sunni scholars engaged deeply into arguments based on pure reasoning, was to refute the beliefs of the philosophers. Accordingly, they studied their concepts and terminology, and then showed how the Aristotelian arguments were wrong using the terminology of philosophy.

FACT 2

On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyyah also studied Aristotelian arguments, particularly as presented by the Spanish philosopher Ibn Rusħd (the grandson). His purpose, however, was quite different. What he wanted was to find arguments against the Sunnis that could be used to defend and support his anthropomorphist belief that Aļļaah is something with a size, in a location, that moves and goes through changes. During this process he even adopted some beliefs that are identical or equivalent to those of the Aristotelians.

He was however a rhetorician of proportions, knowing how to sound convincing to the naïve, without actually saying much at all. He rarely defines his terms or clarifies exactly what the point of disagreement is. He sidetracks a lot and makes long and useless discussions arguing about terminology, “if you by this word this, then I say that,” even when he knows very well that this is not what his opponent means. He also hides his own views by arguing through quoting others, or by saying, “it could be said to that…” or the like. That is why you find him extremely long winded and incredibly vague. It is because he beats around the bush so much, that many scholars never discovered him and caught him red handed with his anthropomorphist agenda.

ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON OF MUSLIM & IBN TAYMIYYAH BELIEFS VS PHILOSOPHERS

The below table outlines some of the fundamental principles of belief that are disputed between the philosophers, the Sunnis and Ibn Taymiyyah, to see who resembles one another more. Be forewarned that the Wahabis will try to skew the results below by making two of the principle issues into many issues.

The first principle issue is that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something in a direction that can be pointed at. It is based on this principle that they denied that any of the words ascribing meanings to Aļļaah in the Qur’aan and the Sunnah, such as nazala, jaa’, istawa, wajh, yad, ˆaynayn, janb, qadam, ‘işbiˆ, and yamiin, can be understood in terms of movement, shape, parts, limbs or the like. So it becomes according to them, nazala (descend by movement), jaa’ (came by movement), istawa (become settled), wajh (face), yad (forelimb), ˆayn (organ of sight), janb (side), qadam (foot), ‘işaabiˆ (fingers), and yamiin (right hand side), etc. In contrast, the ‘Asħˆariyys will either simply narrate such words, when apparently ascribed to Aļļaah, without assigning any meaning, but denying a bodily meaning, or they will look at what the Arabic language allows of meanings, and choose one meaning that befits the Creator. For example, jaa’ becomes “His orders came,” and “istawa” becomes “controls”, and wajh becomes “what is done for His sake”, and so on. This is not denial of attributes, as the followers of Ibn Taymiyyah claim, it is a denial of limbs, and this comes back to one principle belief, namely that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something with size or shape or borders. Since Ibn Taymiyyah believes that Aļļaah is a body, he interprets any word that can be understood in a bodily manner as having a bodily meaning, whereas Muslims interpret such words in ways that do not involve bodily attributes. There are therefore many differences on interpretation that in reality come back to one single principle.

The second principle issue is the Muslim principle belief that Aļļaah is not something that events happen in, not something that changes, in contrast with the opposite belief of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is another principle belief with many sub questions in the same manner as the first principle issue. For example, ghađab will be interpreted by Ibn Taymiyyah as emotional change, whereas Muslims will understand it as Aļļaah willing punishment, without Him changing or being in time.

That being said, here are the details of the analysis:

The belief of the philosophers	The belief of the Sunnis (Asħˆariyys, Maaturiidiyys and noble Ĥanbaliyys)	The belief of Ibn Taymiyyah
1. Most of the philosophers believed that the world is eternal. They believed that matter is eternal and that there are one or more eternal bodies (something with size) (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 13). (Adħ-Dħakħiirah is a book written by a Turkish scholar to judge between Al-Ghazaaliyy and the philosophers, as ordered by Muĥammad Al-Faatiĥ)	Nothing is eternal other than Aļļaah, and He is not a body. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said: {He is now as He always was, eternally with His attributes, before His creation came into being.} The existence of a body without a beginning is impossible, because it needs a creator to specify its shape. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said {in brackets}: {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}	He believed that Aļļaah is an eternal body (i.e. limited in all 6 directions – a 3 dimensional shape) and that there have always been other bodies with Him, coming into existence, one after another eternally without a beginning.[1] Accordingly, there is one eternal body, while other bodies are eternal in kind in his view.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Identical (in meaning, but not in naming; he calls the eternal body Aļļaah, while the philosophers do not.)
2. The philosophers said that the world (anything other than Aļļaah) cannot cease to exist (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 65). In other words, it is a must to them that other than Aļļaah exists.	It is rationally possible for the world to cease to exist completely. We only know that it will continue by the scriptures that tell us about resurrection and eternal life in Paradise or torture in Hell.	Ibn Taymiyyah said it is not rationally possible that there be no creation (something other than Aļļaah), because Aļļaah must always create.[2] This is because his actions are not beginningless and endless according to Ibn Taymiyyah, but happen one after another.[3] In other words, it is a must to him that other than Aļļaah exists.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Identical in meaning, but not in naming.
3. The philosophers do not accept to say that Aļļaah has choice in whether to create or not (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 71).	The Sunnis say that Aļļaah has a Will, and that it is impossible that Aļļaah should need/ be compelled to create.	Ibn Taymiyyah said that Aļļaah must always create, as mentioned. He said Aļļaah has a choice in what to create, but not whether to create or not.[4]
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Identical
4. The philosophers cannot prove that the world needs a creator based on their premises. This is because they claimed that matter, and what they call “the first mind”, and some other parts of the world, are eternal. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 87)	The Sunnis said that all other than Aļļaah need to be created by Him, and that He is not of created kind, such as bodies, so He does not need a creator. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said {in brackets}: {The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}	Ibn Taymiyyah cannot prove that the world needs a creator based on his premises. This is because he said that Aļļaah himself is in a place and has 6 limits (i.e. 3 dimensional) and yet is not created (see footnote 1). He is therefore unable to establish that things with 6 limits need a creator, i.e. all the world as we know it. After all, if such a complex body can exist without a creator, then what about simpler ones?
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Identical
5. The philosophers said that it is only possible for Aļļaah to create one single thing, and He cannot create a body. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 99).	Aļļaah has the power to create infinitely many creations appearing over time.	Aļļaah has the power to create infinitely many creations appearing over time.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Disagree
6. The philosophers refused to ascribe to Aļļaah attributes that affirm meanings to Aļļaah Himself, and are not mere negations. That is, knowledge, power, life, will, hearing, seeing, and speech. Even when they use these words, they intend by them the negation of some meaning. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 106).	Sunnis said that Aļļaah is attributed with knowledge, power, life, will, hearing, seeing and speech that are not merely negations of their opposites. They said that these are eternal and unchanging attributes that are not in time and affirm meanings that are eternally true of Aļļaah, and are not mere negations of flaws.	He said that Aļļaah is attributed with knowledge, power, life, will, hearing, seeing and speech that are not merely negations of their opposites. He said, however, that these change over time.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Disagree
7. The philosophers agreed to say that the creator is not a body, nor like a body, and He is not in time, place, direction, or existing in something else. That is, to ascribe attributes to Aļļaah that negate what does not befit Him. They also agreed to ascribe to Him meanings related to creating, such as providing, creating, controlling etc. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 106)	Although there are differences regarding the details of this issue, Sunnis said that Aļļaah is not in time or in place, or direction. The bases for this is the Quranic, “He does not resemble anything”, which is understood literally, and any other scripture is understood in light of it. The reason for this is that the reality of the Creator’s existence must be complete in perfection, and created existence is need in each and every sense, because it needs a creator. Since Aļļaah is not created, He cannot resemble created things. This is shown by the Quranic rhetorical, “Is the One that Creates like what does not create?”	Ibn Taymiyyah believed that the creator is a body  located above creation,[5]  with created events in it, such as movement.[6] His basis for this is taking all scriptures ascribing a meaning to Aļļaah according to the customary meanings; the meanings that apply to creation. He then interprets the Quranic, “He does not resemble anything” accordingly. He understands this non-resemblance to mean different from creation the way created things differ from one another, so He is bigger in size than anything else, stronger, etc. Accordingly, he interpreted words ascribed to Aļļaah in the scriptures as meaning physical attributes and change, such as limbs, place, movement, emotions, and so on.
Similarity to philosophers	Identical	Disagree
8. The philosophers denied that Aļļaah knows particulars. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 172).	Aļļaah knows everything with an eternal knowledge that does not change.	He said that Aļļaah knows everything, but that it changes over time in terms of particulars as the future becomes past.[7]
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Similar (because this means he believed that Aļļaah’s knowledge is bounded by time. )
9. The philosophers discussed whether the universe itself, as a total body, has a self that speaks and moves by will.  (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 179).	The Sunnis said there is no way of knowing such a thing without revelation from Aļļaah.	I haven’t seen Ibn Taymiyyah mention this, so we’ll give him the benefit of the doubt.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Disagree
10. The philosophers said that normal cause actually influences in reality its effect, i.e. the causes between created things, such as glass hits floor – glass breaks is a matter of real influence.  (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 219).	The Sunnis said that the hit to the floor and the breaking of the glass are two different creations of Aļļaah, thus the hit has no real influence, only apparently and according to the normal correlation that Aļļaah has created between things, such as: heat (one creation) – burn (another creation), hit (one creation) – break (another creation), jump off cliff (one creation) – fall down (another creation), etc.	Ibn Taymiyyah is very vague on this issue. However, it appears that he is close to the muˆtazilite view, namely that things do have actual intrinsic influence on each other, but that this is created in them, and they use it by Aļļaah’s permission.[8] This is half way to the belief of the philosophers, who believed that such influence is not created. For example, it could be then, according to him heat (one creation) – burn (a creation brought into existence by heat.)
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Similar
11. The Aristotelians believed that bodies do not contain indivisible elements that are not divisible in the mind’s eye.	The Asħˆariyys agreed that if bodies are divided, one would eventually reach an element that is not divisible. Not by force, and not even in the mind’s eye could it be divided. This is because if one said e.g. that a stone is infinitely divisible into infinite quantities, then this would necessitate that the stone has infinite quantity, which would mean that its size is infinite, and this is clearly not the case.[9]	Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with the Aristotelians and criticized the Asħˆariyys for their claim that all bodies must consist of indivisible particles.[10] This is because he believed Aļļaah to be a body, and did not want to say openly that this body is divisible. He did however say that it is shrinkable, as seen in the quote in last quoted paragraph of this article.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Identical
12. The Platonic philosophers believed that the human soul is beginningless. Aristoteleans disagreed. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 248).	It is impossible that other than Aļļaah could exist without a beginning.	Since Ibn Taymiyyah allows for created kinds to be eternal, he would say that the human soul as a kind could be beginningless, even if he did not say this about the soul in particular.
Similarity to philosophers:	Disagree	Similar
13. The philosophers denied bodily resurrection, as well as Hell and Paradise, and said that what the prophets said regarding this are all figures of speech. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 261).	Since the apparent meaning of the scriptures is that there will be bodily resurrection and Hell or Paradise for them, we must accept this. There is no reliable evidence contrary to this. The philosophers reasoned that the non-existent cannot re-exist, because it will be something else. The answer is that it was possible in existence in the first place, so one cannot say it becomes impossible in existence after that.	Ibn Taymiyyah has no dispute with Sunnis on this matter – as far as I know.
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Disagree
14. The philosophers developed their opinions on theology without support from revelation. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 270).	The primary bases for religious knowledge are the Qur’aan and  ĥadiitħ.[11] As for the mind, its role is to conceptualize and judge in terms of true and false. It is the tool by which the scriptures can be understood through sound deductive reasoning, and avoiding contradictory ideas. It is not in itself a tool for knowing facts of religion. However, the knowledge that Aļļaah exists, has Will, Power and Knowledge can be achieved without scripture, because creation definitely needs a creator. Likewise, the mind alone can reach the conclusion that Muĥammad ibn ˆAbduļļaah was indeed the Messenger of Aļļaah. In short, the premises for knowing that the Qur’aan and the Prophet’s teachings are sources of true information are reached by the mind by observation of the nature of creation.	Ibn Taymiyyah claims to stick to the scriptures more than anyone, but due to his blindness he ended up understanding them in a contradictory manner,[12] and in a way that ruins the premises for proving that Aļļaah exists by observing creation. For details see the PDF article: Rational Quranic Islam vs Wahabism See also: For children: “How can we know that all other religions than Islam are incorrect when there are so many?”
Similarity to philosophers	Disagree	Disagree

	MUSLIM sayings versus those of the philosophers	Ibn Taymiyyah’s sayings versus those of the  philosophers
Number of disagreements	13	6
Number of agreements	1	5
Number of similarities	0	3
Total number of beliefs compared	14	14
% of agreements	7%	36%
% of similar sayings	0%	21%
% of similar sayings or agreements	7%	57%

 

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[1] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – (1 / 438) فهذا القول الوسط من أقوال القاضي الثلاثة هو المطابق لكلام أحمد وغيره من الأئمة وقد قال إنه تعالى في جهة مخصوصة وليس هو ذاهبا في الجهات بل هو خارج العالم متميز عن خلقه منفصل عنهم غير داخل في كل الجهات وهذا معنى قول أحمد “حد لا يعلمه إلا هو” ولو كان مراد أحمد رحمه الله الحد من جهة العرش فقط لكان ذلك معلوما لعباده فانهم قد عرفوا أن حده من هذه الجهة هو العرش فعلم أن الحد الذي لا يعلمونه مطلق لا يختص بجهة العرش

“This middle saying among the three sayings of Al-Qaađii Abuu Yaˆlaa is the one that agrees with what Aĥmad says and others among the imaams. He [i.e. Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal – and this is a lie, Aĥmad believed what Muslims believe, but that is another matter (Trans.)] has stated,

“Aļļaah is in a particular direction, and He is not spread out in all directions. Rather, He is outside the world, distinct from His creation, separate from it, and He is not in every direction.”

This is what Aĥmad, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, meant when he said,

“He has a limit that only He knows.”

