Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah needs, is divisible, settles in a place, has 6 limits, has a size, and must be creating (though He can choose what to create – but not whether to create or not.)

Before reading the below, note that Fakħruddiin Ar-Raaziyy said :

The evidence shows that the one who says that Aļļaah is a body has denied Aļļaah’s existence. The reason is that the God of the World exists, and is not a body or positioned in a body. Therefore, if the one who says that Aļļaah is a body denies this existence (without a body) then he has denied Aļļaah’s existence. It is correct to say then, that the one who says that Aļļaah is a body does not believe in Allah¹. (Mafaatiiĥ Al-Għayb, 16/24)

Similarly, Al-Qurţubiyy in his commentary in the Qur’aan narrates from his Sħaykħ Ibn Al-ˆArabiyy regarding the those who say Aļļaah has a body:

The sound verdict is that they are blasphemers, because there is no difference between them and those that worship idols and pictures². (Tafsiir Al-Qurţubiyy, 4/14)

In light of this, to know the reality of the one the Wahabi sect calls "Sħaykħ of Islaam," read the following.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah is divisible

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s book Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah³:

[Fakħruddiin Ar-Raaziyy says,] if He (Aļļaah) was divisible, then He would be composed (i.e. and therefore attributed with multitude of parts) which contradicts oneness and we have already showed that this is an invalid claim….

[Ibn Taymiyyah responds:] Rather, it is clear that if this (i.e. that Aļļaah should be divisible) was impossible, then this would mean nothing could exist….(Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

Take note of what he is saying. He is saying that if something is not divisible in some sense, then it cannot exist, even Aļļaah. He is affirming his belief that Aļļaah is indeed divisible.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah has composition, settles in a place, has different sides/parts, and needs

[Ibn Taymiyyah continues to say:] We have already clarified what possibilities (in terms of what they mean) are associated with the words composition, settling in place, being other (having different sides or parts), and need, and that the meaning meant by this is something all existing things must be attributed with, whether necessary in existence (he means Aļļaah) or possible in existence (creation.) Verily, to say that this is impossible (for Aļļaah to be attributed with,) is pure sophistry. (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/33)

He is saying here that nothing can exist, not even Aļļaah, unless it has a place, parts (such as different physical sides), and needs.

Based on this incredibly ugly statement, it is no wonder then, that a number of scholars, as mentioned by TaqiyyudDiin Al-Ĥuşniyy, said that Ibn Taymiyyah was "an absolute kaafir." It is no wonder also that ˆAlaa’udDiin Al-Bukħaariyy in fury uttered, "whomsoever calls him Sħaykħ of Islam is himself a kaafir." That is, those who know about his blasphemous beliefs, as being uttered by him, or believe that he died on such beliefs without repenting.

Ibn Taymiyyah says Aļļaah has 6 limits, one of which is adjacent to the ˆArsħ

Ibn Taymiyyah said:

This moderate saying among the three sayings of Al-Qaađii Abuu Yaˆlaa is the one that agrees with what Aĥmad says and others among the imaams. He [i.e. Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal – and this is a lie, Aĥmad believed what Muslims believe, but that is another matter (Trans.)] has stated, “Aļļaah is in a particular direction, and He is not spread out in all directions. Rather, He is outside the world, distinct from His creation, separate from it, and He is not in every direction.” This is what Aĥmad, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, meant when he said, “He has a limit that only He knows.” If Aĥmad had meant the direction towards the ˆArsħ (Throne) only, then this would be known to Aļļaah’s slaves, because they know that Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ, so we know then that the limit they do not know is unqualified, and is not specified for the direction of the ˆArsħ (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/438).⁴

Note from this that He is saying: First he claims that “Aļļaah is in a particular direction,” and that “Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ.” This is according to him the known limit. Then by his saying, “He is not in spread in all directions,” he affirms that Aļļaah has limits in all other directions, that is up, left, right, back and front, but that these are unknown in term of where.