If Aĥmad had meant the direction towards the ˆArsħ (Throne) only, then this would be known to Aļļaah’s slaves, because they know that Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ, so we know then that the limit they do not know is unqualified, and is not specified for the direction of the ˆarsħ.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/438)

Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyyah’s saying was that Aļļaah has one limit which is known, and that is the ˆArsħ, and that the other directions are also limited,  but these are unknown to us. This is understood from his support to the expression “He is not spread out in all directions”. This is made even clearer in his statement:

بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية – (1 / 601) فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل

“That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/601)

In other words, he is of the opinion that everything that exists, including the Creator, must have a size. According to Ibn Taymiyyah then, Aļļaah has a size limited by 6 limits.

He is also of the opinion that creation as a kind has always existed without a beginning, because he believes that Aļļaah’s creating happens in time. Therefore, he argues, Aļļaah has always been doing one act after another (i.e. creating) without a beginning. He says:

الصفدية – (2 / 97): وحينئذ فالذي هو من لوازم ذاته نوع الفعل لا فعل معين ولا مفعول معين فلا يكون في العالم شيء قديم وحينئذ لا يكون في الأزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء من العالم ولكن لم يزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء بعد شيء

“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and not having something done in particular, so there is no eternal object in the world, and He is not a complete cause for anything in the world, but He has in beginningless eternity always been a complete cause for something, one after another…” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97) Since nothing exists in his belief, except what has a size, we can understand that he believes bodies to be eternal in kind, even if each individual body has a beginning, except the Creator’s.

[2] He says:

الصفدية – (2 / 97): وحينئذ فالذي هو من لوازم ذاته نوع الفعل لا فعل معين ولا مفعول معين فلا يكون في العالم شيء قديم وحينئذ لا يكون في الأزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء من العالم ولكن لم يزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء بعد شيء

“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and not having something done in particular,…” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97)

[3] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

الصفدية – (2 / 141) وتبين أنه لا يمكن حدوث شيء من الحوادث إلا عن فاعل يفعل شيئا بعد شيء

“It has become clear that nothing can come into existence except from an actor that does something one after another.” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141) He also said:

الصفدية – (2 / 141): الفعل لا يعقل ولا يمكن إلا شيئا فشيئا

“An act is impossible except bit by bit.” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141)

[4] See footnote 2.

[5] See footnote #1

[6] Ibn Taymiyyah said :

ونقول رابعا الحركة الاختيارية للشيء كمال له كالحياة ونحوها فإذا قدرنا ذاتين إحداهما تتحرك باختيارها والأخرى تتحرك أصلا كانت الأولى أكمل ويقول الخصم رابعا قوله لم لا يجوز أن يكون متحركا قولك الحركة حادثة قلت حادثة النوع أو الشخص الأول ممنوع والثاني مسلم (درء التعارض, ج 4 / ص 160)

In the above statement, Ibn Taymiyyah addresses his opponent, who has stated that movement must have a beginning, so it cannot be an attribute of perfection. Ibn Taymiyyah responds to this: “Beginning for its kind or each distinct movement? The first is impossible, but the second is accepted as true.” (Dar’ Taˆaaruđ A-ˆAql wa-n-Naql, 4/160)

In other words, it is not impossible that there are infinitely many movements in the past in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and it can be an attribute of Aļļaah, since it is an attribute of perfection in his view. This is based on his belief that Aļļaah is a body, because a body that cannot move is “stuck” and it is better to be able to move than to be stuck. Sunnis believe that Aļļaah is not a body, so the attributes of being able to move or being stuck do not apply to Him. Note that movement is not an attribute of perfection, because movement happens due to the need to move, although being stuck is even worse, as it signifies inability to do what one needs to to do. Both movement and being stuck are thus attributes of imperfection.

Ibn Taymiyyah also said:

(الفتاوى الكبرى, 5 / 127): فهذا لا يصح إلا بما ابتدعته الجهمية من قولهم: لا يتحرك ولا تحل به الحوادث وبذلك نفوا أن يكون استوى على العرش بعد أن لم يكن مستويا وأن يجيء يوم القيامة وغير ذلك مما وصف به نفسه في الكتاب

“So this is not correct except according to what they innovated by their saying “Aļļaah does not move and things do not come into existence in Him,”  by which they denied that He settled on the throne after being unsettled and that He comes on the Day of Judgment and other things that Aļļaah described Himself with in the Qur’aan and ĥadiitħ.” (Al-Fataawaa Al-Kubraa, 5/128)

He also said:

وتبين امتناع أن يؤثر في واجب الوجود غيره. (منهاج السنة النبوية , ص. 182)

It has become clear that other than the necessary in existence can influence the necessary in existence (the necessary in existence, i.e. Allaah(.

This shows that Ibn Taymiyyah considered Aļļaah to have bodily attributes based on his understanding of the scripture texts. He understood them according to the customary meanings that are true of creation.

[7] Ibn Taymiyyah said regarding Aļļaah’s attribute of knowledge:

وهذه الصفة هي صفة قديمة إذ كان لا يجوز عليه أن يتصف بها وقتا ما,  لكن ليس ينبغي أن نتعمق في هذا فنقول ما يقوله المتكلمون : إنه يعلم المحدث في وقت حدوثه بعلم قديم فإنه يلزم على هذا أن يكون العلم بالمحدث في وقت وجوده وعدمه علما واحدا

 وهذا أمر غير معقول إذ كان العلم واجبا أن يكون تابعا للموجود (درء تعارض العقل والنقل – (5 / 169)

“This attribute is beginningless, since it is impossible that He be attributed with it as some particular time (and not others). However, one should not delve deeply on this and end up saying what the kalaam scholars say: “Verily He knows the event when it happens with a beginningless knowledge,” for this implies that the knowledge of something previously non-existing during both its existence and non-existence one single knowledge. This is irrational, because knowledge follows what exists.”

He says this, because He believes Aļļaah to must be in time, since He believes He is a body (see footnote1,) and that Aļļaah’s beginninglessness is a beginningless series of moments. See one of Ibn Taymiyyah’s follower’s argument for this with a rebuttal here: Aļļaah is not in time.

[8] Ibn Taymiyyah plays word games on this issue, so it is hard to catch what he is actually saying. However, the following phrase of his is telling. Because he rejects the idea that created things have real influence, as the Sunnis say, and then states:

بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية (1/ 567): كما أنه سبحانه إذا خلق الأسباب وخلق بها أمورا أخرى ودبر أمر السماوات والأرض كان ذلك أكمل وأبلغ في الاقتدار من أن يخلق الشيء وحده بغير خلق قوة أخرى من غيره يخلقه بها

He says: If Aļļaah created causes, and created through them other things, and controlled the matters of the skies and the earth, then this would be more complete in ability than creating something by itself, without creating another power, other than it, by which He creates it.

In other words, He is saying that the power of creating can be put in causes, and other created things. This means that he believes that Aļļaah could have partners in creating, which is another shirk to add to the list of the other ones he commits. This belief is identical to that of the Muˆtazilah. This is not perfection, as he claims, but in contradiction to it, because it is among the perfect attributes of Aļļaah that His Power is not merely a possibility, but an uncreated eternal necessary attribute. Aļļaah’s attribute of Power is necessary in existence, and therefore not amendable. Had it been amendable, or shareable, then this would mean that it was not necessary in the first place, and it would have needed a creator, like anything that is subject to specification and change. Actually, Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument is identical to Christian arguments like this one. A related topic regarding omnipotence is also presented here.

[9] See also this article.

[10] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

منهاج السنة النبوية – (ص. 138): وبعض المصنفين في الكلام يجعل إثبات الجوهر الفرد هو قول المسلمين وأن نفيه هو قول الملحدين وهذا لأن هؤلاء لم يعرفوا من الأقوال المنسوبة إلى المسلمين إلا ما وجدوه في كتب شيوخهم أهل الكلام المحدث في الدين الذي ذمه السلف والأئمة.

“Some of the authors in Kalaam science make the affirmative belief in the indivisible particle of bodies the saying of the Muslims, and claim that denying it is the saying of the non-Muslims. This is because they don’t know anything about the sayings of the Muslims except what they found in the books of their shaykħs, the people of kalaam science, the innovation in religion that the Salaf and the Imams spoke against.” (Minhaaj As-Sunnah An-Nabawiyyah, 138)

[11] Scholarly ijmaaˆ consensus and Islamic legal analogy (qiyaas) are also proofs, of course, but these are established as proofs by Qur’aan and ĥadiitħ.

[12] This article addresses this problem: The ‘Simple’ Wahabi Belief II: Contradiction versus narration 

Deviant contention: “There is no room in Islam for logic and rational reasoning.”

Deviant contention: “There is no room in Islam for logic and rational reasoning. If Islam was based on the logic of humans, we would not wipe our hands above the khuffayn, as the greats of the Ummah have taught us, but rather underneath them.”

Question regarding this contention: It is known that the Naql (Quraan and the Sunnah) is given preference over the ‘Aql. What are the relative positions in the Aqeedah of Ahl-Sunnah wal Jamaah (Ash’aree?Maturidi) given to these ie. ‘Aql and Naql ? A person of a Literalist inclination argued that the Ash’aree school give the ‘aql priority over the naql.

Answer:

There is no clearer sign of deviance and backwardness than refuting logic and rational reasoning. After all, the alternative is illogical and irrational.

This topic has been touched upon already in other article like this one.

The methodology of these people is to take interpret scripture text referring to Aļļaah’s attributes, understand the text as having the same meaning as when referring to a human, and then cling to it by all available means, even if the interpretation is irrational. The attacks made on logic is an attempt to hide this irrationality from the public. After all, if you want people to believe whatever you say, what better position to be in than not having to be logical or rational?

What is the study of logic as it is done by Muslims? It is the study of how to make proper definitions for the concepts you are dealing with, and how to construct a sound argument based on sound premises. Whenever you hear someone attacking the study or use of logic there are only a few possibilities:

1. He does not know what it is, or has a different definition for it. Many scholars in the past spoke against the formal study of logic, because they considered greek theology to be part of it, which is full of ideas against Islam, or the trivial pursuits that philosophers often deal with that have no practical value for the Islamic belief or its practice. The study of elementary Islamic logic today does not suffer from any of these problems.
2. He has an agenda, like the wahabi scholars.
3. He is a dumb animal.

Narrational knowledge, knowledge based on information narrated in hadith is founded on rational reasoning, the core arguments being:

Reliability of narrator in terms of piety:

1. God-fearing men do not lie.
2. The narrator is apparently god-fearing
3. Therefore, the narrator apparently does not lie.

Reliability of narrator in terms of accuracy:

1. A person with an incredibly good memory is likely to tell narrations accurately, as they were told.
2. The narrator has an incredibly good memory
3. Therefore, the narrator is most likely accurate in his narration

Reliability of chain of narration in terms of continuity:

1. If all the narrators in a chain of narration are mentioned in the chain, it is more likely that the information they narrate is accurate.
2. The narrators in the narration chain are all mentioned – without interruption in any generation.
3. Therefore, if the narrators are pious and accurate, the information narrated is most likely correct.

 Supporting narrations:

1. If the same narration comes through several chains, then this increases confidence that the narration is accurate.
2. The narration has several continuous chains with pious and accurate narrators.
3. Therefore the narration is more likely to be correct than one that has only one chain.

As you can see, denying logic and rational reasoning as means to knowledge of the truth undermines all religious knowledge, even narrational.

The orders pertaining to how to worship cannot be known by reason alone, this is what is meant by the saying regarding wiping the khuff. For example, how would one know that one needs to wash one’s face (in wuđuu), after passing gas – before praying. If one was going to wash anything after it normally, it would be the place where the dirt came out, because the normal purpose of washing is to clean. In the same manner, the normal purpose of wiping is to clean, and the part of the khuff most in need of cleaning is the underneath part.

The problem with this reasoning is NOT that it is rational! On the contrary, it is based on false premises. In this case the premise being that the wiping is about cleaning dirts. It is not, because wuđuu is not about cleaning dirts in the first place. The reasoning then, had no scriptural basis for reaching a conclusion for a religious judgment. It is this type of opinion, or reasoning that Islam forbids; spurious reasoning based on unfounded premises. After all, if Aļļaah did not send a messenger, we would not know whether we would be held accountable for anything at all.

The scriptures have many examples of logical arguments to prove the correctness of the Islamic belief. For example, when the Prophet said when presented with the theory of contagious spread of disease between animals in a flock, “and the first one?” I.e. there must be a first one to have the disease, without having caught it from another animal. This arguments is based on the premise that there could not have been infinitely many camels transferring the disease in the past.

Similarly, the encouragement to think of proofs of Aļļaah’s existence and attributes are very many in the Quran, and they are not restricted to what is verbatim mentioned in the scriptures. An example of such encouragement is in this ayah:

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآيَاتٍ لِأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ

Meaning: “Verily in the creation of the Skies and the Earth, and the differences of night and day there are signs for those who have perceptive minds.” (Aal-ˆImraan, 190)

How to follow the order of the Aayah? The only way is to look at the characteristics of creation and derive logical proofs based on them for proofs for the Creator’s existence, such as was done in this article.

Deviant objections to the fact that Allaah has no obligations

Some deviants say: Yes, it is rationally possible for Allah to do wrong, or Ţħulm, because the Prophet said of Allah in Hadeeth Qudsi, ‘I have forbidden oppression on myself’. He could only forbid oppression if it was possible for Him to commit.

Answer: The ĥadiitħ qudsiyy saying they are referring to was narrated by Muslim, and is as follows:

إِنِّي حَرَّمْت الظُّلْم عَلَى نَفْسِي

If translated literally, it would be: ‘I have forbidden injustice upon myself’

The literal translation implies that injustice would in principle be possible, because otherwise there would be nothing to forbid. However, this literal meaning is impossible, because of the meaning of injustice. It either means:

1. to cross the rules that have been imposed upon one, or
2. to deal in someone else’s property without a right.

These meanings cannot be true of Aļļaah to begin with, they have no relevance to Him Himself, so how could they become forbidden?! In other words, those who claim that it is rationally possible are going to have to say that He has someone that can impose rules upon Him, or that there is a property that is not His! We ask Aļļaah for protection against such heresy.

That is why An-Nawawiyy commented on this ĥadiitħ saying:

The meaning is ‘Aļļaah is clear of and above the imperfection of injustice,’ because injustice is impossible with regards to Him. How could he cross any rule imposed upon him, and there is no one above Him that He would have to obey?! How could He deal in the property of someone else, when all of the world is His property and under His might?! The origin of the world ĥarrama (translated above as forbid) is “to be prevented,” so the meaning of “being clear of the imperfection” was expressed with the word “forbidden,” because one aspect of its meaning is similar to “being clear of”, namely the meaning of non-existence. (I.e. what is prevented does not exist, just as what one is clear of does not exist.)[1]

A similar issue is raised when the deviants say that Aļļaah could have obligations. To show this, they mention aayahs like the following:

كَتَبَ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ الرَّحْمَةَ

Meaning if literally translated: “He has written upon Himself mercy.” (Al-‘Anˆaam, 12)

كَتَبَ رَبُّكُمْ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ الرَّحْمَةَ

Meaning if literally translated: “Your Lord has written upon Himself mercy.” (Al-‘Anˆaam, 54)

An-Nasafiyy said in his tafsiir regarding these Aayahs:

The original meaning of write (kataba) is obligate, but it is not allowed to take it literally, because nothing is obligatory upon Aļļaah to do for created beings. The meaning then, is that He promised an ascertained promise that He will definitely hold. The mention of “Himself” is for the purpose of linguistic specification of Him and that it was not through means.[2]

Aţ-Ţabariyy said:

He decreed (i.e. for it to be, not obligated) that He will give mercy to His created beings. He does not punish them hastily, and accepts from them their repentance. This mention from Aļļaah is for the purpose of inclining those who have turned away from Him towards Him through repentance.[3]

The same was mentioned by Al-Bagħawiyy in his tafsiir.[4]

The important linguist and commentator on the Qur’aan Abuu Ĥayyaan said:

When Aļļaah mentioned that the creator of the word does what He wills with what is in it, and this indicates that His Power is effective, He followed this with a mention of His mercy and favors to creation. The apparent meaning of kataba (has written) is that of the sense of rows and strokes. This is what a number of people said is the meaning in this context, and that what is meant is actual writing, and that the meaning is that He ordered it to be written in Al-Lawĥ Al-Maĥfuuţħ (the Preserved Tablet). (Note: This is the same meaning as when Aţ-Ţabariyy said it mean that “He decreed.”)

It has been said that the meaning of “kataba” is that He promised as a grace and benevolence from Him. It has also been said that it means “He informed.” It has also been said that He made it necessary, in the sense as a grace and benevolence,  not in the sense of obligation. It has also been said that it means, “decreed and executed.”[5]

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[1] Al-Nawawiyy, Sharĥ Saĥiiĥ Muslim Li-l-Nawawiyy (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Ihyaa’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 1392), Vo. 16, P. 132.

[2] Abuu Barakaat Al-Nasafiy, Madaariku-t-Tanziil wa Ĥaqaa’iqu-t-Ta’wiil, ed. Maĥmuud Muĥammad Asħ-Sħaˆˆaar, 1st ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: Daar An-Nafaa’is, 2005), Vol. 2, P. 7.

[3] Abuu Jaˆfar Aţ-Ţabariy, Jaamiˆu-l-Bayaan Fiy Ta’wiili-l-Qur’aan (Beirut, Lebanon: Mu’assasah Al-Risaalah, 1420), Vol 11, P. 273.

[4] NaşirudDiin Al-Bayđaawiyy (685 AH/ 1286 AD), Tafsiir Al-Bayđaawiyy (Beirut, Lebanon: Daar Al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 3, P. 130.

[5] Abuu Ĥayyaan Al-Andalusiyy, Al-Baĥru-l-Muĥiiţ (Beirut, Lebanon: Daar Al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 4, P. 81.

Anthropomorphism, the first step towards atheism

Many people today have the belief that Aļļaah is a being in a particular location, i.e. something with size. This belief is in itself incompatible with the teachings of Islam, and makes one a non-Muslim.

However, this is not the only problem. Another problem is that this is sometimes presented to the world as the real view of Islam, and as such makes Muslims look like clownish buffoons. Harsh words, yes, but unfortunately it is an understatement. This creed is incompatible with a logical and scientific view, like any of the other arbitrary religions out there.

This is because these proofs, and the proofs mentioned in the Qur’aan for that matter, are all based on looking at the world, i.e. looking at shapes of different color and movement, and construct logical argument for why they cannot be beginningless, and therefore must have a creator. When one turns around and says that Aļļaah Himself has a shape, by saying that He is in a location/direction, which necessitates a boundary confining Him, according to them, to this location, then one has effectively destroyed all arguments for the Creator’s existence. They make the atheist question, “if the world needs a creator, then why not the creator?” impossible to answer in a logically consistent manner, because if the shapes of the world need a creator, then why not all shapes? By representing their goofy view as Islam, they have opened the gates for the antichrist so to speak, by presenting it as just another incoherent religion.

 

Sanuussiyy Creed Downloadable Again

The link to the Sanuusiyyah commentary is working again on the Classical Texts page.

Abu Adam

Microblog for Sunnianswers

In shaa’ Allaah I will make frequent and brief posts here: http://sunnianswers.tumblr.com/

 

 

The Quran does not imply that Allaah could have taken a child by the use of “if”

Ibn Kathiir states: “Aļļaah made it clear that He does not have a child, unlike what the ignorant idolaters claimed with regards to the angels, and the obstinate among the Jews and the Christians claimed with regards to Al-^Uzayr and Jesus, and said (what might be literally translated as): “If Aļļaah had willed to take a child for Himself, then He would have selected from what He creates whatever He wills.” That is, it would have been different from what they claim. And this condition (of “If Aļļaah had willed”) is not necessary to happen, or even be possible (in the mind’s eye). Actually, it is completely impossible that it could be. It is only meant to show their ignorance in their claim.”

Then Ibn Kathiir gave a couple of similar uses of “if” for impossibilities, and said, “it is allowed to make a statement conditional upon something impossible for some purpose of the speaker.”[1]

Accordingly, the meaning is: ” if it was possible, and it is not, then it still would not be the angels, Jesus, or Al-^Uzayr.” In other words, the purpose is to show that their claim about them is wrong from several viewpoints, not only in the sense that it is impossible that Aļļaah should have a child.

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[1] تفسير ابن كثير (7 / 85) : ثم بين تعالى أنه لا ولد له كما يزعمه جهلة المشركين في الملائكة، والمعاندون (6) من اليهود والنصارى في العزير، وعيسى فقال: { لَوْ أَرَادَ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَتَّخِذَ وَلَدًا لاصْطَفَى مِمَّا يَخْلُقُ مَا يَشَاءُ } أي: لكان الأمر على خلاف ما يزعمون (7) . وهذا شرط لا يلزم وقوعه ولا جوازه، بل هو محال، وإنما قصد تجهيلهم (8) فيما ادعوه وزعموه، كما قال: { لَوْ أَرَدْنَا أَنْ نَتَّخِذَ لَهْوًا لاتَّخَذْنَاهُ مِنْ لَدُنَّا إِنْ كُنَّا فَاعِلِينَ } [الأنبياء:17]{ قُلْ إِنْ كَانَ لِلرَّحْمَنِ وَلَدٌ فَأَنَا أَوَّلُ الْعَابِدِينَ } [الزخرف:81]، كل هذا من باب الشرط، ويجوز تعليق الشرط على المستحيل لقصد المتكلم. وقوله: { سُبْحَانَهُ هُوَ اللَّهُ الْوَاحِدُ الْقَهَّارُ } أي: تعالى وتنزه وتقدس عن أن يكون له ولد، فإنه الواحد الأحد، الفرد الصمد، الذي كل شيء عبد لديه، فقير إليه، وهو الغني عما سواه الذي قد قهر الأشياء فدانت له وذلت وخضعت.

The impossibility of Aļļaah lying is absolute, and not “contingent,” even in the sense of so called "kalaam lafthiyy"

The right belief and expression is that it is "intrinsically/absolutely impossible", and not contingent upon anything.

It should be clear that the meaning of "contingently impossible" is "intrinsically possible". It is just that the latter expression is not as easy to sell to ignorant imitators in belief.

1) Aļļaah’s Eternally Speech (which is not letters, sounds, or language) must be true, and cannot be untrue, because it is not created. In a speech that could tell a lie, a specific lie is only one possibility among infinite possibilities, thus such a speech would need to be specified and brought into existence, i.e. it would have to be created. This is unlike true speech, because the truth can only be one about any particular matter, and is known by Aļļaah eternally. This is the meaning of imam Ahmad’s saying, "His Speech is from His knowledge," i.e. "agrees with His knowledge," and His knowledge is One, Eternal, and True just as His Speech.

2) The uttered speech that is called "Aļļaah’s Speech" tells us what He said with His Eternal Speech. The Qur’aan in the sense of the book with Arabic expressions is utterable speech that tells us what Aļļaah said eternally. That is why it is called Aļļaah’s speech, even though Aļļaah’s actual attribute of speech is eternal, and is not letters, sounds, or language. This has been extensively explained in "The Qur’aan and Aļļaah’s attribute of Speech."

3) According to 2), an utterance that says something other than what Aļļaah said eternally is not His Speech.

4) Therefore, any uttered speech that is not true cannot rationally be said to be Aļļaah’s Speech, because it does not tell us what He said eternally.

5) Conclusion: it is impossible in the mind’s eye that Aļļaah’s so called kalaam lafţħiyy (speech of utterable expressions) could contain a lie.

As for what Al-Jurjaaniyy, Al-Iijiyy and At-Taftaazaaniyy are saying; what they mean is that the speech that we say refers to Aļļaah’s eternal Speech, how do we prove that it really is true, i.e really refers to Aļļaah’s eternal speech? The proof for that is one of normal necessity according to some scholars, that is, the miracles of the Prophet, the agreement of everything in the scripture with the truth, and so on prove that. They don’t mean that it is contingently possible for Aļļaah to lie, as is clear from the context.

That being said, it is important that one does not read books, other than the Qur’aan, assuming that every letter in the book was actually written by the author. There could be perversions, and there could be slips of the pen. It happens all the time. This is in addition to the fact that there is no proof in what a non-Prophet says, especially in belief issues. The sources of knowledge according to Sunnis is either observation, or pure reason (not depending on repeated experiences, but coming from a valid conclusion necessitated by irrefutable premises), or information from a prophet.

At-Taftaazaaniyy’s basic belief regarding Allaah, the Creator

At-Taftaazaaniyy states: “The belief of Ahlu-s-Sunnah is that the world has a beginning, and that the Creator is beginninglessly eternal, attributed with beginninglessly eternal attributes that are not Him himself, nor other than Him¹. Moreover, He is One, He has no like or opposite, or equal. He has no end, or shape, or limit. He is not in something, and nothing begins to exist in Him (i.e. He does not change) and it is invalid (i.e. intrinsically impossible) that He could move, or be transported, or be ignorant, or lie, or have a defect. In addition, He is seen in the Hereafter, but He is not in a space, or in a direction. Whatever He has willed will be, and what He has not willed will not be. He does not need anything, and He has no obligations.”²

1 I.e. it is impossible in the mind’s eye that they could be separated from Him – because they are eternally attributes of His, and what is eternal cannot change.

2 SaˆdudDiin Al-Taftaazaaniy (712-793AH/ 1312-1390 AD), Sħarĥu-l-Maqaaşid Fiy ˆIlmi-l-Kalaam, 2/514.

شرح المقاصد فى علم الكلام ، 2 / 514

وطريقة أهل السنة أن العالم حادث والصانع قديم متصف بصفات قديمة ليست عينه ولا غيره وواحد لا شبه له ولا ضد ولا ند ولا نهاية له ولا صورة ولا حد ولا يحل في شيء ولا يقوم به حادث ولا يصح عليه الحركة والانتقال ولا الجهل ولا الكذب ولا النقص وأنه يرى في الآخرة وليس في حيز ولا جهة ما شاء كان ومالم يشأ لم يكن لا يحتاج إلى شيء ولا يجب عليه شيء

شرح المقاصد في علم الكلام ، اسم المؤلف: سعد الدين مسعود بن عمر بن عبد الله التفتازاني الوفاة: 791هـ ، دار النشر : دار المعارف النعمانية – باكستان – 1401هـ – 1981م ، الطبعة : الأولى

Stephen Hawking contradicts himself

It can be embarrassing and disastrous when someone competent in a field of knowledge starts to utter claims in a field that is not his. Embarrassing because he might say something stupid. Disastrous, because people have a tendency to assume that someone that is really famous and good at something in particular, automatically achieves expertise in something else, so they heed his words, and won’t even question what he says. That is why we see people listening to actors and singers about how they live their lives, even though they are often complete imbeciles.

Recently there has been much fuss over Hawking’s new book, where he allegedly says, “the universe can and will create itself from nothing.” This is a very stupid thing to say, because if there is nothing, then the universe does not exist, so how could it create itself??? He thinks the creation of the universe can be explained by physics, but physics does not explain anything, it only describes – if we do that, or this or that happens, then this happens. Why this happens – if the relationship is truly and really causal – is not something provable by observation. That is, the assumption that there are actual causal powers in matter is only a guess – such as the force of gravity. No one has ever seen “gravity” or known it to actually exist, it was assumed to exist because of the predictability of the behavior of large objects in light of their mass. It is pathetic that he does not seem to know – or hides – this fact.

Stephen, please stay in your lab, you have ventured into a field you don’t understand, apparently you know what you are doing when you are there. Your field is physics, not metaphysics.