Ibn Taymiyyah said Aļļaah has a size

Ibn Taymiyyah said:

That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size – this is impossible (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 3/146).⁵

In other words, he is of the opinion that everything that exists, including the Creator, must have a size. According to Ibn Taymiyyah then, Aļļaah has a size limited by 6 limits.

Ibn Taymiyyah said that Aļļaah’s acts of creating come into existence in Him

Sunnis believe that Aļļaah creates by His Power without changing or going through time. This is because anything that has a beginning must be created. Accordingly, claiming that Aļļaah’s actions have a beginning implies that His actions need to be created by another act, and that act by another act, and so on. This means that an infinite loop of acts need to be completed before anything can be created, and this is impossible, because an infinite loop cannot be completed.

An-Nasafiyy said:

"The Karraamiyyah (pre-Ibn Taymiyyah anthropomorphists) all claimed that Aļļaah’s creating is an event in Aļļaah with a beginning, and that events occur in Aļļaah. Aļļaah is greatly above what the unjust ascribe to Him (Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 141)."

He also said about them:

I really do not know how these unbelievers in God talk the talk of atheists and Greek philosophers and affirm the beginning of the world, and then accept to believe that the beginninglessly eternal (i.e. Aļļaah) is something in which events (anything with a beginning) take place. How can they, when this necessitates either believing that the Creator has a beginning, or that the world (anything other than Aļļaah) has no beginning….(Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 501-502)

Ibn Taymiyyah, in contrast to this, said:

It has become clear that nothing can come into existence except from an actor (he means the Creator) that does something one after another.” He also said:“An act is impossible except bit by bit. (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141)⁶

In other words, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, acts of creating come into existence in Aļļaah Himself, after non-existence. This is a blasphemous belief, as mentioned above.

Ibn Taymiyyah said that creation is eternal, and that Aļļaah has no choice, but to create something

Based on his idea that Aļļaah’s actions have a beginning, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that Aļļaah has always been doing one act after another (i.e. creating) without a beginning. He says:

It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and not having something done in particular, so there is no eternal object in the world, and He is not eternally a complete influencer for anything (to exist) in the world, but He has in beginningless eternity always been a complete influencer for something (to exist), one after another… (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97)⁷

Note that his statement “It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular,” means that Aļļaah has no choice but to create something. This is a plain ascription of flaw to the Creator, and the one that has such a belief is light years away from being anything that can be called a Muslim. All Muslims must believe that Aļļaah does not need, and is not compelled to, or obligated to create at all.

Note also that the influence for something (to exist) that he speaks of, will be for a body to exist, or something to exist in a body, because he believes nothing can exist except bodies. According to him then, Aļļaah is the only eternal body among an eternal series of other bodies that He was compelled to create, although the type of bodies and events in them was His choice. In other words, he says that the world (which is anything other than Aļļaah) is eternal, because Aļļaah is eternally compelled to create something or another.

What Muslims believe, on the other hand, is that Aļļaah is the Creator of all things, and that He did not have to create anything, because He does not need anything, and is not obligated to do anything. In other words, it is not a necessity for Aļļaah to act, i.e create, anything at all. This is because Aļļaah is perfect, and therefore does not need to do anything. Ibn Taymiyyah, however, does not accept this, and comments on a statement of Ibn Ĥazm:

And even stranger than that is his (Ibn Ĥazm’s) claim that the scholars are in consensus about declaring a kaafir the one that does not believe that “He was eternally the only one in existence, and there was nothing existing with Him, then He created everything as He willed. (Naqd Maraatibi-l-‘Ijmaaˆ, 303)⁸

This is an attempt to hide his ugly kufr from his followers, for look at what Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy said:

Our shaykħ in his explanation of At-Tirmidħiyy said, “….. and it has been related by Al-Qaađii ˆIiaađ and others that the one who says that the world (anything other than Aļļaah) is eternal is a kaafir (non-Muslim) by scholarly consensus.” And Ibn Daqiiq Al-ˆIiid said: “It happened from some of those who claim to master intellectual matters, and inclines towards Philosophy, to think that the one that disagrees with the world having a beginning is not declared a kaafir…. and this is from blindness, or pretended blindness, because the world having a beginning is one of those things that are established by scholarly consensus and unequivocal (mutawaatir) narrational evidences.(Fatĥu-l-Baarii, 12/202)⁹

References:

Aş-Şafadiyyah. Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy. Egypt: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, 1406.

Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah. —. Makkah: Maţbaˆah Al-Ĥukuumah, 1392.

Fatĥu-l-Baarii Sħarĥu Şaĥiiĥi-l-Bukħaariyy. Ibn Ĥajar Al-ˆAsqalaaniyy. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Marefah, 1379.

Jaamiˆu Aĥkaami-l-Qur’aan. Al-Qurţubiyy (671 AH), Sħasuddiin. Ed. Hisħaam Samiir Al-Bukħaariyy. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Daar ˆaalam Al-Kutub, 1423.

Mafaatiiĥ Al-Għayb. FakħrudDiin Al-Raaziy. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 1421.

Naqd Maraatibi-l-‘Ijmaaˆ. Aĥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) Al-Ĥarraaniyy. Beirut, Lebanon: Daar Ibn Ĥazm, 1419.

Tabşiratu-l-Adillah. Abu-l-Muˆiin An-Nasafiyy. Ed. Dr. Hüseyin Atay. Turkey: Riʼāsat al-Shuʻūn al-Dīnīyah lil-Jumhūrīyah al-Turkīyah, 1993.

الصفدية. أحمد عبد الحليم بن تيمية الحراني (728). مصر: مكتية ابن تيمية, 1406.

بيان تلبيس الجهمية في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية. —. Ed. محمد بن عبد الرحمن بن قاسم. مكة المكرمة: مطبعة الحكومة, 1392.

فتح الباري شرح صحيح البخاري. أحمد بن علي بن حجر أبو الفضل العسقلاني الشافعي 852 هـ. بيروت, لبنان: دار المعرفة, 1379.

نقد مراتب الإجماع. أحمد عبد الحليم بن تيمية الحراني (728). بيروت, لبنان: دار ابن حزم, 1998.

1 يقول الرازي: الدليل دل على أن من قال إن الإله جسم فهو منكر للإله تعالى وذلك لأن إله العالم موجود ليس بجسم ولا حال في الجسم فإذا أنكر المجسم هذا الموجود فقد أنكر ذات الإله تعالى فالخلاف بين المجسم والموحد ليس في الصفة بل في الذات فصح في المجسم أنه لا يؤمن بالله (مفاتيح الغيب ـ ترقيم الشاملة موافق للمطبوع – 16 / 24)

2يقول القرطبي: الصحيح القول بتكفيرهم ، إذ لا فرق بينهم وبين عباد الأصنام والصور (تفسير القرطبي – 4 / 14)

3قال ابن تيمية: قولك إن كان منقسما كان مركبا وتقدم إبطاله تقدم الجواب عن هذا الذي سميته مركبا وتبين أنه لا حجة أصلا على امتناع ذلك بل بين أن إحالة ذلك تقتضي إبطال كل موجود ولولا أنه أحال على ما تقدم لما أحلنا عليه وتقدم بيان ما في لفظ التركيب والتحيز والغير والافتقار من الاحتمال وإن المعنى الذي يقصد منه بذلك يجب أن يتصف به كل موجود سواء كان واجبا أو ممكنا وإن القول بامتناع ذلك يستلزم السفسطة المحضة (بيان تلبيس الجهمية ج 1 ص 33).