One has to wonder though, if he really does not realize the silliness of what he is saying. Maybe he does, it is just that he wants to make people talk about his book, so he can make money. Subhaan Allaah, his life does not seem like a lot of fun, as crippled as he is, yet he hungers for it so much that he is willing to deny his Creator for a penny. If he refuses to admit to himself that this world needs a Creator, why isn’t he at least afraid of being wrong and of its consequences for him after his inevitable death? This by itself shows that he is not being rational about this. It is frightening how this life deceives even intelligent people with its small and absolutely temporary pleasures. We ask Allaah to give us wisdom and protect us from such madness.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The difference between wahabi creed and Islaam III: what the scholars said about their belief

An important reply has been posted at this link regarding takfiir of anthropomorphists.

Applied Belief Science: The first of the ĥikam explained

Introduction

The great scholars of taşawwuf are also great scholars of belief, because taşawwuf is about bringing all ones actions, most specifically those of the heart, in alignment with the Islamic belief in Aļļaah. For this reason we will put some writings of taşawwuf on this blog. The first of these is from the ĥikam of Ibn ˆAţaa’ illaah As-Sakandariyy. These ĥikam, or words of wisdom, need to be put in context of each other as well as the Islamic beliefs and laws established by the Qur’aan, ĥadiitħs and Scholarly Ijmaaˆ Consensus. They are a set of tools for diagnosis and treatment of the heart. A competent medical doctor does not base his diagnosis on temperature alone, but combined with clinical signs, blood tests, x-rays and other tools. Having said that, the following is the first of the ĥikam and its explanation:

من علامات الاعتماد على العمل، نقصان الرجاء عند وجود الزلل

Among the sign of one’s reliance on his own effort, is the loss of hope when one makes a mistake.

The author is saying that if you experience such loss of hope, then this may be a sign that your heart is skewed towards relying on your deeds to succeed in the Hereafter. The perfect state however, is to rely on Aļļaah only, since He is the Creator of all deeds, all benefit, all harm, all reward, and all punishment. Nothing influences Aļļaah, including your deeds, because He created them, knew what you would do eternally, and He Himself is not created. He is eternal and does not change, so nothing with a beginning can influence Him in any way. He is the creator of everything, so He is not affected by it, because an effect must have a beginning, and anything with a beginning is His creation.

Aļļaah is not obliged to punish or reward anyone for anything they do.

Al-Bukħaariyy narrated through Abuu Hurayrah that the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) said:

لَنْ يُدْخِلَ أَحَدًا عَمَلُهُ الْجَنَّةَ قَالُوا وَلا أَنْتَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ قَالَ لا وَلا أَنَا إِلاَّ أَنْ يَتَغَمَّدَنِي اللَّهُ بِفَضْلٍ وَرَحْمَةٍ فَسَدِّدُوا وَقَارِبُوا وَلا يَتَمَنَّيَنَّ أَحَدُكُمْ الْمَوْتَ إِمَّا مُحْسِنًا فَلَعَلَّهُ أَنْ يَزْدَادَ خَيْرًا وَإِمَّا مُسِيئًا فَلَعَلَّهُ أَنْ يَسْتَعْتِبَ

"Your deeds will not put you in Paradise." They asked: "Not even for you, O Messenger of Aļļaah?" He answered: "No, not even for me, except that Aļļaah will cover me with grace and mercy. So seek what is correct, and strive to be close to it, and let no one of you hope for death, because he will either be a doing well, so perhaps he will do better, or he will be doing poorly, so perhaps he will remove what is blameworthy."

The actions we make are creations of Allah, predestined and created by him.

Aļļaah (عز وجل) said:

وَاللَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وَمَا تَعْمَلُونَ

Meaning: "Aļļaah created you and what you do." (Aş-Şaaffaat. 96).

He (عز وجل) also said:

وما تشاءون إلا أن يشاء الله

Meaning: "You do not will anything unless Aļļaah has willed it." (Al-Insaan, 30).

Every instance of pleasure or pain is created by Him.

Aļļaah (عز وجل) said:

وَخَلَقَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ فَقَدَّرَهُ تَقْدِيرًا

Meaning: "And He created everything and predestined it." (Al-Furqaan, 2) He (سبحانه وتعالى) also said:

هَلْ مِنْ خَالِقٍ غَيْرُ اللَّهِ

Meaning: "Is there another creator than Aļļaah?" (Faaţir, 3)

Accordingly, if one makes a mistake and loses hope because of that, then it is an indication that one is relying on one’s own deeds, rather than on their Creator.

As long as there is life there is hope

One should not lose hope, because it is the state one is at in the final moment that matters, and this can change completely in a matter of seconds. Al-Bukħaariyy narrated that the Prophet said:

إِنَّ أَحَدَكُمْ يُجْمَعُ فِي بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ أَرْبَعِينَ يَوْمًا ثُمَّ عَلَقَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ثُمَّ يَكُونُ مُضْغَةً مِثْلَ ذَلِكَ ثُمَّ يَبْعَثُ اللَّهُ مَلَكًا فَيُؤْمَرُ بِأَرْبَعٍ بِرِزْقِهِ وَأَجَلِهِ وَشَقِيٌّ أَوْ سَعِيدٌ فَوَاللَّهِ إِنَّ أَحَدَكُمْ أَوْ الرَّجُلَ يَعْمَلُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ حَتَّى مَا يَكُونُ بَيْنَهُ وَبَيْنَهَا غَيْرُ بَاعٍ أَوْ ذِرَاعٍ فَيَسْبِقُ عَلَيْهِ الْكِتَابُ فَيَعْمَلُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ فَيَدْخُلُهَا وَإِنَّ الرَّجُلَ لَيَعْمَلُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ الْجَنَّةِ حَتَّى مَا يَكُونُ بَيْنَهُ وَبَيْنَهَا غَيْرُ ذِرَاعٍ أَوْ ذِرَاعَيْنِ فَيَسْبِقُ عَلَيْهِ الْكِتَابُ فَيَعْمَلُ بِعَمَلِ أَهْلِ النَّارِ فَيَدْخُلُهَا

"Verily one of you is gathered in his mothers stomach for forty days, then he is a blood-clot for forty days, then a piece of meat for forty days, then Aļļaah sends an angel ordered with four words: his provision, his end, happy or miserable. By Aļļaah, verily one of you may be committing the deeds of the people of Hell, until he is only an arm’s length away, when (it is as if) his destined end overwhelms him and he starts to perform the works of the people of Paradise, and enters it. And verily one of you may be committing the deeds of the people of Paradise, until he is only an arm’s length away, when (it is as if) his destined end overwhelms him and he starts to perform the works of the people of Hell, and enters it."

The meaning of all of the above

One’s hope for Allah’s grace and mercy should be based purely on hoping from Allah alone, because all your efforts, intentions and thoughts are all simply part of what Allah has created in you. Aļļaah is attributed with pure and perfect benevolence, His benevolence and gifts are hoped for because of His perfection in His Self, attributes and actions, not because of other than Him, including one’s deeds. This does not contradict the desire for His reward, due to His benevolence, when obedience occurs; nor does it contradict fear from punishment, when one is afflicted with committing a sin.

The point is that the focus of the one who truly knows Aļļaah, is towards His Lord and not his own deeds, because Aļļaah:

- gave us the power to do good deeds.

- created them in us.

- and out of generosity accepted them.

Not only that, but after he gave us the power, and created them, and accepted them, then without any obligation, he rewards us on our deeds. So how can we thank our God that rewards us on deeds that He created and accepted?

Scholars and worshipful Muslims used to perform a lot of prayers and fasting and other good deeds, because they knew that no matter what they do, they cannot thank Aļļaah as He deserves. The Prophet Muhammad had no sins to worry about for his Hereafter, yet his heals would get swollen from standing long hours in prayers. When asked about this he said, "should I not be a thankful slave?"

Good deeds are signs that a person is a good person, but if Allah does not accept them they are nothing. If a person made sujuud for Aļļaah on fire from the days of Adam to the end of this world will he have thanked Aļļaah as He deserves? How can he, when he is Aļļaah’s creation and Aļļaah is the one who created this sujuud in him and he is an absolute slave of Aļļaah, created and sustained by Him in every sense?

On the other hand, when a person does a bad thing, then the sin by itself is nothing in light of Aļļaah’s forgiveness and mercifulness, or His Self Existence, without need for anything or anyone. If a person does a sin and sees only his deed without recognizing Aļļaah’s mercifulness and forgiveness, then this is a sign that this person is arrogant; he gives his deeds a great deal of importance. Sins are signs that this person is not a thankful person, but sins by themselves are nothing if Aļļaah does not will to punish us for them.

All taşawwuf revolve around the belief that everything is by Aļļaah’s will, and is created by Aļļaah and that we are slaves that do not have the power or will to do anything if Aļļaah does not will it . Our own existence is by the will of Aļļaah and His creation. Our deeds are created by Aļļaah; our intensions are created by Aļļaah. We would be nothing if Aļļaah had not willed us to exist.

This does not mean that a person should not do good deeds or he should not feel sad or bad when he does a sin. It means that a person should know who he is. He should always remember that he is a slave that has no power or will if His Creator does not will.

All great sufis, scholars, and Islamic figures were great worshipers, because they knew the greatness of Aļļaah, and knew their state as slaves, and knew that no matter what they do they cannot thank their creator for all the gifts that He gave them. This state of always recognizing that they are slaves and trying to thank their Creator for all His gifts overwhelmed them and this led them to do all this worship.

Good deeds are good because they are signs of worshipping Aļļaah, and sins are bad because they are signs of disobeying Aļļaah. From this one can see why Allah might forgive sins, but will not forgive kufr, because the person who does a sin still recognizes that He is a slave and has a God, a Creator that owns him. The one who does kufr, however, is so egocentric that He thinks himself not a slave. Even when he worships idols he only does that because his ancestors did so, and this is arrogance in thinking high of his ancestors. If, on the other hand, he selects what he thinks is his god, other than Aļļaah, or attributes to Aļļaah what does not befit Him, then this is also arrogance, because he only does that thinking he has the right, or power, or knowledge to so.

I end this by saying that they say that Abuu Yaziid al Bustaamiyy saw Aļļaah in his dream and asked him: O Aļļaah! How can a person reach a state of "wusuul," which is a high state in taşawwuf (slavery to Aļļaah). They say that Allah answered him in the dream: "leave your ‘self’ and you will reach that state."

The difference between wahabi creed and Islaam II: what the scholars said about their belief

Further to the point that those who believe Aļļaah to be a body i.e. occupy a location are not Muslims, as mentioned in "The difference between the Wahabi creed and Islam", here are some quotes by well known scholars testifying to that :

Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy said they are not Muslims:

قال حذاق المتكلمين ما عرف الله من شبهه بخلقه أو أضاف إليه اليد أو أضاف إليه الولد فمعبودهم الذي عبدوه ليس هو الله وإن سموه به (فتح الباري, ابن حجر العسقلاني, دار المعرفة – بيروت ، 1379, 3 / 359)

The brilliant kalaam scholars said: "The one that likened Aļļaah to His creation, or ascribed a hand to Him (i.e. in the sense of a part or limb) or a child; what he worships is not Aļļaah, even if he called it Aļļaah.

An-Nawawiyy and Al-Qaađii ˆIiaađ said they are not Muslims:

قوله صلى الله عليه و سلم ( فليكن أول ما تدعوهم إليه عبادة الله فإذا عرفوا الله فأخبرهم إلى آخره ) قال القاضي عياض رحمه الله هذا يدل على أنهم ليسوا بعارفين الله تعالى وهو مذهب حذاق المتكلمين في اليهود والنصارى أنهم غير عارفين الله تعالى وان كانوا يعبدونه ويظهرون معرفته لدلالة السمع عندهم على هذا وان كان العقل لا يمنع أن يعرف الله تعالى من كذب رسولا قال القاضي عياض رحمه الله ما عرف الله تعالى من شبهه وجسمه من اليهود أو اجاز عليه البداء أو أضاف إليه الولد منهم أو أضاف إليه الصاحبة والولد وأجاز الحلول عليه والانتقال والامتزاج من النصارى أو وصفه مما لا يليق به أو أضاف إليه الشريك والمعاند في خلقه من المجوس والثنوية فمعبودهم الذى عبدوه ليس هو الله وان سموه به اذ ليس موصوفا بصفات الاله الواجبة له فاذن ما عرفوا الله سبحانه فتحقق هذه النكتة واعتمد عليها وقد رأيت معناها لمتقدمى أشياخنا وبها قطع الكلام ابوعمران الفارسى بين عامة اهل القيروان عند تنازعهم في هذه المسألة هذا آخر كلام القاضي رحمه الله تعالى. (المنهاج شرح صحيح مسلم بن الحجاج , النووي , دار إحياء التراث العربي , 1392, 1 / 199-200)

The saying of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) "let the first you call them to be the worship of Aļļaah, then when they know Aļļaah tell them…" etc. Al-Qaađii ˆIiaađ (رحمه الله) said: "This (i.e. the foregoing statement of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم)) indicates that they (the Christians) do not know Aļļaah, and this is the saying of the brilliant kalaam scholars regarding the jews and the Christians; that they do not know Aļļaah (تعالى) even if they worship Him (i.e. call what they worship by His name) and making it appear as if they know Him, based on what they narrate amongst themselves, even though it is not impossible in the mind’s eye that someone who disbelieves in a messenger does know Aļļaah." Al-Qaađii ˆIiaađ (رحمه الله) said: The one that likened Aļļaah to His creation, or believed Him to be bodily among the jews and Christians, or believed that He gains knowledge over time, or claimed He has a child, or a female companion and a child, or said he could exist in created things, or move from one place to another, or be mixed with creation, among the Christians or attributed to Him what is not befitting, or associated with Him a partner or opponent in creating among the Magians an dualists; what they worship is not Aļļaah, even if they called it that. This is because it is not attributed with the attributes that are necessarily His. Accordingly, they do not know Aļļaah (سبحانه), so realize this point well, and depend on it, and I have seen this point made by our predecessor shaykhs."

Ar-Raaziyy said they are not Muslims:

الدليل دل على أن من قال إن الإله جسم فهو منكر للإله تعالى وذلك لأن إله العالم موجود ليس بجسم ولا حال في الجسم فإذا أنكر المجسم هذا الموجود فقد أنكر ذات الإله تعالى فالخلاف بين المجسم والموحد ليس في الصفة بل في الذات فصح في المجسم أنه لا يؤمن بالله أما المسائل التي حكيتموها فهي اختلافات في الصفة فظهر الفرق وأما إلزام مذهب الحلولية والحروفية فنحن نكفرهم قطعاً فإنه تعالى كفر النصارى بسبب أنهم اعتقدوا حلول كلمة اللَّهِ في عيسى وهؤلاء اعتقدوا حلول كلمة اللَّهِ في ألسنة جميع من قرأ القرآن وفي جميع الأجسام التي كتب فيها القرآن فإذا كان القول بالحلول في حق الذات الواحدة يوجب التكفير فلأن يكون القول بالحلول في حق جميع الأشخاص والأجسام موجباً للقول بالتكفير كان أولى (مفاتيح الغيب – دار الكتب العلمية, 16 /24)

"Proofs tell us that the who says that God is a body is a disbeliever in God (who is greatly above and clear of flaws). The reason is that the God of the World exists, and He is not a body, or stationed in a body. So if the one who believes that God is a body denies this non-bodily existence, then he has disbelieved in God Himself. This means that the disagreement between the one that believes that God is a body, and the monotheist (i.e. in the Islamic sense, namely that God does not have a partner, part or a like in His self of attributes), is not based on a disagreement regarding attributes, but regarding the self (i.e. the identity of the one attributed with godhood.) It is sound to say then, that the one who believes that God is a body does not believe in Aļļaah….

As for the ĥuluuliyyah (those who believe that Aļļaah settles in created things, such as the sky or a human body) and ĥuruufiyyah (those who believe that Aļļaah’s attribute of kalam/speech consists of letters and sounds) sects, we say that they are unequivocally disbelievers. This is because Aļļaah declared the christians blasphemers for believing that Aļļaah’s speech entered into Jesus, whereas the ĥuruufiyyah believe that it settles in the tongue of all those who recite Qur’aan, and in all physical things that the Qur’aan was written on. Accordingly, if the belief in its settlement in one single body (Jesus) is blasphemy, then it is even more blasphemous to believe that it settles in all shapes and bodies."

As-Subkiyy calls them idol worshipers:

As-Subkiyy in his Tabaqaatu-sħ-Sħaafiˆiyyatu-l-Kubraa says regarding scripture texts that appear to be referring to bodily attributes:

طبقات الشافعية الكبرى : إنما المصيبة الكبرى والداهية الدهياء الإمرار على الظاهر والاعتقاد أنه المراد وأنه لا يستحيل على الباري فذلك قول المجسمة عباد الوثن الذين في قلوبهم زيغ يحملهم الزيغ على اتباع المتشابه ابتغاء الفتنة عليهم لعائن الله تترى واحدة بعد أخرى ما أجرأهم على الكذب وأقل فهمهم للحقائق طبقات الشافعية الكبرى ج 5 ص 192

"the saying of the mujassimah (anthropomorphists), worshipers of the idol, makes them always focus on ambiguous aayahs."

Al-Qurţubiyy and Ibn Al-ˆarabiyy

الصحيح القول بتكفيرهم ، إذ لا فرق بينهم وبين عباد الأصنام والصور.

Similarly, Al-Qurtubīy in his commentary in the Qur’ān narrates from his Shaykh Ibn Al-’Arabīy regarding the those who say Allāh has a body: "The sound verdict is that they are blasphemers, because there is no difference between them and those that worship idols and pictures." (Tafsiir Al-Qurţubiyy, 4/14).

The Qur’aan as a Miracle of the Prophet Muĥammad (صل الله عليه وسلم)

The miracles of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) are many, but the most obvious is the Qur’aan itself. This book has been preserved to the last letter, without any perversions or alterations for some 1400 years. This is extraordinary, because no other book has been maintained in this way in human history. It is also a miracle, however, because the Prophet Muhammad’s (صل الله عليه وسلم) message stated that this was to be so:

إِنَّا نَحْنُ نَزَّلْنَا الذِّكْرَ وَإِنَّا لَهُ لَحَافِظُونَ

Meaning: “Aļļaah has revealed this remembrance that is the Qur’aan, and He protects it.” (Al-Ĥijr, 9). This statement shows extraordinary knowledge of the future, and it is joined with the challenge and claim of prophethood, thus meeting the criteria for a miracle. It is a challenge, because the enemies of the religion would attempt to prove this statement wrong. The fact that they have not been able to do so strengthens the miracle further, because it shows that the Creator really is protecting the book.

The Qur’aan is narrated collaboratively from masses to masses from the time of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم). It is an oral tradition from day one, and written copies are used as an aid only. When the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) passed away he had several thousand followers, and many of them had memorized the entire Quran, and as a group of individuals they had memorized the Qur’aan hundreds of times over. This mass narration is the one we have today, and it is what protects the Qur’aan from alteration by the will of Aļļaah. Anything that does not reach this level of solid narration is simply rejected. Why? Because the Qur’aan was well known and taught in public everywhere already in the time of the Prophet himself, who encouraged his thousands of enthusiastic followers to spread, publicize and memorize every letter of it. They firmly believed this to be the revealed book of the Creator Himself, and to be negligent in its careful preservation, memorization and distribution was unthinkable. Then this spread and enthusiasm only spread and continued from generation to generation, and even today there are millions of people who have memorized it cover to cover. Accordingly, the idea that an individual or a handful of individuals should know something of it that no one else did is rejected by default. In addition, the eloquence of the Qur’aan is greater than other things written or said in Arabic, which makes it recognizable and distinct. This adds to the preservation attained by the mass narration.

Another miracle is the challenge to those who disbelieve in Prophet Muhammad  (صل الله عليه وسلم), to compose a Suurah like any of its 114 Suurahs[1]:

وَإِنْ كُنْتُمْ فِي رَيْبٍ مِمَّا نَزَّلْنَا عَلَى عَبْدِنَا فَأْتُوا بِسُورَةٍ مِنْ مِثْلِهِ

Meaning: “If you are in doubt about what Aļļaah has revealed to the Prophet  (صل الله عليه وسلم), then bring a Suurah like any of its Suurahs in eloquence, if you can, but you will not be able.” (Al-Baqarah, 23)

To understand the significance of this challenge, one must keep in mind that eloquence was a central part of Arab culture at the time. The Arabs prided themselves in their excellence as poets and public speakers, and rivalry in eloquence was an integral part of their culture. One-upmanship in poetic brilliance between rivaling tribes and individuals was a daily affair. As in any human endeavor, however, no record performance lasted forever; eventually someone would at least reach an equivalent level. The challenge of the Qur’aan then, was not unfamiliar to the Arabs. The only thing new was their realization that no one could meet it; to the extent that they were left speechless and unable to even make a serious try.

The Qur’aan first challenged these people to come up with anything like it in eloquence, but they failed, then anything like 10 of its suurahs, but again they failed, then like any 1 of its suurahs, some of which are just a few words, and once again they failed. The Prophet’s opponents saw these challenges as their opportunity to make him lose support, and they were the rich, the powerful and the eloquent. They were all of the Arabs facing a tiny minority of Muslims at that time. Despite their enormous number, however, their reputation for being the champions of eloquence, their extreme enmity to Islam, and their absolute refusal to swear allegiance to anything but their tribe out of extreme bigotry, they could not do it. This is very apparent historical fact, because they resorted to meeting the challenge of words with the blades of their swords, and putting their lives at stake. If they could have met the challenge with words, they certainly would have preferred that, and if they had met the challenge, then this would have been a known historical fact, because the motives to spread such news were and are still in abundance among non-Muslims. Accordingly, the lack of anyone ever meeting this challenge could not have been because they did not care about it, or that the news of it did not reach us. It has now been more than 1400 years, and the challenge still stands.

This miracle is further strengthened by the fact that Prophet Muĥammad  (صل الله عليه وسلم)  was unlettered and never took part in composing any poetry. Moreover, he told his opponents that no one would ever be able to match the eloquence of the Qur’aan, not now and not in the future. Being of great intelligence, he would never have made such a challenge had he not known this by revelation. Had he not had such a revelation it would have been foolish to make such a challenge.

The Qur’aan also contains many statements about things the Prophet  (صل الله عليه وسلم) could not have known through ordinary means. An example is the description of what would happen to the breathing of a person if lifted up into the atmosphere:

فَمَنْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَهدِيَهُ يَشْرَحْ صَدْرَهُ لِلإِسْلامِ وَمَنْ يُرِدْ أَنْ يُضِلَّهُ يَجْعَلْ صَدْرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّمَا يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّمَاءِ

Meaning: “Whoever Allah has willed to guide, He will open his heart to accept Islaam, and whoever He has willed misguidance for, He will make his chest tight and narrow, as if he is ascending up in the sky.” (Al-Anˆaam, 125)

In addition to the above, consider also that the Prophet r did not read and had not travelled except two short trips, and never went to anything like a school or been present in circles of knowledge and science. He remained like that for the first forty years of his life; in the town of Makkah, a place without scholars or science, or even educational books. Then suddenly, at the age of forty, he brings the Qur’aan, a book that contains an abundance of wisdom and knowledge, and is of great eloquence by anyone’s standard. This is something completely extraordinary, because a book like that does not appear from the hands of a person that is without background in research, reading or studies of any kind. Accordingly, it must have been by revelation and guidance from Aļļaah that he brought it.

 

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[1] The Qur’aan is divided into what is known as Suurahs, not chapters. They vary in length between a few words to several pages.

Miracles of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) other than the Qur’aan

The Prophet had many miracles other than the Qur’aan. Most of these are narrated in narrational chains that do not reach the status of collaborative mass narrations from the witnesses to the following generations. However, the sheer amount of such narrated incidents together as a whole is vast. Moreover, the people who were witnesses are people who hated lying from the depth of their being, and would neither permit themselves to lie, nor others to engage in lies in front of them, and related what they saw to specific places and times known to all. This makes us sure that at least some of them are true. The reason for this is that it would normally be impossible for all of them to be incorrect or lies in light of their number and circumstances. A few of these are mentioned below.

Miracles other than the Qur’aan

The splitting of the Moon

This miracle is actually mentioned in the Qur’aan:

اقْتَرَبَتِ السَّاعَةُ وَانْشَقَّ الْقَمَرُ (1) وَإِنْ يَرَوْا آيَةً يُعْرِضُوا وَيَقُولُوا سِحْرٌ مُسْتَمِرٌّ

Interpretation: The Last Hour has come near, and the Moon has split. If Arab idolaters of Quraysħ see a miracle, they turn their backs on it and say, "This is just powerful magic!" (Al-Qamar, 1-2)

This miracle came when the tribe of Quraysħ demanded a proof from the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) for his truthfulness. It was narrated by Al-Bukħaariyy that Ibn Masˆuud[1] said:

انْشَقَّ الْقَمَرُ عَلَى عَهْدِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ شِقَّتَيْنِ فَقَالَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ اشْهَدُوا

"During the time of the Messenger of Aļļaah (صل الله عليه وسلم) the Moon split into two halves, and the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) said, ‘Bear witness!’"[2]

The result of this great miracle, however, was just more obstinacy from the leaders of Quraysħ, as indicated in the Aayah above.

Food praising Aļļaah while being eaten

Al-Bukħaariyy narrated that Ibn Masˆuud said:

كُنَّا مَعَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي سَفَرٍ فَقَلَّ الْمَاءُ فَقَالَ اطْلُبُوا فَضْلَةً مِنْ مَاءٍ فَجَاءُوا بِإِنَاءٍ فِيهِ مَاءٌ قَلِيلٌ فَأَدْخَلَ يَدَهُ فِي الْإِنَاءِ ثُمَّ قَالَ حَيَّ عَلَى الطَّهُورِ الْمُبَارَكِ وَالْبَرَكَةُ مِنْ اللَّهِ فَلَقَدْ رَأَيْتُ الْمَاءَ يَنْبُعُ مِنْ بَيْنِ أَصَابِعِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَلَقَدْ كُنَّا نَسْمَعُ تَسْبِيحَ الطَّعَامِ وَهُوَ يُؤْكَلُ

We were traveling with the Messenger of Aļļaah (صل الله عليه وسلم) when our water supply became little, so he said, "get some remaining water." When they brought him a vessel with a little water, he put his hands into it and said, "Come on to the purifying and blessed – and the blessing is created by Aļļaah!" Then I saw water gush forth from between the fingers of the Messenger of Aļļaah r , and we also used to hear food praising Aļļaah while being eaten.[3]

Pure water gushing from between the Prophet’s (صل الله عليه وسلم) fingers

Note that it happened in several different occasions that water gushed from between the fingers of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) , sometimes enough for hundreds of people to drink and wash. Al-Bukħaariyy narrated from Jaabir ibn ˆAbdillaah[4]:

عَطِشَ النَّاسُ يَوْمَ الْحُدَيْبِيَةِ وَرَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ رَكْوَةٌ فَتَوَضَّأَ مِنْهَا ثُمَّ أَقْبَلَ النَّاسُ نَحْوَهُ فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مَا لَكُمْ قَالُوا يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ لَيْسَ عِنْدَنَا مَاءٌ نَتَوَضَّأُ بِهِ وَلَا نَشْرَبُ إِلَّا مَا فِي رَكْوَتِكَ قَالَ فَوَضَعَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَدَهُ فِي الرَّكْوَةِ فَجَعَلَ الْمَاءُ يَفُورُ مِنْ بَيْنِ أَصَابِعِهِ كَأَمْثَالِ الْعُيُونِ قَالَ فَشَرِبْنَا وَتَوَضَّأْنَا فَقُلْتُ لِجَابِرٍ كَمْ كُنْتُمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ قَالَ لَوْ كُنَّا مِائَةَ أَلْفٍ لَكَفَانَا كُنَّا خَمْسَ عَشْرَةَ مِائَةً