4قال ابن تيمية: فهذا القول الوسط من أقوال القاضي الثلاثة هو المطابق لكلام أحمد وغيره من الأئمة وقد قال إنه تعالى في جهة مخصوصة وليس هو ذاهبا في الجهات بل هو خارج العالم متميز عن خلقه منفصل عنهم غير داخل في كل الجهات وهذا معنى قول أحمد “حد لا يعلمه إلا هو” ولو كان مراد أحمد رحمه الله الحد من جهة العرش فقط لكان ذلك معلوما لعباده فانهم قد عرفوا أن حده من هذه الجهة هو العرش فعلم أن الحد الذي لا يعلمونه مطلق لا يختص بجهة العرش (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج1/ص438).

5قال ابن تيمية: فأما كون الشيء غير موصوف بالزيادة والنقصان ولا بعدم ذلك وهو موجود وليس بذي قدر فهذا لا يعقل (بيان تلبيس الجهمية, ج3/ص146).

6قال ابن تيمية في الصفدية : وتبين أنه لا يمكن حدوث شيء من الحوادث إلا عن فاعل يفعل شيئا بعد شيء….” وقال: “الفعل لا يعقل ولا يمكن إلا شيئا فشيئاً….(الصفدية, 2/141)”

7قال ابن تيمية في الصفدية (2 / 97): وحينئذ فالذي هو من لوازم ذاته نوع الفعل لا فعل معين ولا مفعول معين فلا يكون في العالم شيء قديم وحينئذ لا يكون في الأزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء من العالم ولكن لم يزل مؤثرا تاما في شيء بعد شيء وكل أثر يوجد عند حصول كمال التأثير فيه.

8قال ابن تيمية في: وأعجب من ذلك حكايته الإجماع على كفر من نازع أنه سبحانه "لم يزل وحده، ولا شيء غيره معه، ثم خلق الأشياء كما شاء.(نقد مراتب الإجماع, 303)”

9قَالَ شَيْخنَا فِي شَرْح التِّرْمِذِيّ : الصَّحِيح فِي تَكْفِير مُنْكِر الْإِجْمَاع تَقْيِيدُهُ بِإِنْكَارِ مَا يُعْلَم وُجُوبُهُ مِنْ الدِّين بِالضَّرُورَةِ كَالصَّلَوَاتِ الْخَمْس ، وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ عَبَّرَ بِإِنْكَارِ مَا عُلِمَ وُجُوبه بِالتَّوَاتُرِ وَمِنْهُ الْقَوْل بِحُدُوثِ الْعَالَمِ ، وَقَدْ حَكَى عِيَاض وَغَيْره الْإِجْمَاع عَلَى تَكْفِير مَنْ يَقُول بِقِدَمِ الْعَالَم ، وَقَالَ اِبْن دَقِيق الْعِيد : وَقَعَ هُنَا مَنْ يَدَّعِي الْحِذْق فِي الْمَعْقُولَات وَيَمِيل إِلَى الْفَلْسَفَة فَظَنَّ أَنَّ الْمُخَالِف فِي حُدُوث الْعَالَم لَا يُكَفَّر لِأَنَّهُ مِنْ قَبِيل مُخَالَفَة الْإِجْمَاع ، وَتَمَسَّكَ بِقَوْلِنَا إِنَّ مُنْكِر الْإِجْمَاع لَا يُكَفَّر عَلَى الْإِطْلَاق حَتَّى يَثْبُتَ النَّقْلُ بِذَلِكَ مُتَوَاتِرًا عَنْ صَاحِب الشَّرْع ، قَالَ وَهُوَ تَمَسُّكٌ سَاقِط إِمَّا عَنْ عَمًى فِي الْبَصِيرَة أَوْ تَعَامٍ لِأَنَّ حُدُوث الْعَالَم مِنْ قَبِيل مَا اِجْتَمَعَ فِيهِ الْإِجْمَاع وَالتَّوَاتُر بِالنَّقْلِ (فتح الباري – العسقلاني, 12/202).