The people became thirsty on the day of the Al-Ĥudaybiyyah incident[5]. The Prophet had a vessel in front of him that he took water for (Wuđuu’) ablusion from. The people approached him, so he said, "what is the matter?" They replied, "O Messenger of Aļļaah, we do not have any water to make ablution, or to drink, other than what you have in your vessel. Upon hearing that, the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) put his hand in the vessel, and water gushed out from between his fingers like a spring. So we drank (Jaabir said) and performed ablution. I (the narrator from Jaabir, a man by the name of Saalim ibn Abii Al-Jaˆd) said to Jaabir: "How many were you on that day?" He answered: "If we had been a hundred thousand it would have been enough. We were fifteen hundred (individuals)."[6]

Rocks greeting the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم)

It was narrated and authenticated by Al-Ĥaakim[7] and others Aliyy ibn Abii Ţaalib[8] said,

كنا مع رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بمكة ، فخرج في بعض نواحيها فما استقبله شجر ، ولا جبل إلا قال : السلام عليك يا رسول الله

"I walked with the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) in Makkah, and we went to some of its areas. He was not faced by a rock or a tree that did not say to him: Peace upon you O Messenger of Aļļaah!"[9]

Tree bearing witness to the prophethood of Muĥammad (صل الله عليه وسلم)

It was narrated by NuurudDiin Al-Haytħamiyy in his book Majmaˆ Az-Zawaa’id[10] through the companion Ibn ˆUmar:

عن ابن عمر قال : كنا مع رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم في سفر فأقبل أعرابي فلما دنا قال له النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم : " أين تريد؟ " قال : "إلى أهلي." قال : " هل لك في خير؟ " قال : "وما هو؟" قال : " تشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له وأن محمدا عبده ورسوله." قال : "من شاهد على ما تقول؟" قال : " هذه الشجرة." فدعاها رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم وهي بشاطئ الوادي فأقبلت تخد الأرض خدا حتى جاءت بين يديه فاستشهدها ثلاثا فشهدت أنه كما قال ثم رجعت إلى منبتها ورجع الأعرابي إلى قومه وقال : "إن يتبعوني آتيك بهم وإلا رجعت إليك فكنت معك."

We were traveling with the Messenger of Aļļaah r when a desert Arab approached. When he came near them. The Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) said, "where are your heading?" He answered, "to my people." Then the Prophet asked (صل الله عليه وسلم) him, "are you interested in something that is good for you?" The Arab asked, "what is it?" He answered, "testify that there is no god but Aļļaah alone, He has no partner, and that Muĥammad is His created slave and His messenger." The man asked, "Who testifies to what you say?" The Prophet said, "this tree," and called the tree that was at the edge of the valley. The tree came, leaving a groove in the ground as a track, until it stood in front of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم). He asked it to testify three times, and it bore witness to that he is what he said he is. Then the tree returned to its place. The Arab also headed back to his people. He said, "if they follow me I will bring them to you, and if not, then I will come back to you myself in order to be with you."[11]

In another incident that narrated by Al-Bukħaariyy from Jaabir ibn ˆAbdillaah[12]:

كَانَ الْمَسْجِدُ مَسْقُوفًا عَلَى جُذُوعٍ مِنْ نَخْلٍ فَكَانَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِذَا خَطَبَ يَقُومُ إِلَى جِذْعٍ مِنْهَا فَلَمَّا صُنِعَ لَهُ الْمِنْبَرُ وَكَانَ عَلَيْهِ فَسَمِعْنَا لِذَلِكَ الْجِذْعِ صَوْتًا كَصَوْتِ الْعِشَارِ حَتَّى جَاءَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَوَضَعَ يَدَهُ عَلَيْهَا فَسَكَنَتْ

The Masjid of the Prophet’s roof was supported by palm trunks, and when the Prophet spoke, he used to lean on one of these palm trunks. When a pulpit was made for him, and he stood on it, we heard a sound from that palm trunk, like the sound of a camel in her tenth month of pregnancy. It continued until the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) came and put his hand on it. Only then did it become calm. [13]

A camel prostrating to the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم)

It was narrated through a chain of reliable narrators by NuurudDiin Al-Haythmiyy, through Anas ibn Maalik[14], that a family in Al-Madiinah had a camel that used to fetch water for them had become obstinate and dangerous to go near. The Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) went to see the camel inside its fence, despite his companion’s fear that the animal might attack him. When the camel saw him it approached him, faced him, and prostrated. He grabbed it by its forehead, and put it back to work.

فقال له أصحابه : يا رسول الله هذا بهيمة لا يعقل يسجد لك ونحن نعقل فنحن أحق أن نسجد لك قال : " لا يصلح لبشر أن يسجد لبشر ولو صلح لبشر أن يسجد لبشر لأمرت المرأة أن تسجد لزوجها لعظم حقه عليها…."

His companions said: "O Messenger of Aļļaah, this animal that does not have a mind prostrates to you, and we do have minds, so we are even more befit to prostrate to you!" He responded (in part), "it is not sound for a human to prostrate to another human. If it was sound for a human to prostrate to another human, then I would have ordered the wife to prostrate to her husband, because of the enormous rights he has over her…."[15]

Defeating an army with a handful of soil

In the battle of Ĥunayn, after the conquest of Makkah, the Prophet had with him an army of 12,000 men facing the tribe Hawaazin, who were under the leadership of a man by the name of Maalik ibn ˆAwf. Maalik had made the men of his tribe bring their property and families, to make them fight for all they hold precious. They were thousands of men and fought very hard and with strong unity. In the beginning, most of the Muslim army retreated, but the Prophet along with a few men remained. Muslim narrated:

نَزَلَ عَنْ الْبَغْلَةِ ثُمَّ قَبَضَ قَبْضَةً مِنْ تُرَابٍ مِنْ الْأَرْضِ ثُمَّ اسْتَقْبَلَ بِهِ وُجُوهَهُمْ فَقَالَ شَاهَتْ الْوُجُوهُ فَمَا خَلَقَ اللَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنْسَانًا إِلَّا مَلَأَ عَيْنَيْهِ تُرَابًا بِتِلْكَ الْقَبْضَةِ فَوَلَّوْا مُدْبِرِينَ فَهَزَمَهُمْ اللَّهُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ

The Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) came down from his mule and grabbed a handful of soil from the ground. Then he threw it towards their faces (the army of Hawaazin) and said, "The faces became ugly." There was not a human created by Aļļaah among them that did not get soil in his eyes (and they were thousands ) from that handful, so they turned around and Aļļaah (عز وجل) defeated them.[16]

A poisoned sheep leg speaks

After victory in the battle of Kħaybar, an oases north of Al-Madiinah controlled by jews, a jewish woman gave the Prophet a broiled sheep. Al-Haytħamiyy narrates[17]:

فأكل وأكل أصحابه ثم قال لهم: " أمسكوا." ثم قال للمرأة: " هل سممت هذه الشاة؟" فقالت: من أخبرك؟ قال: "هذا العظم لساقها." وهو في يده قالت: نعم. قال: "لم ؟" قالت: "قلت : إن كنت كاذبا أن يستريح الناس منك وإن كنت نبيا لم يضرك."

He (the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم)) ate from it and so did some of his companions, then he said, "hold back!" Then he said to the woman, "have you poisoned this sheep?" She answered, "who told you?" He answered, "this bone of its foreleg," and it was in his hand. She answered, "yes." He asked her, "why?" She said, "I said to myself, ‘if he is a liar, then people will be rid of him, and if he is truthful it will not harm him."[18]

This idea of hers, that a prophet would not get harmed by poison, is pure ignorance, because prophets are human beings, and get harmed like others.

A wolf speaks

Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal[19] narrated in a chain declared authentic[20] that a wolf captured a sheep and the shepherd pursued it until he took it back. The wolf sat down with its tale between its legs in the manner that dogs do. It spoke and said, "do you not fear Aļļaah? You take a provision from me that was led to me by Aļļaah?" The shepherd said, "How strange! A wolf sitting on its tale and speaking to me in human speech." The wolf said, "How about I tell you something stranger than that? Muĥammad (صل الله عليه وسلم) in Yatħrib (the city of Al-Madiinah) telling people about what happened in the past!"[21]

The shepherd then went to Al-Madiinah and told the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم), who had him announce it in the Masjid. The Messenger of Aļļaah (صل الله عليه وسلم) then swore it was true and said:

لاَ تَقُومُ السَّاعَةُ حَتَّى يُكَلِّمَ السِّبَاعُ الإِنْسَ، وَيُكَلِّمَ الرَّجُلَ عَذَبَةُ سَوْطِهِ ، وَشِرَاكُ نَعْلِهِ، وَيُخْبِرَهُ فَخِذُهُ بِمَا (3) أَحْدَثَ (4) أَهْلُهُ بَعْدَهُ

"The last hour will not occur until predators speak to humans, and the man is spoken to by the lash of his whip, and the leather strip (the one across the instep) of his sandals, and by his thigh, about what his family was doing while he was away."[22]

His knowledge of the unseen of the past and the future

Muslim narrated that Ĥudħayfah[23] said:

قام فينا رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم مقاما ما ترك شيئا يكون في مقامه ذلك إلى قيام الساعة إلا حدث به حفظه من حفظه ونسيه من نسيه قد علمه أصحابي هؤلاء وإنه ليكون منه الشيء قد نسيته فأراه فأذكره كما يذكر الرجل وجه الرجل إذا غاب عنه ثم إذا رآه عرفه

The Messenger of Aļļaah (صل الله عليه وسلم) stood and delivered a great speech to us in which he did not leave anything untold that would be from that time until the Last Hour. Some of us memorized it while others forgot. These companions of mine know (about) it. Verily some of what I have forgotten of it happens, and then I remember it when I see it. Just like when a man remembers the face of another man that was away from him, (and he forgot what he looks like[24]) and then when he sees him again, he remembers him.

In another narration, by Abuu Daawuud[25], Ĥudħayfah said:

وَاَللَّهِ مَا تَرَكَ رَسُول اللَّه صَلَّى اللَّه عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مِنْ قَائِد فِتْنَةٍ إِلَى أَنْ تَنْقَضِيَ الدُّنْيَا يَبْلُغُ مَنْ مَعَهُ ثَلاثمِائَةٍ إِلاَّ قَدْ سَمَّاهُ لَنَا

By Aļļaah, the Messenger of Aļļaah r did not leave out naming (i.e. specifically by full name) any leader of deviation[26] to be before the end of this world, that has followers reaching 300 men (or more).[27]

In another narration, as quoted by Al-Haytħamiyy, Abuu Dħarr[28] said:

لَقَدْ تَرَكَنَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَمَا يُحَرِّكُ طَائِرٌ جَنَاحَيْهِ فِي السَّمَاءِ إِلاَّ ذَكَّرَنَا مِنْهُ عِلْمًا

The Messenger of Aļļaah (صل الله عليه وسلم) left us, and no bird moves its wings in the Sky without him having mentioned something about it.

In other words, the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) knew about all events of significance to his nation, and told his companions about these. It must not be understood from this that the Prophet knows everything, because it is impossible for a creation to have infinite knowledge. Infinite knowledge is only for Aļļaah, because His knowledge is eternal and not created.

Moreover, it cannot be that the Prophet knows all that is written to be in this world. This is because such a claim would contradict with what Aļļaah told us in the Qur’aan.

---

[1] See footnote 23 on page 10.

[2] Muĥammad ibn ‘Ismaaˆiil Al-Bukħaariyy (194 – 256 AH), Şaĥiiĥu-l-Bukħaariyy, 4/206.

[3] Ibid., 4/194.

[4] Jaabir ibn ˆAbdillaah Al-Kħazrajiyy Al-Anşaariyy (78 AH/ 697 AD) (رضي الله عنه) was a companion of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم), as was his father, and is an important narrator who narrated more than 1500 ĥadiitħs, and he also participated in 19 military campaigns. Towards the end of his life, he used to give lessons in the Prophet’s Masjid in Al-Madiinah. Az-Zirikliyy, Al-’Aˆlaam (2002), 2/104.

[5] The Ĥudaybiyyah incident happened when the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) and his companions were stopped at an area at the outskirts of Makkah, called Al-Ĥudaybiyyah. The men of Quraysħ prevented from proceeding further to perform the short type of pilgrimage called ˆUmrah – it is different from the long type, called Ĥajj.

[6] Muĥammad ibn ‘Ismaaˆiil Al-Bukħaariyy (194 – 256 AH), Şaĥiiĥu-l-Bukħaariyy, 5/122.

[7] See footnote 24 on page 11. See footnote 34 on page 13.

[8] See footnote 34 on page 13.

[9] Al-Naysaabuuriyy, Al-Mustadrak, 2/677.

[10] NuurudDiin Al-Haytħamiyy 807 AH/1305 AD was a great ĥadiitħ master who authored many books, among these is the book Majmaˆu-z-Zawaa’id, which is a respected ĥadiitħ collection. Az-Zirikliyy, Al-’Aˆlaam (2002), 4/266.

[11] Nuuru-d-Diiin Al-Haytħamiy, Majmaˆu-z-Zawaa’id (Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr, 1412), 8/517.

[12] See footnote 147 page 81.

[13] Muĥammad ibn ‘Ismaaˆiil Al-Bukħaariyy (194 – 256 AH), Şaĥiiĥu-l-Bukħaariyy, 4/195-196.

[14] Anas ibn Maalik Al-Kħazrajiyy Al-Anşaariyy (93 AH/ 712 AD) (رضي الله عنه) was a companion and used to be the servant of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) in Al-Madiinah, his hometown. After the Prophet’s (صل الله عليه وسلم) death he emigrated to Damascus and finally to Başrah, where he died as the last companion to die in that city. Az-Zirikliyy, Al-’Aˆlaam (2002), 2/24-25.

[15] Al-Haytħamiy, Majmaˆu-z-Zawaa’id, 8/556.

[16] Muslim ibn Al-Ĥajjaaj Al-Naysaabuuriy, Şaĥiiĥ Muslim (Beirut, Lebanon: Daar Ihyaa’ Al-Turaath Al-Arabi), 3/1402.

[17] In a chain with sound narrators, except that one of them has been declared weak by some ĥadiitħ experts, and declared acceptable by others. However, this ĥadiitħ is narrated in many different chains as well.

[18] Al-Haytħamiy, Majmaˆu-z-Zawaa’id, 8/523.

[19] See footnote 9 on page 6.

[20] Al-Haytħamiyy declared the men of the chain as sound. Al-Haytħamiy, Majmaˆu-z-Zawaa’id, 8/516.

[21] Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal (241 AH/ 856 AD), Musnad Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal (241 AH) (Beirut, Lebanon: Mu’assasah Ar-Risaalah, 1421), 18/316.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ĥudħayfah ibn Al-Yamaan was a great companion of the Prophet (صل الله عليه وسلم) whom the Prophet told the names of all the hypocrites, and no one else. If someone died, ˆUmar used to see if Ĥudħayfah went to the funeral or not; if he did not go, then ˆUmar would not perform the funeral prayer. ˆUmar also put him in charge of several military campaigns and made him a governor of several cities. When he sent new governors he used to send the message, "I have sent so and so to you, and ordered him so and so," but when he sent Ĥudħayfah, he would say, "listen to him, obey him, and give him whatever he asks." Az-Zirikliyy, Al-’Aˆlaam (2002), 2/171.

[24] Explanation in brackets as stated by Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy. Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy, Fatĥu-l-Baarii, 11/496.

[25] Abuu Daawuud (202 AH/ 817 AD – 275 AH/ 889 AD), Sulaymaan ibn Al-’Asħˆatħ ibn Isĥaaq ibn Basħiir Al-’Azdiyy As-Sijistaaniyy was the leader of ĥadiitħ scholars in his time. He is originally from Sijistaan (a region in today’s Iran and Afghanistan) and died in Başrah, Iraq, where he was buried. He is the author of the famous ĥadiitħ collection Sunan Abii Dawuud. Az-Zirikliyy, Al-’Aˆlaam (2002), 3/ 122.

[26] Leader of deviation, i.e. a leader of a deviation of some kind, or unjust warfare. Al-Qaariy, Mirqaatu-l-Mafaatiiĥ, 10/ 21.

[27] As quoted by Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy, and he did not mention anything negative about this narration, which means he considered it acceptable according to his methodology. Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniy, Fatĥu-l-Baariy (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar El-Marefah Publishing & Distributing), 11 / 496.

[28] Abuu Dħarr, Jundab ibn Junaadah, Al-Għifaariyy (32 AH/ 652 AD), was one of the earliest converts to Islam and greatest of the companions of the Prophet.

Important note on the evidences of the prophethood of Muĥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم)

In addition to his miracles, we get supporting evidences from the human perfection of the person of the Prophet himself; from both the perspective of insight and that of action. The greatest kind of insight is that of knowing Aļļaah, while the greatest kind of action is that of obeying Aļļaah. The greater one’s knowledge of Aļļaah and one’s obedience to Him, the more perfect one will be as a human being. We can also consider the level of strength of these two perspectives of human perfection. The first level would be to apply them to oneself. The higher level would be the strength to help others achieve high levels of insight and action.

Now, consider that at the time of the Prophet’s appearance, the world was full of blasphemy and vice of great varieties. As for the Jews, they had drowned in anthropomorphic beliefs, perverting the books brought by prophets, and even showing enmity towards some of them, like Jesus. The Christians, on the other hand, were fumbling in the fog of self contradictory superstitions, such as their beliefs in the trinity, the father and the son, along with the belief that creator and created are united. Others, like the Magians, were allowing men to marry their mothers, while the Arabs were busy with robbery, kidnapping and worshipping idols.

After the Prophet’s appearance (صلى الله عليه وسلم) these blasphemies and vices were replaced by the belief in the Oneneness of Aļļaah and obedience to Him at an unprecedented scale. This reversal from blasphemy and vice is the greatest achieved by any prophet in history, much greater than that of previous prophets, such as Moses or Jesus.

Look for example at his own people, the Arabs. Before his call they were split into tribes, clans and families with ongoing conflicts and enmity. After their embracement of Islam they became united to defend the Prophet and his teachings, emigrated from their lands, left their families and sacrificed their blood in his cause, making themselves targets for the blows of swords and the strikes of arrows. All this to strengthen the Prophet’s call, and nothing else. For he offered them no ease in this world, no riches as compensation, and no immediate benefits as incentive, no kingdom, no rule, no worldly titles. On the contrary, many spent their riches to support him and embraced poverty and a life of obeying orders.

This tells us, in addition to miracles, that the Prophet Muĥammad is not only a prophet, but the greatest prophet of all. He was supremely successful as a political leader and in his influence on the personalities of his followers. This influence and its intensity is still very evident today for anyone comparing Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of whom they are influenced by and to what extent.

The difference between the Wahabi creed and Islam

I am often asked to make a list of things that are different between the wahabi creed (i.e. that of their leaders) and Islam.

The core difference is that when wahabis say that Aļļaah does not resemble His creation, they mean that He is different in the same way as created things differ from one another, like in the case of fingerprints. Everybody has different fingerprints. So when they say Aļļaah has a hand, but “not like ours,” they mean that it has different physical characteristics, such as color, number of fingers, or print, or something like that. This is true, because they believe Aļļaah is something that can be pointed at in a direction and has a limit, i.e. a shape and size. For simplicity, let us call it a body, because a body is anything with a size and shape, even if many wahabis do not like this word.

All creations as observed by our eyes, have a shape, and differ only in the form of the shape, and in size. Since the wahabis believe that their god is a body, their belief is that he is only different in bodily characteristics, such as the exact form and size. This means that he would be part identical to creation, and part different; the way created things differ.

On the other hand, Sunnis say that the reality of Aļļaah’s existence absolutely does not resemble that of His creation. They do not believe that Aļļaah is different from His creation merely in the way created things differ from one another. For this reason, Sunnis say that the reality of Aļļaah’s existence is not bodily. That is, He must be without size or shape.

Another way to express the Sunni belief in Aļļaah’s non-resemblance to creation is to say that Aļļaah is clear of resemblance to whatever needs specification. The reality of Aļļaah’s existence cannot require specification. This is because requiring specification means being dependent on something else to be specified by. In other words, it means being dependent upon a creator to provide specification and existence according to the specification.

Bodily existence, which entails size and shape, is in need of specification of its size and its shape, because no shape or size has a higher priority for existence intrinsically. No size is more likely to exists than any other without influence from other than it. Likewise, no shape is more likely to exist than any other without influence from other than it. It needs therefore to have specification from other than it. Anything that has bodily existence must therefore be a creation, and cannot be the Creator. That is why the Salaf, though they did not explain in detail, always stated that Aļļaah’s attributes are without a how, that is, without specification, that is, without shape or change. Due to the closeness to the time of prophethood, they had great minds, and a profound understanding of the religion, They understood that Aļļaah is not limited or having boundaries, or less than perfect in any sense, and that He is therefore not in a direction or changing. They expressed all this with the simple phrase: “without a how,” They took this phrase from the quranic: “He absolutely does not resemble anything.” That is, the reality of His existence does not resemble that of creation.

In conclusion, the wahabi belief is that Aļļaah differs from creation the way creation differ from one another. They believe that His existence is bodily, like that of creatures. This is the most fundamental difference between Sunnis and wahabis.

The other core difference, their unique concept of shirk, is really a consequence of this. Let me explain…

When human beings worship a 3 dimensional shape, they feel a need to somehow make it different than other objects. The reason is that the essential reality of the existence of what they worship, is the same as all other things around them. After all, a 3 dimensional shape is just a 3 dimensional shape with respect to its kind of existence, i.e. bodily existence. Thus, this difference that they seek can only be in terms of:

-what is seen, i.e in appearance, i.e. in shape, size or color, or location

-some unseen characteristic claimed, or

-how one behaves towards this object.

That is why you will find a buddhist or anemist (those who worship trees and other objects found) makes sure to decorate his idol, gives it a weird shape, such as several heads, and if he is rich he’ll buy one made from gold. You will also find him putting it in a special location in his house. This takes care of appearance. He will claim that the idol has godly power, or knowledge, or the like, to attempt to rationalize its worship. Then he will behave with special ceremonial rites in its physical presence. A lot of attention is paid then to the idol’s location, ceremonial behavior related to this location, and ornamentation to distinguish it from other object. This is to contribute to the illusion that it is essentially different from other objects, and make it seem plausible that it is a god.

The wahabis are the same, because just like ordinary idol worshipers, they worship what is essentially a 3 dimensional thing. However, their object of worship is not present, so they will simply say regarding its appearance, “not like other objects, and we do not know how.” This way they leave it open, and can tell a buddhist, “our object is so much better than yours,” and when asked “how?” They will say, “we do not know, but it the best that can be.”

In the appearance aspect of location, their special location is “above the world in direction.” Here they have exceeded all other idol worshipers by choosing a really, really special location that cannot be reached by the senses.

But they are at a conceptual loss for what on earth Aļļaah’s oneness would mean, as it is not an absolute to them. After all, any single physical object is “one” in count, but not in kind, and since they believe He is an object, the meaning of “one” that would be worth being zealous about becomes quite foggy, and they have quite a dilemma. All they can do is say that only the body they call Aļļaah (but is actually not Him) deserves worship, while the other objects/bodies do not. But what would be their bases for this claim?

They cannot claim this based on the reality of the existence of their object of worship, because it is a body, and there are very many bodies around with the same mode of existence.

They cannot claim distinction based on unseen characteristics, because if omnipotence, omniscience and eternal existence could be attributes of a 3 dimensional being, then there is no way to rationally prove that one such thing could have them, while another not. That is, basing it on the claim that this object has all sorts of unseen characteristics, such as power, would not satisfy them in their search for the meaning of oneness that would make them different from other idol worshipers. After all, all idol worshipers claim their idols have all sorts of powers, so this wouldn’t make them special, or different in an essential way. This is especially when compared to religions with an identical belief regarding the reality of the creator’s existence, namely bodily existence, such as the christians, and especially the jews.

In practice, however, wahabi’s have achieved an advantage over other object worshipers, because they could break physically present idols, and claim that their (o so conveniently absent) object is unbreakable, and no competing idol worshipers would be able to prove them wrong, even if they themselves cannot prove that they are right.

In these ways, the wahabis can make themselves feel superior in the distinguishing game of idol worship (like when Hindus claim their idols are better than those of Bhuddists and vice versa). However, this is all very weak by itself, because it is based on the physical absence of their idol, and the existence of such a fantastic idol is impossible to prove. This is because physical objects cannot be proven to exist except by observation. The proofs for the existence of a creator that Muslims use do not help them, because they are all based on the idea that what has a size and shape and changes needs a creator, which means that their idol would need one also.

This is where their concept of shirk comes to play; they needed something to make them really different in their claim to be uniquely monotheist. They felt a need to make their worshiped object different than other objects in a more tangible way. After all, they are a people that do not think much of non-tangibles. They, or rather Ibn Taymiyyah, invented the concept of Aļļaah’s oneness being a matter of our behavior, a matter of who can be called for help and who cannot. This is their equivalent to the Buddhists ceremonious behavior around where the idol is placed, to their own physically absent idol, in order to distinguish it from other bodies. They made it the only body that can be called for help, regardless of whether one believes the called upon to have actual and real independent power or not.

All the other differences they argue for, such as their saying that all scripture texts must be understood literally, are inconsistent ideas that they use only when it suits their purpose. After all, if it suits their purpose they will go against all Arabic dictionaries in their understanding of a word, as is the case with (خلق) kħalaqa – to create, and (أحدث) aĥdatħa – to bring into existence. This is when they say that Aļļaah’s attribute of Speech is muĥdatħ but not makħluuq. An interpretation does not get more far-fetched than that, and yet they will cry “deviance!” if someone chooses a meaning from the dictionary, if it does not agree with their belief that Aļļaah is a body.

(Updated) Takwiin, effective pertainment and AI-‘Iijiyy on Allaah not being in time

By actions the Asħˆariyys mean the created things themselves that exist by the influence of Aļļaah’s attribute of power, or what they call effective pertainment. Effective pertainment is the pertaining of Aļļaah’s power to what exists of created things, as opposed to valid pertainment, which is the pertaining Aļļaah’s power to everything possible. The Maaturiidiyys say that the attribute of power is Aļļaah’s power to bring into existence, while the bringing into existence is another attribute called takwiin. So what Asħˆariyys explain as (1) "effective pertainment" and (2) "valid pertainment" is explained as two attributes, respectively: (1) "takwiin" or "creating" and (2) "power to create" according to Maaturiidiyys.

Aļļaah’s providing, giving, bringing into existence, etc. is called effective pertainment in the Asħˆariyy school, while in the Maaturiidiyy school these are different names for takwiin according to what the attribute of takwiin pertains to.

When we remember that Aļļaah is not in time according to all, then it becomes easy to understand that this is mainly a semantical difference; using different words to explain the same thing. Although the Asħˆariyys say that the effective pertainment has a beginning, this is with respect to us, because we are in time. So we say that Jill was created yesterday, but the time element of yesterday is a created attribute of Jill, where as the attribute of Aļļaah is creating Jill with the "yesterday" as one of her attributes, the meanings associated with her being, sort of like color. In other words, Aļļaah does not pass through a state of time called before creating Jill and after creating Jill, because He is not in time.

This means that Aļļaah Himself did not change during those six days in which He created the Heavens and the Earth. What changed is creation; those six days are for creation. Accordingly, the Imam of Guidance, Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy says: “A fundamental belief principle is that whenever Aļļaah is ascribed an attribute, then this attribute is eternal (i.e. without a beginning or end). One says that He is attributed with knowledge, power and providing eternally without a beginning and without an end. If He is mentioned with regard to His management of creation and orders to it, then time is stated, but this time is for creation, not for Him. For example, it is said, "Aļļaah knows eternally that you are sitting here," or "(sitting here) at this time." I.e. Aļļaah knows eternally without a beginning or an end that the person is sitting now…. This is all to prevent people from thinking "How were the created things in eternity?”[1]

An-Nasafiyy, the second most important scholar in the Maaturiidiyy school after Al-Maaturiidiyy himself, said: "His eternal attribute of creating does not lead to saying that the world is eternal, because the possible in existence cannot be eternal, and because creating is not for the immediate existence of the created, but for the time of its existence."[2] He also said: "The Karraamiyyah all claimed that Aļļaah’s creating (takwiin) is an event in Aļļaah with a beginning, and that events occur in Aļļaah. Aļļaah is greatly above what the unjust ascribe to Him."[3]

It must be understood that Aļļaah’s creating is not a sequential action, it is an action without a how. It has no beginning or end. If it was sequential, one previously non-existent action coming into existence after another, then each action would itself need to be brought into existence. This is because it did not exist previously. Then if that action of bringing the action into existence also had a beginning, we would need a bringing into existence of that one also, etc. to infinity, which would mean that one single act of creating would need an infinite amount of bringings into existence prior to it. This means that the act of creating can’t ever exist, because the prerequisite infinite amount of bringings into existence cannot ever be concluded. The solution to this is to say that Aļļaah’s act of bringing into existence does not have a beginning, and therefore does not need to be brought into existence.

In other words, Aļļaah created the world in six days, without His act of creating it having a beginning or an end, because Aļļaah is not in time; His attributes do not change and do not renew.

Further to this concept, here is what the two famous asħˆariyys, ˆAđududDiin Al-’Iijiyy, and Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy have to say about Aļļaah not being in time. Al-‘Iijiyy’s words are bolded in brackets, while the rest is Al-Jurjaaniyy’s explanation[4]:

الشرح (المقصد الرابع إنه تعالى ليس في زمان) أي ليس وجوده وجودا زمانيا ومعنى كون الوجود زمانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في زمان كما أن معنى كونه مكانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في مكان	(The fourth topic: on Aļļaah not being in time.) That is, His existence is not in time. The meaning of existence in time is that it cannot be except in time, just as the meaning of existence in a location is that it cannot be except in a location.
(هذا مما اتفق عليه أرباب الملل ولا نعرف فيه للعقلاء خلافا) وإن كان مذهب المجسمة يجر إليه كما يجر إلى الجهة والمكان	(This is one of the things that the people of all sects and religions agreed upon, and we do not know of any disagreement upon this between rational beings.) This is so, even if the anthropomorphists imply that, just as they imply direction and location.
(أما عند الحكماء فلأن الزمان) عندهم (مقدار حركة المحدد) للجهات (فلا يتصور فيما لا تعلق له بالحركة والجهة)	(As for according to the philosophers, this is because time) according to them (is the amount of limited movement) in any direction (so being in time cannot be true of what does not have to do with movement or direction.)
وتوضيحه أن التغير التدريجي زماني بمعنى أنه يتقدر بالزمان وينطبق عليه ولا يتصور وجوده إلا فيه والتغير الدفعي متعلق بالآن الذي هو طرف الزمان فما لا تغير فيه أصلا لا تعلق له بالزمان قطعا نعم وجوده تعالى مقارن للزمان وحاصل مع حصوله وأما أنه زماني أو آني أي واقع في أحدهما فكلا	That is, gradual change is in time, in the sense that it is measured in time, and coincides with time, and its existence cannot be other than in time, and a momentary change defines the “now” which is a the last point in time [i.e. so far]. Accordingly, what does not change at all, is not related to time at all. Yes, Aļļaah’s existence is affirmed as true and real no matter what time one is in, but it is not in time, or momentary. That is, it is not occurring in a time or a moment.
(وأما عندنا فلأنه) أي الزمان (متجدد يقدر به متجدد فلا يتصور في القديم فأي تفسير فسر) الزمان (به امتنع ثبوته لله تعالى)	(As for according to us, this is because it) i.e. time (is something renewing by which something else renewing is measured, so it cannot be true of the beginninglessly eternal. Accordingly, no matter how we define it,) i.e. time (it cannot be affirmed as being true of Aļļaah.)
(تنبيه) على ما يتضمنه هذا الأصل الذي مهدناه آنفا (يعلم مما ذكرنا أنا سواء قلنا العالم حادث بالحدوث الزماني) كما هو رأينا (أو الذاتي) كما هو رأي الحكيم (فتقدم الباري سبحانه عليه) لكونه موجدا إياه (ليس تقدما زمانيا) وإلا لزم كونه تعالى واقعا في الزمان بل هو تقدم ذاتي عندهم وقسم سادس عندنا كتقدم بعض أجزاء الزمان على بعضها	(Important note) regarding this principle that we have just explained: (It is known from what we mentioned previously that regardless of whether we say that the world has a beginning that is in time) as is our view, (or that it is in being) as is the view of the philosopher (it is still true that the precedence of Aļļaah over creation) by His being its Creator (is not a precedence of time.) Otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is a precedence of being, according to the philosophers, and a sixth meaning [of precedence] in our view [that is not in time], like the precedence of moments of time over other moments of time [The sixth meaning of precedence is that of Creator over created, not in time, and this is beyond what our minds can grasp, because the reality of Aļļaah's existence cannot be grasped. The precedence of moments of time over other moments is mentioned to show that precedence in existence is not necessarily in time].
(و) يعلم أيضا (أن بقاءه ليس عبارة عن وجوده في زمانين) وإلا كان تعالى زمانيا بل هو عبارة امتناع عدمه ومقارنته مع الأزمنة (ولا القدم عبارة عن أن يكون قبل كل زمان زمان) وإلا لم يتصف به الباري تعالى	(Moreover,) it is also known (that His everlastingness is not an expression meant to indicate His existence in two consecutive times,) otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is an expression meaning that it is impossible for His to cease to exist, or accompany time [i.e. to be thought of as passing through time]. (Furthermore, His beginningless existence is not meant to express that there is a time before all times,) otherwise it would not be ascribed to Him.
(وأنه) أي ما ذكرناه من أنه تعالى ليس زمانيا (يبسط العذر في ورود ما ورد من الكلام الأزلي بصيغة الماضي ولو في الأمور المستقبلة) الواقعة فيما لا يزال كقوله تعالى إنا أرسلنا نوحا وذلك لأنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لا بحسب ذاته ولا بحسب صفاته كان نسبة كلامه الأزلي إلى جميع الأزمنة على السوية إلا أن حكمته تعالى اقتضت التعبير عن بعض الأمور بصيغة الماضي وعن بعضها بصيغة المستقبل فسقط ما تمسك به المعتزلة في حدوث القرآن من أنه لو كان قديما لزم الكذب في أمثال ما ذكر فإن الإرسال لم يكن واقعا قبل الأزل	(In addition it) [i.e. the fact we have mentioned regarding Him (تعالى) not being in time] (justifies what has been revealed of Aļļaah’s speech expressed in the past tense, even for what pertains to the future) and happens with a beginning, such as His saying (تعالى): إنا أرسلنا نوحا Meaning: Verily we have sent Nuuĥ. This is because if He is not in time, neither in His Self, nor His attributes, then His beginningless and endless Speech has the same relation to all times. It is just that His wisdom dictates revealing expressions regarding some issues in past tense, and some in future tense. Accordingly, the claim of the Muˆtazilites regarding the Qur’aan [i.e. the attribute of speech that the expressions in the revealed book refer to] having a beginning is invalid. [They claimed invalidly that it must have a beginning, and cannot be an eternal attribute, saying:] because otherwise the expressions like the one mentioned would be untrue, since the sending [of Nuuĥ in this case] did not happen before beginningless eternity.
(وههنا أسرار أخر لا أبوح بها ثقة بفطنتك) منها إذا قلنا كان الله موجودا في الأزل وسيكون موجودا في الأبد وهو موجود الآن لم نرد به أن وجوده واقع في تلك الأزمنة بل أردنا أنه مقارن معها من غير أن يتعلق بها كتعلق الزمانيات	(There are other hidden realities known through this that I will not mention explicitly, based on trust in your intelligence.) Among these is the fact that if we say “Aļļaah existed before creation, and shall exist forever, and He exists now,” then we do not mean by this that His existence falls in these times. Rather, we mean that His existence is true at all times, without Him being in them the way things in time are.
ومنها أنه لو ثبت وجود مجردات عقلية لم تكن أيضا زمانية	Another [fact known from this] is that if it was established that there are beings with a beginning that are not in place, then they would not be in time. [This is true according to the philosophers' definition of time, because it is dependent on space. In Sunni terminology, however, it is not acceptable to say that such beings would not be in time. This is because such beings would pass through renewed existence, as they are not necessary in existence, and can change in knowledge or will, or other attributes.]
ومنها أنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لم يكن بالقياس إليه ماض وحال ومستقبل فلا يلزم من علمه بالتغيرات تغير في علمه إنما يلزم ذلك إذا دخل فيه الزمان	[Yet] another [fact known from this] is that if He is not in time, then the measures of time in terms of past, present and future would not hold true of Him. Accordingly, it is not necessitated from His knowledge of changing things that His knowledge should change. It would only be necessary if He was in time [and He is not.]

[1] Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH), Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah, 9/473.

[2] Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115 AD), Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 1:1/99.

[3] Ibid., 1:1/401.

[4] Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD) and ˆAđudu-d-Diin Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD), Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif, 3/41.

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Bilbliography

Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115 AD). Tabşiratu-l-Adillah. Edited by Dr. Huuseyin Atay. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Turkey: Ri’aasat al-Shu’uun al-Diiniiyyah lil-Jumhuuriyyah al-Turkiyyah, 1993.

Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH). Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 1426.

Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD), and ˆAđudu-d-Diin Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD). Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif. 3 vols. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Jiil – Shaamilah, 1997.

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Question: Can we say that we mainly use logic when it comes to belief (Aqeedah)?

I do not think that is precise. You need logic in all matters of belief and jurisprudence (fiqh). The question is where the most explicit and immediate premises come from; are they scriptural, or based on the nature of the world around us? In fiqh they are always scriptural, i.e. based on the judgments (orders/prohibitions, etc.) that they contain. In belief issues, however, they are sometimes based on the world around us. Why? Because the premises for relying on scriptures must be from something other than the scripture, to avoid circular reasoning[1].

This means that the proofs of Aļļaah’s existence, some of His attributes, and the miracles of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم), and thus his prophethood (صلى الله عليه وسلم), have premises based on:

a) the essential nature of the world, such as the fact that it changes, and consists of parts that are intrinsically possible in existence, and therefore need a creator (see Foundations of The Religion."

b) on what is normally correlated, such as "touch fire -> get burned". It is through the normal we can recognize the extraordinary, i.e. miracles that prove prophethood. We know the splitting of the moon as a miracle of the Prophet Muĥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم) because it never happened before or after him.

Note that the underlying premises (unlike the immediate and explicit) on any fiqh issue are not based on the scriptures, but also on these premises. This is because the establishment of the scriptures as being revealed from Aļļaah, and obligatory to follow, are based on these premises.

Logic is always needed, even if you are only dealing with proofs from the Qur’aan and the Sunnah. This is because logic is about making precise definitions and constructing proofs, whether they be constructed from premises that are taken from the revealed scriptures or not.

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[1] An example of this would be if someone said, "I pray because Aļļaah orders me to, because it says so in His book, and I know this book tells me what Aļļaah orders, because the book tells me it is." To get out of this line of reasoning, you need to prove by other means than the book’s instructions that the book is really from Aļļaah. To do this you need to prove that Aļļaah exists, and that miracles prove prophethood, and that is the role of Kalaam/Belief Science.

Perversion by those who claim Allaah could lie exposed

It was a glimmer of light in a world filled with the darkness of blasphemy when someone sent me a link with the following statement by Dr. Muĥammad, Saˆiid Ramađaan Al-Buuţiyy:

Question: It has been related to your distinguished self, in one site on the internet, the opinion that it is not intrinsically impossible that Allaah could lie, but that Allaah made it an obligation for Himself not to lie. This statement has been translated to English, and we would like to check with you the truthfulness of the attribution of this statement to you.

سؤال: نسب إلى فضيلتكم في أحد المواقع القول بأن الكذب في حق الله تعالى ليس مستحيلاً ذاتياً وأنه تحت قدرته. ولكنه تعالى أوجب على نفسه أن لا يكذب. وهذا القول ترجم إلى الإنكليزية ونريد أن نتأكد منكم مدى صحة نسبة هذا القول إليكم

Answer by Dr. Muĥammad, Saˆiid Ramađaan Al-Buuţiyy: No one has ever asked me about this, and I believe that no one has ever faced me, nor will anyone ever face me with such a despicable question. There is no one among the people that does not know that lying belongs to the category of lowly attributes. Moreover, there is no one among the believers in Allaah that does not know that Allaah is only attributed with complete perfection, and that He is clear of all attributes of flaw. Furthermore, something pertaining to the Power of Allaah does not mean it is possible that Allaah could be attributed with it. Finally, His Power pertains only to what is possible, and does not pertain to what is impossible. Muĥammad Saˆiid Ramađaan Al-Buuţiyy

أجاب عنه: أ.د.محمد سعيد رمضان البوطي إن أحداً لم يوجه إليّ هذا السؤال. وأعتقد أن أحداً لم يواجهني ولن يواجهني بمثل هذه السفالة في السؤال. ليس في الناس من يجهل أن الكذب من الصفات الذميمة. وليس في المؤمنين بالله من يجهل أن الله متصف بصفات الكمال كلها ومنزه عن سائر صفات النقصان. وقدرته جل جلاله على شيء ما لا يعني بالضرورة إمكان اتصافه به. على أن قدرته إنما تتعلق بالممكنات ولا تتعلق بالمستحيلات. محمد سعيد رمضان البوطي

So the devils that are busy spreading this terrible belief find no support, or understanding, with Dr. Al-Buuţiyy, in contrast with statements that have been spread around lately. Moreover, this example very clearly shows that there is willful perversion of texts happening in this issue, as I have pointed out earlier. The great scholars of this nation are definitely far away from this blasphemous belief.